Essays on international capital flows by Brandão, Tatiana Glindmeier Didier
Essays on International Capital Flows
by
Tatiana Glindmeier Didier Brandao
B.S., Economics
Pontificia Universidade Cat61lica do Rio de Janeiro, 2001
Submitted to the Department of Economics
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
August 2008
© 2008 Tatiana Glindmeier Didier BrandAo.
All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce
and to distribute publicly paper and electronic
copies of this thesis document in whole or in part
in any medium known or hereafter created.
Signature of the
Certified by .....
MASSACHUSETS INSTITUTE
OFF
OCT 10 2008
LIBRARIES
A uthor ........................................ ................. ................................
Department of Economics
August 15 2008
....................... .. .  . . .... ...
Ricardo aballero
Ford International Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor
Certified by ..................................................... ................................
Guido Lorenzoni
Assistant Professor
S--- Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by .............. ............................... .......... ...... ........... .....
Peter Temin
Elisha Gray II Professor of Economics
Chairman, Department Committee on Graduate Students
ARCHIVES

Essays on International Capital Flows
by
Tatiana Glindmeier Didier Brandao
Submitted to the Department of Economics
on August 15 2008, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters on international capital flows. Chapter I
emphasizes the importance of innovations in the investment opportunity set, captured by
changes in expected asset returns, as an important mechanism to explain international
capital flows. More specifically, it analyzes the implications of time-varying portfolio
shares on the dynamics of the current account. The predictions of a partial-equilibrium
model of the current account, with dynamic portfolio choices, are evaluated using data for
the U.S. and Japan. We show that variations in investment opportunities change agents'
optimal portfolios in a direction consistent with the actual bilateral current account
movements. Chapter 2 focuses on two questions related to international investment and
access to international capital markets. First, does the structural change in the U.S. mutual
fund industry toward more "aggregation" (favoring funds that invest globally over funds
that invest in specific countries or regions) affect firms in other countries? And second, are
investors forgoing gains from international diversification by shifting toward more global
funds? The empirical evidence presented suggests that the answer is yes to both questions.
Chapter 3 investigates the relation between information asymmetries and institutional
investor mandate. The results suggest that information asymmetries vary across
institutional investor mandates, being significantly more pronounced for funds with broader
mandates.
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Introduction
I study three different aspects of international capital flows in this thesis. In the fist chapter,
my co-author and I focus on the dynamics of the financial account, empirically measured
by its accounting counterpart, the current account. In other words, the current account can
be understood as the outcome of investment decisions made by domestic and foreign
investors. Focusing on this asset allocation aspect of the problem, we analyze the
implications of time-varying portfolio shares on the dynamics of the current account. We
emphasize the importance of innovations in the investment opportunity set, captured by
changes in expected asset returns, as the main mechanism behind variations in countries'
portfolios. We evaluate the predictions of a partial-equilibrium model of the current
account, with dynamic portfolio choices. Using data for the U.S. and Japan, we show that
variations in investment opportunities change agents' optimal portfolios in a direction
consistent with the actual bilateral current account movements. Furthermore, we provide
econometric evidence of a robust positive relation between our predicted and the actual
bilateral current account series. Therefore, our approach highlights changes in expected
asset returns as an important mechanism to explain international capital flows.
In the second chapter, my co-authors and I study the lack of perfect international
diversification by analyzing unique micro data on U.S. institutional investors' foreign
holdings. This chapter focuses on two questions related to international investment and
access to international capital markets. First, does the structural change in the U.S. mutual
fund industry toward more "aggregation" (favoring funds that invest globally over funds
that invest in specific countries or regions) affect firms in other countries? And second, are
investors forgoing gains from international diversification by shifting toward more global
funds? We find that the answer is yes to both questions. In particular, we find that mutual
fund managers tend to invest in a finite - and rather small - number of stocks almost
independently of the level of country aggregation. In other words, the number of stocks in
a mutual fund portfolio does not tend to rise significantly as funds have a broader mandate
to invest in more countries. We also show that there are unexploited diversification gains
to be made, even when the both Specialized and Global funds are all part of the same
mutual fund family. The work has several important implications for emerging and
transitional economies trying to attract foreign capital and trying to develop their own
institutional investor bases. It sheds light on the scope of action that government and
companies have when attracting funds from international institutional investors.
Lastly, the third chapter expands the literature on the home bias that characterizes
international capital flows. In particular, two biases have been identified in the literature: a
foreign bias and an institutional investor bias. The first bias describes the fact that foreign
investors tend to hold assets from larger firms than domestic investors, whereas the second
one goes one step further and state that this is actually a feature of institutional investors,
independent of their nationality. Moreover, firm size is interpreted as a proxy for
information asymmetries. In this chapter, I further analyze this institutional investor bias.
The hypothesis is that there is actually heterogeneity in the institutional investor bias
across investors with different investment mandates. My main argument relies on
managers with different mandates facing different costs and benefits in gathering and
processing information. As the investment mandate becomes broader, informational costs
for a specific region becomes higher and benefits lower. Therefore, Global fund managers
would prefer to invest in larger firms, less prone to information asymmetries, than
Specialized fund managers. After controlling for transaction costs, liquidity, and other
direct and indirect barriers to international capital flows, I find strong evidence in favor of
our hypothesis. Hence, the results suggest that information asymmetries vary across
institutional investor mandates, being significantly more pronounced for funds with
broader mandates.
Chapter 1
The Current Account as a Dynamic
Portfolio Choice Problem
Co-author: Alexandre Lowenkron, Banco BBM
The current account can be understood as the outcome of investment decisions made by
domestic and foreign investors. Focusing on this asset allocation aspect of the problem, we
analyze the implications of time-varying portfolio shares on the dynamics of the current
account. We emphasize the importance of innovations in the investment opportunity set,
captured by changes in expected asset returns, as the main mechanism behind variations in
countries' portfolios. We evaluate the predictions of a partial-equilibrium model of the
current account, with dynamic portfolio choices. Using data for the U.S. and Japan, we
show that variations in investment opportunities change agents' optimal portfolios in a
direction consistent with the actual bilateral current account movements. Furthermore, we
provide econometric evidence of a robust positive relation between our predicted and the
actual bilateral current account series. Therefore, our approach highlights changes in
expected asset returns as an important mechanism to explain international capital flows.
"... specific trade-related factors cannot explain the magnitude of the U.S. current account
imbalance and its recent sharp rise. Rather, the U.S. trade balance is the tail of the dog,
for most part it has been passively determined by foreign and domestic incomes, asset
prices, interest rates, and exchange rates, which are themselves in turn the product of
more fundamental driving forces... " - Ben Bernanke (2005)
1.1. Introduction
In theory, the current account can be understood as the outcome of investment decisions
made by domestic and foreign investors. Empirically, we can study the outcome of these
decisions by analyzing a country's gross foreign asset positions. Factors that affect these
gross positions, such as asset returns and exchange rates, also have an impact on the
current account. Furthermore, the recent empirical literature on the dynamics of countries'
portfolios highlights the importance of their variations over time.' Thus, in this chapter, we
analyze the implications of changes in a country's optimal portfolio allocation for the
dynamics of the current account. In particular, we focus on time-varying optimal portfolio
shares caused by variations in the investment opportunity set. 2 Most significantly, we
empirically evaluate the relevance of these variations to explain movements in the current
account. We focus on the predictions of a partial-equilibrium model of the current account
with dynamic portfolio choice. In this model, time-varying investment opportunities,
captured by the dynamics of asset returns, are the main mechanism behind portfolio
rebalances. Therefore, our approach highlights changes in expected asset returns as an
important factor to explain international capital flows.
Although the current account is essentially an issue of portfolio allocation, standard
macroeconomic models have not incorporated this aspect of the problem until very
recently. Even then, commonly used models have static-like solutions with constant
See, for example, Calderon, Loayza, and Serven (2003), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005), and Gourinchas
and Rey (2006).
2 Other reasons for optimal portfolio reallocations have been suggested, namely time-varying preferences
(e.g. risk aversion), parameter uncertainty, and financial constraints.
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portfolios over time. For example, Kraay and Ventura (2000) use Merton's (1971) model
of portfolio allocation to analyze the current account. This model assumes constant asset
risk and return, and agents with log-utilities. The optimal portfolio allocation is thus
characterized by constant portfolio shares, implying that a country's net foreign asset
position is a constant fraction of its wealth. Therefore, this model highlights only a
portfolio growth component as an explanation for the dynamics of the current account.
On the other hand, in this chapter we focus on portfolio rebalancing as the driving
force behind the dynamics of the current account. We extend existing structural models of
the current account in order to incorporate the growing empirical evidence on the dynamics
of countries' portfolios. 3 More specifically, we emphasize the importance of innovations in
investment opportunities, captured by changes in expected asset returns, as the main
mechanism behind variations in countries' portfolios. Merton's (1971) portfolio model is
the foundation of our theoretical framework. By changing two central assumptions of
Merton's model, we are able to obtain a structural model of the current account with
dynamic portfolio choice. First, we assume that asset returns are non-i.i.d. and exploit their
predictability. Second, we depart from the assumption of a log utility function. To separate
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution from the relative risk aversion parameter, and
therefore to model savings and investment decisions separately, we assume agents with
Epstein-Zin utility function. We also assume a relative risk aversion parameter greater than
one. Both assumptions are important in obtaining time-varying optimal portfolio shares for
investors with long-term investment horizons. As already discussed, the main mechanism
behind optimal portfolio reallocations in our model is time-varying investment
opportunities, characterized by the dynamics of expected asset returns. The model allows
us to obtain clear predictions of this mechanism for the current account balance.4
Next, we empirically analyze the model's implications for the current account. Due
mostly to data availability, we focus on two countries and their bilateral current account.
3 See for example, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005).
4 In contrast to the approach taken by Kraay and Ventura (2000), our model can generate predictions for both
gross and net capital flows.
Campbell, Chan and Viceira's (2003) method is used to solve and estimate the model for
U.S. and Japanese investors. We present robust empirical evidence that time-varying
investment opportunities are important determinants of the dynamics of the bilateral
current account. We show that variations in expected asset returns change agents' optimal
portfolios in a direction consistent with the actual bilateral current account movements. We
also find that positive changes in the predicted bilateral current account are significantly
associated with improvements in the actual bilateral current account. Furthermore, we
provide robust evidence that predicted portfolio shares, combined with actual data on
savings and consumption instead of the model's predictions, can explain the dynamics of
the bilateral current account. Our empirical results thus provide strong support for the main
mechanism highlighted in this chapter.
Although our model effectively captures the dynamics of the bilateral current
account, it does not successfully explain the level of the bilateral current account. There are
two reasons for that. First, we do not impose either borrowing or short-selling constraints
in the model, and as a result, we allow leveraged portfolios. We are thus bound to obtain
larger and more volatile capital flows than actual ones. This problem is typical of models
which assume perfect mobility of capital flows. Similar implications have been reported in
portfolio allocation models by Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003), Evans and Hnatkovska
(2005), Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007), and Rapach and Wohar (2007).
Correcting this issue in a portfolio model with several assets is not simple, so we share this
problem with the rest of the literature.
Furthermore, similar models have been widely used to analyze issues of optimal
portfolio allocation. For example, Campbell and Viceira (1999), Campbell et al. (2001),
Normandin and St-Amour (2002, 2005), Watcher (2002), and Sangvinatsos and Watcher
(2005) highlight these models' success in explaining optimal portfolio choice in different
contexts. However, they acknowledge that they are not well-suited to capture the dynamics
of agents' wealth. The models predict rapidly growing wealth, low consumption-wealth
ratios, and relatively low consumption volatility. Nonetheless, the predicted dynamics of
consumption is reasonable: an investor wants more wealth in states when the marginal
utility is higher. Therefore, given our focus on changes in optimal portfolio allocation as an
explanation for movements in the current account, we believe that our model is appropriate.
It effectively captures variations in the optimal portfolio allocation caused by changes in
the investment opportunity set.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first article to empirically analyze the
relevance of changes in investment opportunities for the dynamics of the current account.
Although we develop our own theoretical framework, a few theoretical papers should be
mentioned.5 Devereux and Sutherland (2006) and Tille and van Wincoop (2007) highlight
the importance of time-varying portfolio shares in a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model with portfolio choice. In theoretical terms, they show the
importance of portfolio rebalancing for net and gross capital flows. Also from a theoretical
perspective, Evans and Hnatkovska (2005) and Hnatkovska (2006) use a general
equilibrium model with portfolio choice to discuss the size and volatility of capital flows
and their determinants. Closely related to the empirical findings of this chapter, Caballero,
Farhi, and Gourinchas (2007) discuss theoretically the possibility that a collapse in
financial development in Japan and emerging markets could have led to a sustained
reallocation of savings to the United States.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, we present
preliminary evidence to illustrate the empirical relevance of our argument. Section 1.3
presents our model of the current account with dynamic asset allocation. In Section 1.4, we
further develop our empirical analysis. We estimate the model for the U.S. and Japan and
compare its predictions with the actual bilateral current account data. Section 1.5 concludes
and is followed by the appendices.
5 From a different perspective, the International RBC literature has incorporated the effects of changes in the
productivity of physical capital on investment decisions. See, for example, Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland
(1992).
1.2. Preliminary Empirical Evidence
As a starting point to illustrate the empirical importance of portfolio rebalancing as
opposed to the portfolio growth component, a simple accounting exercise is helpful. A
country's wealth can be decomposed in to the sum of its net foreign asset positions and
domestic assets:
W, = NFA, + Dom.Assets, (1.1)
We can then define the portfolio share in net foreign assets as:
NFA, = a' . W, (1.2)
Next, differentiating this equation, we obtain the standard definition of the current
account:
ANFA, = Aa* W, + a*.AW,
Current Account Portfolio Rebalancing Portfolio Growth (1.3)
Component Component
Lastly, we perform a variance-decomposition analysis based on equation (1.3):
var(Aa* -W, + a' -AW,) = var(Aa' -W)+ var(a' -AW,)+ (1.4)
+ 2cov(Aa* W,a* AW,)
The results are shown in Table 1.1. High-income countries are shown in the top
panel, middle-income countries in the middle-panel, and low-income countries in the
bottom panel. 6 The first column on these tables, R-squared, reports how much of the
variation of the current account can be explained by these two components, the portfolio
growth and portfolio rebalancing. The other three columns report the three RHS variables
on equation (1.4), scaled by the LHS variable. Thus, these three columns should sum up to
one. Lastly, the final two columns report the relative size of the portfolio rebalancing and
portfolio growth components.
6 A detailed description of the data is presented in Section 1.4.
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For high-income countries, the portfolio rebalancing component is on average
three-times as large as the portfolio growth component. This is indeed the case for both the
U.S. and Japan for example. For middle-income countries, the same pattern is observed.
The portfolio rebalancing component is on average 2.5 times larger than the portfolio
growth component. In low-income countries, it is slightly smaller, but it is still double the
size of the portfolio growth factor. Although these average effects are large, there is
heterogeneity across countries. The portfolio growth component can be as large as 96% in
Belgium and 92% in the U.K. and Malaysia or as low as 37% in Argentina. But in either
scenario, portfolio rebalancing seems to be important to explain the dynamics of the
current account.
Next, we focus on the empirical relevance of changes in expected asset returns to
explain the dynamics of the current account. We thus graphically analyze the relation
between real asset returns and the current account. More specifically, we focus on two
countries and their bilateral current account, namely the U.S. and Japan. We compute the
expected real return differential between U.S. and Japanese assets. 7,8 Figure 1.1 shows the
results for long-term government bonds, averaged over decades.9 In this figure, a positive
real return differential implies that the return on a Japanese bond is larger than the return
on a U.S. bond. We also report the actual real return differential on these bonds. We plot
the U.S. bilateral current account with Japan in the bottom panel of Figure 1.1.
The patterns based on actual and expected returns are very similar and consistent
with the observed movements in the bilateral current account. For example, as the expected
return differential declines in the 70s and 80s, our theory would suggest that, ceteris
paribus, investors should shift their portfolios toward U.S. assets, implying a deterioration
in the bilateral current account. The actual data shows that the dynamics of the bilateral
current account supports this argument. Similarly, from the 80s to the 90s, the expected
7 As will become clear in Section 1.4, the empirical analysis of this chapter focuses on the bilateral current
account between the U.S. and Japan, as opposed to the total U.S. current account.8 Expected returns are calculated using a vector autoregression system (VAR) with past returns and other
gredictive variables identified in the finance literature. Our methodology is explained in Section 1.4.
The results are qualitatively similar if other assets are considered.
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return differential slightly increases. The mechanism highlighted in this chapter implies an
improvement in the bilateral current account, which is actually observed in the data. Lastly,
the reversal of the expected return differential from the 90s to the 00s - U.S. returns
become larger than Japanese ones - is also accompanied by a worsening of the bilateral
current account. Therefore, this preliminary evidence is consistent with the mechanism
proposed here: changes in expected returns can be an important factor behind the dynamics
of the current account.
We can further develop the argument behind this preliminary evidence. We propose
a simple reduced form model of the bilateral current account. We assume that ex-ante
domestic and foreign expected asset returns (both in levels and in differences), and
domestic and foreign savings can explain the dynamics of the bilateral current account,
from the perspective of a domestic investor. Expected asset returns are capturing changes
in investment opportunities as a driving force behind portfolio reallocations. For example,
as domestic expected asset returns increase, ceteris paribus, there is an incentive for both
domestic and foreign investors to rebalance their portfolios toward domestic assets.
Therefore, a decrease in foreign investments by domestic investors and an increase in
domestic investments by foreign investors imply a deterioration of the current account. The
opposite effect happens if foreign expected asset returns increase. Domestic and foreign
savings capture a portfolio growth effect. Larger domestic savings should imply larger
holdings of foreign assets, being thus associated with an improvement on the bilateral
current account. Conversely, if foreign savings increase, we should observe a negative
effect on the bilateral current account. Equation (1.5) summarizes this model:
BCA, = , + P (ER,+1 )+ + 2 (ER,+R) " + )P3 (ER,+, - E-tR,) + P4 (E,R1 - E-_R) (1.5)(1.5)
+ P5s;, + p6s,
We estimate this simple reduced-form model of the bilateral current account
between the U.S. (domestic) and Japan (foreign) from 1960 to 2005. The following assets
are considered: short-term and long-term government bonds and equities. The estimated
coefficients are correctly signed and statistically significant in both annual and quarterly
samples.'l Figure 1.2 plots the fitted values of this model. For comparison purposes, we
also show the results for a variant of Kraay and Ventura's (2000) model of the current
account. They use Merton's (1971) model, which assumes constant asset risk and return,
and agents with log-utilities. The optimal portfolio allocation is thus characterized by
constant portfolio shares. In other words, agents behave as mean-variance optimizers' A la
Markowitz-Tobin. This implies that a country's net foreign asset position is a constant
fraction of its wealth. As opposed to our reduced form model, Kraay and Ventura's model
emphasizes only a portfolio growth component. It does not incorporate a portfolio
rebalancing component.
As can be seen in Figure 1.2, our simple setup, with portfolio rebalancing effects,
explains the dynamics of the bilateral current account remarkably well. It provides us
preliminary evidence that portfolio rebalancing can be empirically important. More
specifically, it emphasizes that portfolio rebalances caused by changes in investment
opportunities can be empirically relevant in explaining current account movements. In the
next sections, we further develop the argument behind the preliminary evidence shown
here. We extend existing structural models of the current account in order to allow optimal
time-varying portfolio shares caused by changes in investment opportunities. We then
empirically evaluate the predictions of our model of the current account.
1.3. A Dynamic Portfolio Allocation Model of the Current Account
In this section, we present a structural model of the current account, with dynamic
portfolio choice. The main mechanism behind portfolio reallocations in our model is time-
varying investment opportunities, characterized by the dynamics of expected asset returns.
Therefore, this model provides a theoretical framework to further analyze the empirical
evidence shown in Section 1.2. It allows us to obtain clear predictions of the effects of
changes in expected returns on the current account balance.
10 See Appendix A for a detailed description of the estimated regressions.
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Our model is an extension of Merton's (1971) model to examine the dynamics of
the current account. Merton's model assumes agents with logarithmic utility functions and
i.i.d. asset returns. It thus implies that long-term investors behave as mean-variance
optimizers, choosing the same portfolio as a short-term investor. Given the assumptions,
the optimal portfolio allocation is characterized by constant portfolio shares. To obtain a
model with dynamic portfolio choice, we change two central assumptions of Merton's
model. We assume agents with an Epstein-Zin utility function and non-i.i.d. asset returns.
1.3.1. The Environment
The model is set in discrete time. We consider a partial equilibrium analysis in which
agents face exogenous asset returns. There is an arbitrary set of traded assets. We also
assume that all individuals are identical and have access to the same information set
regarding the current state of the world. This common-knowledge assumption is standard
in international macroeconomic models and it implies that capital flows in our model do
not result from differences of opinion on future asset returns or risks.
1.3.2. A Representative Country
Consider a country populated by identical and infinitely lived individuals whose
preferences are represented by Epstein-Zin (1989, 1991) recursive preferences defined
over their consumption stream:
U(C,, E, (U,,,))= k1 - )C>'-r/ + E, U(U(+ Y)/ ]9/Yr (1.6)
1-y
where 0 -1 - Ct is consumption at time t, 0 < 6 < 1 is the time discount factor, y > 0
is the relative risk aversion coefficient, and Ny > 0 is the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution.
This utility function nests as special cases the power utility specification, in which
the relative risk aversion (RRA) coefficient is the reciprocal of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution (EIS), and the log-utility specification, in which both parameters
are equal to one. Therefore, these preferences have the flexibility of modeling the EIS and
the RRA parameters separately. The former has first order effects on savings and
consumption decisions and only secondary effects on investment decisions. In contrast, the
RRA parameter is essential to portfolio allocation. Hence, this functional form disentangles
savings and portfolio allocation decisions."
We assume that individuals can invest in domestic and foreign assets. There are n
securities available for investment at home and n securities available abroad, so that 2n is
the total number of available securities. Therefore, the intra-temporal budget constraint can
be defined as:
W t = C, 
+ 
IA,, +  A~f,f ,  (1.7)
i=1 j=1
where W, is total wealth at time t, A,i,, + is the amount invested in domestic asset i at time t,
and A ,,+ is the amount invested in foreign assetj at time t.
The wealth accumulation equation can then be defined as:
W1+1 = AR,I, ,.,,I + ZR;*+,A;1,+,, (1.8)
i=1 j=1
where Rit+i is the gross real return on domestic asset i from time t to time t+l, and R;j,t+,
is the gross real return on foreign assetj from time t to time t+1.
As can be seen from equations (1.7) and (1.8), we do not model labor income. The
income available for consumption at time t is given by the returns on portfolio holdings
and by the sales of these assets (short sales are allowed). This country's GDP can be
interpreted as the total real return on domestic assets, independently of who owns them.
From equation (1.7), we can define portfolio shares a, - A,, /(W, - C,):
" The reason for this particular utility function as opposed to a more standard power utility function will
become clear in Section 1.3.4.
Ai,+, + A;.,+, = W, -C,
Z[A,,+, /(+W -C,)]+ z[A,+, /(W, -C,)]= 1
i
where a,., is the proportion of a country's wealth, net of consumption, invested in a
domestic asset i from t to t+l, and a ,, is the proportion of a country's available wealth
invested in foreign assetj from t to t+1.
The real portfolio return, Rp,,+i, is thus given by:
n n
R, = Za ,,R,,,+ +Za R, R+ 1. (1.9)
i=1 j=1
Finally, equations (1.7), (1.8), and (1.9) can be combined in order to obtain the
intertemporal budget constraint:
Wt+ 1 = R,,+, (W, - C,). (1.10)
In summary, the problem faced by individuals in this representative country is to
choose consumption (Ct) and portfolio shares (a,) that maximize (1.6) subject to (1.10),
given an initial level of wealth Wo. We thus allow countries to differ in their size, i.e.,
investors from different countries can start with different levels of wealth, Wo. In this setup,
Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) show that investor's optimal consumption and savings
decisions must satisfy the following Euler equation:
E{ J[(C,,, /C,) ]R 4 ' Rk,+1 = 1, Vk, (1.11)
where Rk,t+1 is the gross real return on any asset, including the portfolio itself.
When investment opportunities are constant, portfolio shares are also constant,
implying that Rp,,t+ is time-invariant. Thus, the optimal consumption policy, characterized
by equation (1.11), implies a constant consumption-wealth ratio. It also entails a constant
portfolio share in all available assets. In other words, agents behave as short-term investors
and optimally choose a "myopic" portfolio allocation. To obtain dynamic portfolio choices,
we relax the hypothesis of constant investment opportunities over time. In our setup, a
relative risk aversion parameter greater than one is a sufficient condition for the optimal
portfolio allocation to be dynamic (non-myopic) if asset returns are non-i.i.d.' 2 Thus, we
assume a relative risk aversion parameter greater than one.
Therefore, to model time-varying investment opportunities, we explore the
empirical evidence that financial asset returns are predictable to some extent. 13 For
example, Amromin and Sharpe (2005) provide empirical evidence based on survey data
suggesting, for example, that expected stock returns are extrapolated from actual returns.
We thus assume that asset returns follow a first-order vector autoregression (VAR).' 4 This
assumption captures the history-dependence of expected returns. The empirical finance
literature has identified several predictive variables, besides the historical values of asset
returns themselves. Nominal yield on short-term bonds, the term spread, and earnings-to-
price ratio have been documented to forecast asset returns on many asset classes. Thus, we
also use these predictive variables (st,) to estimate expected returns.
Define a vector zt+l containing the log real return of a benchmark asset (rl,t+l), log
excess returns of domestic and foreign assets, i.e. (ri,t+, - r,.t+,) and (r.*j,+i - r.,t+,), and other
state variables (st+i) used to predict asset returns:
z,= x+1 . where x, 1, = ,J, (1.12)
12 See Campbell and Viceira (2002) for an extensive study on strategic asset allocation.
13 See Fama and Schwert (1977), Shiller, Campbell, Schoenholtz, and Weiss (1983), Campbell (1987),
Campbell and Shiller (1988), Fama and French (1988, 1989, 1992), and more recently, Watcher and
Warusawitharana (2007), among many others.
14 Several papers have used a similar specification, for example, Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003),
Campbell, Viceira and White (2003), Barberis (2000), Normandin and St-Amour (2002, 2005), among many
others.
and where rlt+l is the log real return on the benchmark asset, and xt+ is the vector of log
excess returns, measured as excess returns over this benchmark asset.
As mentioned above, we assume that z,t+ I follows a VAR(l) process:
Zt+ I = (1 + ( I I t+I
id. at U (1.13)where v+, - N(O, 1 ,)and IV =  IX (1.13)xx XS
We allow shocks to be cross-sectionally correlated, but homoskedastic and
independently distributed over time. In other words, we assume that state variables are not
able to predict changes in asset risk. Therefore, only changes in expected asset returns, not
changes in expected asset risks, affect portfolio choices. Even though this assumption may
be unrealistic, it is not restrictive from the perspective of long-term portfolio allocation.
The empirical evidence suggests that changes in risk are not persistent enough to have
large effects on portfolio choices.' 5
1.3.3. The Current Account
At every period, agents decide how to allocate their wealth, net of consumption, among
available financial assets. By analyzing this portfolio choice, it is possible to determine the
total wealth allocated to domestic and foreign assets at each point in time. More
specifically, we can determine the optimal portfolio allocation. Therefore, obtaining an
expression for the current account balance is straightforward.
The current account balance of the Home country (H) can be defined as domestic
savings minus investment in domestic assets: CA, = St - I,. Using equations (1.7) and (1.8),
it is clear that domestic savings must equal domestic and foreign investments made by
domestic agents. Hence, domestic savings are given by:
15 See Campbell (1987), Harvey (1989, 1991), and Chacko and Viceira (2005).
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St = '(A,.,- A)+ I(AH+ j ). (1.14)
Investment in domestic assets is given by the change in holdings of all domestic
assets, aggregated across all countries (c) that have access to domestic assets:
I, = (A,'I,, - A,). (1.15)
Thus, the current account balance of the Home country is defined as (1.14)-( 1.15):
c*H i
Similarly, the Home country bilateral current account with a Foreign country (F)
can be defined as:
BCA = [H (W," -C)-a ,_(W,, CH,)]BCAHF, Z[a(, IC,) 1- 
-
1 1C-
jeF
(1.17)
- [aF,(W," -C )-a -••_  -CF )1
Equations (1.16) and (1.17) clearly show how changes in wealth and optimal
portfolio shares affect the bilateral and the total current account balances, respectively.
Therefore, in order to explain the dynamics of the (bilateral) current account, we need an
explicit solution for these time-varying optimal portfolio shares and for the dynamics of
wealth. More specifically, in the case of the bilateral current account, we need these
solutions for both Home and Foreign countries.
1.3.4. Model's Approximate Solution
Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003) show that there is no closed-form solution for this
multivariate model of strategic asset allocation. However, they propose an approximate
solution method. They show that we can reduce this model to an approximate system of
linear-quadratic equations for portfolio weights and consumption as functions of the state
variables. Therefore, we follow their procedure in order to obtain an approximate solution
to our model.
The solution to our model is characterized by three equations: the portfolio return,
the inter-temporal budget constraint of the representative country, and the Euler equation.
We can rewrite equation (1.9), which characterizes the gross portfolio real return, in the
following way:
R,,,, = a,, (R+,,, I - R 1,, ) + a , (R~,,, - R,,,,) + R,,,, ,  (1.18)
i=2 j=1
where the first asset, whose real return is given by R,,,,+, is a domestic short-term
instrument used as a benchmark asset. Even though asset returns are measured relative to
this benchmark asset, it is not assumed to be riskless. This benchmark asset is subject to
short-term inflation risk. The log return on the portfolio can then be approximated as:
rp,,+ r,+., +a,'x,+ +l a,'(c"~ -aI a,), (1.19)
where o-2  diag(x,) is a vector containing the variance of excess asset returns, and a, is
a vector of portfolio shares. This approximation holds exactly in continuous time and it is
highly accurate for short-time intervals. 16
The next equation is the budget constraint, equation (1.10). Log-linearizing it
around the unconditional mean of the log consumption-wealth ratio, we obtain the
following expression for the wealth dynamics:
Aw,+l ~rp,,+, + i(c, - w,)+ k, (1.20)
where p = 1 - exp(E[c, - w, ]) and k - log(p) + (1 - p) log(1 - p)/ p.
16 This approximation to the log return on the portfolio has the effect of ruling out the possibility of
bankruptcy. See Campbell and Viceira (2002), pp. 28-29.
28
This form of the budget constraint is exact if the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (V/) is equal to 1, in which case p = 6 and c, - w, is constant.
Lastly, we apply a second-order Taylor expansion to the Euler equation (1.11)
around the conditional means of Ac,,,, rp,+,, rk,+1 to obtain:
Olog 6 - E, Ac,, - (1 - O)E,rp,,,, + E, r,,,
- - (1.21)
This form of the Euler equation is exact if consumption and asset returns are jointly
log-normally distributed, e.g. when V = 1.
In sum, the model's approximate solution can be described by these three equations,
(1.19), (1.20), and (1.21). The optimal solution is accurate for an elasticity of intertemporal
substitution around one, independent of the value of the relative risk aversion parameter."7
A model with a distinction between these two parameters is essential to the empirical
evidence presented in the next section. We evaluate the sensitivity of the optimal portfolio
allocation to different values of the relative risk aversion parameter. In the power utility
case, as we increase the relative risk aversion parameter, the model solution becomes
inaccurate. However, with the Epstein-Zin utility function, we have the autonomy to do so
without interfering with the accuracy of the solution. This reason underpins our focus on
an Epstein-Zin utility function as opposed to the more standard power utility function.
Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003) show that the optimal portfolio choice is linear
in the VAR state vector. It is characterized by the following optimal portfolio allocation:
a, = Ao + A,z,, (1.22)
17 This is reasonably consistent with recent estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for
stockholders reported in Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio (2003). However,
this parameter for non-stockholders is typically below unity, as are estimates based on aggregate data. See
Hall (1988) and Yogo (2004).
where
Y+ 2 x +-
A i XH1  +i 1- -(A}
and A0 and A, are constants.
They also show that the optimal consumption rule is quadratic in this VAR state
vector. It is given by:
c, - w, = -py/log5 - pX,, + p(l -y)E,(rp,1 +) + pk + pE,(c,+ - w,+), (1.23)
where E, (rp,+, ) and Z',, are quadratic functions of the VAR state variables.
A numerical recursive procedure, described in Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003),
is used to solve for the optimal consumption and portfolio shares. Using equation (1.17),
we are thus able to construct a measure of the predicted current account balance based on
this model of the current account with dynamic portfolio choice.
1.4. An Application to the U.S. Bilateral Current Account with Japan
In this section, we present a quantitative analysis of the framework developed in Section
1.3. More specifically, we focus on the bilateral current account between the U.S. and
Japan. The model yields optimal portfolio rules that are linear in the vector of state
variables. Therefore, we empirically evaluate time-varying portfolio shares, caused by
changes in expected asset returns, as an explanation for the actual dynamics of the U.S.
bilateral current account with Japan. We estimate our model separately for investors in the
U.S. (Home) and in Japan (Foreign) from 1960 to 2005. We then construct the time series
of portfolio weights for each country, i.e., a j, and a,,,. After aggregating foreign holdings
for both countries, we present a first round of empirical evidence. We analyze whether
variations in expected asset returns change agents' optimal portfolios in a direction
consistent with the actual bilateral current account movements. Next, we combine these
optimal portfolio weights, according to equation (1.17), to obtain our predicted measure of
the bilateral current account. We take into consideration differences in the countries' sizes.
We then evaluate whether our predicted measure can explain the dynamics of the actual
bilateral current account data. Finally, as a robustness exercise, we construct a hybrid
version of equation (1.17): we use the optimal portfolio shares combined with actual data
on wealth, savings, and consumption. We thus obtain another measure of the predicted
current account. We re-estimate the relation between the predicted and the actual bilateral
current accounts. In summary, we provide strong empirical evidence that changes in
investment opportunities are an important mechanism behind the dynamics of the bilateral
current account between the U.S. and Japan.
1.4.1. Why the Bilateral Current Account between the U.S. and Japan?
A large number of countries have significant exposure to U.S. assets. An empirical
analysis of the mechanism highlighted in this chapter for the total U.S. current account
would thus require an estimation of the model for all these different countries. Moreover,
many assets would need to be considered in our quantitative analysis. By focusing on two
countries and their bilateral current account, we only need to analyze the behavior of
investors from these two countries. Hence, we empirically study the U.S. and Japan and
their bilateral current account. In this case, only U.S. holdings of Japanese assets and
Japanese holdings of U.S. assets matter.
There are many reasons for choosing the U.S. and Japan in our empirical exercise.
The first one is data availability. Bilateral current account data between the U.S. and Japan,
Canada, or the U.K. is available since 1960 on a quarterly basis. The data for other
countries starts in the late 1970s, and therefore, has an insufficient time span for our
purposes. Furthermore, in our empirical exercise, we use asset returns on stock markets,
government bonds, and private firm profits (return on equity). This last variable is not
available for the U.K. and Canada, although we could have excluded it from our analysis.
Second, Japan was economically relevant for international capital flows from 1960
to 2006. Both the U.S. and Japan are representatives of the so-called "global
imbalances."18 Figure 1.3 plots the current account balance as a percentage of world GDP
for countries with the largest current account deficits or surpluses in the world. The current
account deficit in the U.S. was soaring and reached 7% of its own GDP in 2005 - almost
2% of world GDP. Japan has long been the country with the largest current account surplus.
Furthermore, the U.S. and Japanese current account balances were mirror images of each
other until the late 90s, suggesting that they could have had a large counterpart in each
other's balances. Moreover, the importance of the U.S. and Japan was even larger when
their external wealth is considered. As pointed out by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005),
Japan was by far the largest net creditor in international investment positions and the U.S.
the largest net debtor in international investment positions.
Third, the total U.S. current account and the U.S.-Japan bilateral current account
have similar dynamics. This is highlighted in Figure 1.4, which plots these series as a
percentage of U.S. GDP. Movements in the total U.S. current account clearly resemble
movements in the U.S. bilateral current account with Japan. Thus, determinants of the
bilateral current account could indeed be relevant to the understanding of factors affecting
the total U.S. current account.
Lastly, it is well known that countries' portfolios are subject to home bias - that is,
portfolio composition tends to be biased toward domestic assets. For example, institutional
investors in the U.S. held only 11% of their portfolios in foreign equity and bonds in 2003.
A similar pattern is observed in Japan, where institutional investors held only 16% of their
portfolios abroad in 2003.19 Although domestic residents hold the majority of their assets
in their own countries, a large number of foreign investors, if allowed, tend to hold these
foreign assets as well. Survey data published by the U.S. Department of the Treasury
shows that residents of Japan were the largest foreign portfolio investors in U.S. securities
IS See Eichengreen (2006) and Bernanke (2005), among others.
'9 See IMF (2005).
by a wide margin in 2005.20 They held US$1.1 trillion (or 16% of the total holdings of U.S.
securities by foreign investors), whereas residents of the U.K., the second major investing
country, had holdings of US$0.56 trillion, only half the holdings of Japanese investors.
Previous surveys show that this pattern is stable over time. For example, in 1994, when the
first survey was conducted, Japan held 18% of the total foreign holdings of U.S. securities.
At the same time, Japan has consistently been one of the main destinations of foreign
purchases of securities by U.S. residents. U.S. investors held around 10% of total market
capitalization of equity markets in Japan in 2005.21 Moreover, in 1994 U.S. residents
invested 15% of their foreign portfolio holdings in Japan - the country that attracted the
largest share of U.S. portfolio investments abroad. A more recent survey shows that Japan
is still a large destination for U.S. funds, attracting 12% of U.S. holdings of foreign
securities in 2005. Although no data is available on the holdings of other foreign investors
in Japan (or even other holdings of Japanese investors), the evidence presented here
suggests that the U.S. has been a major participant in this market.
By focusing on the U.S. and Japan and their bilateral current account, given the
evidence presented above, we are analyzing the two largest holders of U.S. securities: U.S.
investors themselves and Japanese investors, the largest foreign holders. We also examine
large holders of Japanese securities: Japanese investors themselves and U.S. investors. In
sum, U.S. and Japanese investors together are possibly the largest holders of U.S. and
Japanese securities. Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests that U.S. and Japanese
investors hold the majority of their portfolios in the U.S. and Japan themselves. Therefore,
this empirical evidence, combined with the data presented in Figure 1.4, suggests that U.S.
and Japanese assets are the most relevant assets affecting the bilateral current account
between the U.S. and Japan, and possibly the total U.S. current account. We thus assume in
our empirical exercise that U.S. and Japanese investors can only hold assets from either the
U.S. or Japan. Because of the limited time span of our sample, we do not consider other
assets; four decades of data would not be enough for an estimation of our VAR system. On
20 See "Report on U.S. Portfolio Holdings of Foreign Securities," U.S. Department of the Treasury.
21 See "Report on Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities," U.S. Department of the Treasury.
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the other hand, we assume that investors from other countries can hold assets anywhere,
including the U.S. and Japan. Thus, if a Japanese investor decides to sell some of her
holdings, a U.S. investor does not need to buy them. In other words, we are considering a
partial-equilibrium analysis. We are fully aware of the limitations of this last assumption.
Including assets from other countries in the analysis could significantly change the
calculated optimal portfolio allocation among the assets actually considered here.
Therefore, we tried to include assets from a "third" country in our empirical analysis.
According to the survey evidence reported by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the
U.K. and the Euro-area as a whole are the relevant candidates. Thus, we included in our
exercise assets from either the U.K. or Germany, the latter as a representative of Euro-area
assets. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones presented in this chapter and,
therefore, not reported. Moreover, if the inclusion of other relatively large investors does
not qualitatively change our empirical analysis, the inclusion of other smaller investors is
similarly unlikely to affect our results.
1.4.2. Data Description
We use quarterly data extending from the second quarter of 1960 to the third quarter of
2005. As already discussed, we consider financial assets from the U.S. and Japan. The data
was obtained from Global Financial Database, the financial statements from the Ministry
of Finance in Japan, and the U.S. Flow of Funds Accounts calculated by the U.S. Federal
Reserve. The following asset classes are considered in the analysis: stocks, short-term
government bonds, long-term government bonds, and private firms' profits (ROE). U.S.
stock returns are calculated as returns on the S&P 500 index, and Japanese stock returns
are given by the returns on the Tokyo Stock Exchange Topix All Shares Index. The U.S.
and Japanese returns on short-term interest rates are the quarterly returns implied by the
Fed Funds rate and the Japanese Discount rate, respectively. The return on long-term
government bonds is calculated as the return on 10-year constant maturity U.S.
government bonds and as the return on 7-year Japanese government bonds. Government
bonds of longer maturity were not available for Japan. ROE is constructed as the total
operational profits divided by capital (net worth).
Our model is written in real terms. Therefore, our benchmark asset is the ex-post
real return on short-term government bonds. More specifically, the benchmark asset is the
real return on a U.S. short-term bond for a U.S. investor and a Japanese short-term bond
for a Japanese investor. Real returns are constructed as the difference between the log
return on an asset and the log of CPI-inflation. In our theoretical framework, investors
analyze excess returns over the benchmark asset. Thus, all excess returns are calculated as
the log difference between the real return on a specific asset and the real return on the
appropriate benchmark asset, both denominated in the same currency. We use the log
change of the real exchange rate to convert returns to a common currency. We define the
log real exchange rate as the sum of log nominal exchange rate and log domestic CPI less
the log foreign CPI. Lastly, we use variables known to predict asset returns, such as
nominal short-term yield (3-month T-Bills), price-to-earnings ratio, and the nominal term
spread in government bonds.
Table 1.2 reports the summary statistics for real asset returns denominated in local
currency. Data is in annualized percentage units. It shows the sample average and the
standard deviations of the quarterly asset returns used in the analysis. The table also reports
these sample statistics for the CPI-inflation rates and the real exchange rate. Among the
U.S. assets, the short-term government bond is the safest asset, with an average real return
of 1.8% p.a., and equities are the riskiest asset, with larger real returns, 7.1% p.a. on
average. A similar pattern is observed in Japan. Stocks are also the riskiest asset class and
short-term government bonds, the safest, with average real returns of 7.6% p.a. and 0.4%
p.a., respectively. Average inflation rates are smaller in Japan than in the U.S., but more
volatile. Lastly, the real exchange rate shows, on average, an appreciation of the Japanese
yen against the U.S. dollar in our sample from 1960 to 2005.
We have tested all series of asset returns for unit roots using Augmented Dickey-
Fuller tests. These tests strongly reject unit roots in all data series considered, except for
the returns on U.S. long-term government bonds. However, we recognize the low power of
these tests and the evidence in favor of mean-reversion in the long run, and assume U.S.
long-term bonds to be stationary.22 Our VAR estimations also include the CPI-inflation
rates, the nominal exchange rate, or the real exchange rate, depending on the specification
considered. Both CPI-inflation rates are stationary according to Augmented Dickey-Fuller
tests. These tests on the nominal exchange rate and the real exchange rate could not reject
the existence of a unit root. However, the empirical evidence on the stationarity of
exchange rates is highly controversial.23 Therefore, in order to show the robustness of our
results, we present them considering exchange rates in levels or in differences, or no
exchange rate at all.
Besides asset returns, our empirical analysis also uses data on the bilateral current
account between the U.S. and Japan, total wealth, national savings, national consumption,
and GNP. The bilateral current account data is from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
We follow the methodology described in Kraay, Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2005) to
construct measures of total wealth. National savings, national consumption, and GNP are
from IMF's International Financial Statistics.
1.4.3. VAR Estimation
Our empirical results depend on the estimation of the system of equations (1.13). We thus
report the estimations based on five different specifications of this VAR system.24 Through
the rest of the chapter, we report results for all these specifications. We show that the
expected asset returns obtained from these different estimations have similar dynamics. We
will argue that our empirical analysis is robust to these different estimations. In other
words, the portfolio allocations implied by these different VAR systems are similar in their
composition, and thus lead to similar predictions for the bilateral current account between
the U.S. and Japan.
22 Excluding this variable from the analysis does not qualitatively change the results.
23 See Rogoff(1996), Imbs, Mumtaz, Ravn, and Rey (2005), and Chen and Engel (2004).
24 We have analyzed more than these five reported specifications, but choose not to report them here. The
results are qualitatively similar to those shown in this chapter.
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In our theoretical model, we have assumed that investors from both countries have
access to the same information set. They use the same model and know the current state of
the world. Therefore, to characterize the dynamics of asset returns, we estimate a single
VAR that treats Home and Foreign symmetrically. 25 The single framework described in
this section summarizes concisely the information set available to both investors, although
it is not in the format of the system of equations (1.13). In Appendix B, we show how to
obtain the parameters of the system of equations (1.13) for each investor from these
estimated VARs.
When estimating these VARs, we have imposed the following restriction: the
unconditional means of the variables implied by the estimated coefficients should be equal
to their full-sample arithmetic counterparts. Moreover, the estimated systems might be
subject to finite sample bias. However, bias corrections are complex in a multivariate
system. Thus, no corrections were attempted here. Instead, the estimated coefficients are
taken as given and known by investors.
As already mentioned, we estimate five different specifications of this system of
equations. The following variables are considered: real asset returns in local currency,
predictive variables (nominal yield on T-Bills, price-earnings ratio, and the term spread),
the nominal and real exchange rates, and the inflation rates for both countries. The first
estimated system includes only real asset returns and predictive variables for both the U.S.
and Japan. This is our basic VAR.26 The other estimated VARs add control variables to
this basic system. Our second specification includes the real exchange rate in levels. The
third one adds the real exchange rate in differences instead of levels to the basic system.
Our fourth specification includes the nominal exchange rate and the CPI-inflation rates.
25 One of the VAR specifications considered here cannot be estimated by this unified framework; other
control variables are needed. Thus, in this particular case, separate VARs are estimated for U.S. and Japanese
investors.
26 This system cannot be estimated by our single unified framework - other control variables are necessary.
One VAR was estimated for U.S. investors with all variables denominated in U.S. dollars, and another VAR
was estimated for Japanese investors with all variables denominated in Japanese yen.
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Lastly, our fifth specification expands the basic VAR system by including the nominal
exchange rate in differences and the CPI-inflation rates.
We report only the estimation of the VAR system based on our second
specification in order to save space. 27 The results are presented in Table 1.3. The estimated
coefficients are comparable to the ones identified in the finance literature. 28 The
coefficients in all equations are jointly significant at the standard significance level, as can
be seen from the low p-values of the F-statistics. The U.S. short-term return is significantly
explained by the short-term nominal yield and the term spread with a positive coefficient,
however, its own lagged value is not significant. The R-squared is similar to what has been
found in other studies. The same variables significantly explain U.S. long-term
government bond returns. U.S. stock returns are negatively related to price-earnings ratio.
No other variable is significant in this equation. Stock returns have proven rather difficult
to predict, and, as expected, this equation has the lowest R-squared. U.S. ROE, U.S. short-
term bond yield, and the U.S. price-earnings ratio are significantly explained by their own
lagged values, illustrating that a univariate AR(I) process could describe them reasonably
well. The results for the Japanese real returns are less typical than the ones for U.S. assets.
Most of the predictive variables do not significantly explain asset returns, which in turn
can be explained mostly by their own lagged values. However, empirical evidence on
Japanese returns is scarce. Therefore, we do not lengthen our discussion here.
As already highlighted, the model uses the information on expected asset returns.
Table 1.4 reports summary statistics of expected real asset returns implied by the estimated
VARs. They are reported in local currency. Common across all specifications, short-term
government bonds are the safest asset. In both U.S. and Japanese markets, stocks are the
riskiest asset. Therefore, the basic mean-variance pattern of actual returns is reflected in
these expected returns. Furthermore, the standard deviation of expected real returns is
stable across different specifications. Although they consistently increase when the
27 The other estimated VARs are qualitatively similar and the results are available upon request.
28 See Fama and Schwert (1977), Shiller, Campbell, Schoenholtz, and Weiss (1983), Campbell and Shiller
(1988), Fama and French (1988, 1989, 1992), Hodrick (1992), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), Ang and
Bekaert (2006), Campbell and Yogo (2006), among many others.
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nominal exchange rate and the CPI-inflation rates are included in the VAR (instead of the
real exchange rate), they do so by less than 1% p.a. Thus, these measures of expected
returns seem robust to different system estimations. The real expected returns are on
average equal to actual returns, given the in-sample predictions considered here.
Nevertheless, they are much less volatile than actual returns (summary statistics reported in
Table 1.2). In other words, these real expected returns are more persistent than the actual
real returns.
Although this data in local currency is informative, investors actually consider real
returns in their own currency. We thus calculate them in a common currency, the U.S.
dollar, to better understand the implications of these expected real returns to U.S. and
Japanese investors. The results were reported in Figure 1.1, Section 1.2. This figure shows
that the expected real return differential between U.S. and Japanese long-term government
bonds are consistent with the dynamics of the U.S. bilateral current account with Japan.
This preliminary evidence thus supports the mechanism proposed in this chapter: changes
in expected real returns can be an important factor behind the dynamics of the current
account.
1.4.4. Optimal Portfolio Choice and the Bilateral Current Account
Using the estimated VAR coefficients, the model is calibrated using different relative risk
aversion parameters (y). As already mentioned, the model's calibration is accurate for
elasticities of intertemporal substitution around 1. Therefore, results are reported for
different risk aversion coefficients, but we assume that V/ = 0.99 and 5 = 0.92 in annual
terms.29 We first calculate each country's optimal allocation to foreign assets. For a U.S.
investor, this optimal allocation is the sum of all holdings in Japanese assets. Similarly, for
a Japanese investor, it is the share of Japanese post-consumption wealth invested in U.S.
assets. Formally, we obtain the time series of a*" and a,•
29 The results are robust to different parameter values of the time discount factor and the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, as long as these values are close enough to 1.
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-- = stb, b,t11  stocks,t ROE, t  (1.25)
Figure 1.5 plots the time series of a,H ,(-a,), and the U.S. bilateral current
account with Japan. The negative of the optimal Japanese portfolio shares allocated to U.S.
assets is the relevant variable to the U.S. bilateral current account according to equation
(1.17). These optimal portfolio shares are calculated based on the VAR specification with
real exchange rates. We plot the series for a relative risk aversion of 10 and 100.30
Even though this figure addresses only part of the story, it sheds some light on
agents' behavior. The main mechanism behind the time-varying portfolio shares in our
model is the expected changes in asset returns across the different assets. If we assume a
permanent improvement in the U.S. investment opportunity set and everything else
remains unchanged, then, according to our model, an investor should increase her portfolio
share on U.S. assets. If this investor is Japanese, she would increase her holdings of U.S.
assets. If a U.S. investor is considered, her holdings of Japanese assets should fall. This
implies, ceteris paribus, that the U.S. bilateral current account with Japan should worsen.
The reported results are robust to the exclusion of individual assets and to different
parameter values. Although the dynamics of optimal portfolio shares does not change
considerably with the relative risk aversion parameter, the average values of a*,H and a,F
are highly sensitive to this parameter. When a smaller value of the relative risk aversion
parameter is used, individual portfolio shares are extremely high - because of leveraged
portfolios. Reasonable values for these shares are obtained only when larger parameter
values are considered. In our model with exogenous asset returns and endogenous
portfolios, agents take advantage of any small excess risk-adjusted returns. High levels of
relative risk aversion are thus needed to discourage excessive portfolio leverage. This
30 The empirical evidence on the equity premium puzzle suggests values between 0 and 60 (see Ait-Sahalia
and Lo (2000)). See also Mehra and Prescott (1985), Epstein and Zin (1991), Cochrane and Hansen (1992),
Jorion and Giovannini (1993), and Normandin and St-Amour (1998).
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parameter might be capturing the model's sensitivity to the well-known equity premium
puzzle, extensively documented in the international finance literature.
Given the mechanism highlighted in this chapter and the estimated expected asset
returns, the pattern of increased weight on U.S. assets reported in Figure 1.5 is striking.
The correlation coefficient between these two measures is around 0.75, varying little with
the relative risk aversion parameter. The fit of the graphs is remarkable, especially if one
considers that only information on asset returns was used. Therefore, the main argument in
this chapter relies on these figures: optimal portfolio reallocations, caused by
improvements in the U.S. investment opportunity set relative to its Japanese counterpart,
are partly responsible for the shift of the countries' portfolios toward U.S. assets in recent
decades.
Formally, a regression analysis confirms the evidence from the figures. The results
are reported in Tables 1.5A and 1.5B for different values of the relative risk aversion
parameter, for our five different VAR specifications, and for U.S. and Japanese investors,
respectively. Three different regressions are reported: a basic specification that regresses
the bilateral current account on contemporaneous and lagged optimal portfolio shares, the
basic specification with a time trend, and the basic specification with a lagged dependent
variable. We have no priors with respect to the magnitude of these coefficients. However,
our theoretical framework, summarized in equation (1.17), allows us to sign them.
Increases in the optimal portfolio shares abroad should be associated with positive changes
in the U.S. bilateral current account with Japan, if a U.S. investor is considered. On the
other hand, if a Japanese investor is considered, such increases should be related to
negative changes in the bilateral current account. The results confirm these priors. They are
also consistent across the different regression specifications, different measures of
expected returns, and different risk aversion parameters. It should be noted that the
regression coefficients increase in magnitude as the relative risk aversion parameter
increases. This simply reflects the smaller portfolio shares, as observed in Figure 1.5: the
larger the risk aversion parameter, the smaller the shares. Lagged values of optimal
portfolio shares tend not to be significant, although correctly signed. The R-squared
obtained from the basic regression specification is between 0.39 and 0.58, though it is not
reported. If a time trend or a lagged dependent variable is added, the R-squared increases
to values around 0.63 and 0.92, respectively. Thus, in this section, we show that variations
in investment opportunities change agents' optimal portfolios in a direction consistent with
actual bilateral current account movements.31
1.4.5. The Bilateral Current Account: Predicted vs. Actual Values
Going one step further, we use the model's calibrated wealth and consumption to fit
equation (1.17). Our predicted measure of the bilateral current account is scaled by U.S.
wealth, the stock variable of our model. We thus need to make an assumption about
relative country sizes in order to aggregate U.S. and Japanese investors. We assume U.S.
wealth is four times Japanese wealth when denominated in the same currency. This
assumption is consistent with actual data on total wealth for these countries.
Table 1.6 shows our econometric analysis based on the predicted bilateral current
account. We report the regression results based on a quarterly sample. Once more, four
different regression specifications are analyzed. First, our basic specification considers a
regression of the actual bilateral current account on our predicted measure. The second
specification adds a time trend to the basic specification. Given the highly persistent
dynamics of the current account, our third specification adds a lag of both dependent and
independent variables. Finally, the fourth specification considers these variables in
differences. As shown in previous tables, we report the results for our five different
measures of expected returns. Furthermore, we have shown that our measures of optimal
portfolio allocation are similar across different levels of risk aversion. The results in this
section are also robust to different parameter values. Therefore, we report only those for a
reasonable value of the relative risk aversion coefficient - we use a parameter value of 10.
The results on an annual basis are reported in Appendix C.
31 In Appendix C, we report the results when annual data is analyzed - the results are robust to this change.
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The empirical evidence from this econometric analysis reinforces the intuition
behind our previous results. The estimated regression coefficients are significant and
correctly signed in all specifications. They are always significant at the 1% level in our
basic specifications, whether a trend is added or not. In other words, our predicted values
can explain more than just a trend in the actual data. In our third specification, the lagged
independent variable is also significant and negative, as equation (1.17) would suggest.
That is to say, an increase in the predicted bilateral current account is associated with a
contemporaneous significant increase in the bilateral current account, and with a decrease
in next period's balance. The regressions in differences shed some light on the relevance of
changes in expected returns as a mechanism to explain short-term movements in the
bilateral current account. Therefore, based on the evidence of the third and fourth
specifications, positive changes in our predicted values are associated with positive
changes in the actual data.
Although the regression coefficients are always significant and correctly signed in
Table 1.6, they also reflect problems in our model. Our theory suggests that the
coefficients of our basic specification should be equal to one. Even though these
coefficients increase with larger values of the risk aversion parameter, they are statistically
different from one for any value of the relative risk aversion parameter considered. The
first source of this problem is attenuation bias. If we predict expected returns that are more
volatile than actual non-observable expected returns, then our regression coefficients are
downward biased. Although potentially relevant, it is not the main reason behind the low
estimated coefficients. Our assumptions of no financial constraints on investors or market-
wide financial frictions are, however, relevant in our theoretical model. These assumptions
imply larger and more volatile capital flows than actual ones, thus smaller regression
coefficients. In the next section, we discuss these modeling issues. Nevertheless, our model
still effectively captures the dynamics of the bilateral current account. Empirically, our
model is able to explain the short-run movements and long-run trends of the bilateral
current account between the U.S. and Japan. Therefore, our results provide strong evidence
that changes in invesfment opportunities can explain current account movements.
1.4.6. Modeling Issues
We use a portfolio model of the current account with uncertainty to explain the dynamics
of the current account. We do not impose financial constraints on investors nor market-
wide financial frictions. Thus, we are bound to obtain larger and more volatile capital
flows than actual ones. This problem is typical of models with free capital flows. Similar
implications have been reported in portfolio allocation models by Campbell, Chan, and
Viceira (2003), Evans and Hnatkovska (2005), Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007),
and Rapach and Wohar (2007). Therefore, the differences between the actual and our fitted
bilateral current account balances are caused mostly by large portfolio shares allocated
abroad and their impact on the dynamics of wealth.
As already mentioned, we allow portfolios to be leveraged. We do not impose
either borrowing or short-selling constraints. In our model with exogenous asset returns
and endogenous portfolios, agents thus take advantage of any small excess risk-adjusted
returns. When small values of the risk aversion parameter are used, portfolio shares are
exceedingly high. Reasonable values of portfolio shares are obtained only when investors
become extremely risk averse. Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003) acknowledge the
problem. In an application to U.S. bonds and equities only, their model also predicts very
large portfolio shares. Similar issues have been reported by Campbell et al. (2001),
Sangvinatsos and Watcher (2005), Brandt and Santa-Clara (2006), and Rapach and Wohar
(2007). Correcting this first problem is particularly difficult. The approximate solution
used here is no longer valid. Discrete-state numerical algorithms become slow and
unreliable in the presence of many assets and state variables.32 Therefore, it remains
extremely hard to solve realistically complex cases of the Merton model.
Nevertheless, similar models have been widely used to analyze issues of optimal
portfolio allocation. For example, Campbell and Viceira (1999), Campbell et al. (2001),
Normandin and St-Amour (2002, 2005), Watcher (2002), and Sangvinatsos and Watcher
(2005) highlight the models' success in explaining optimal portfolio choice in different
32 See Balduzzi and Lynch (1999) and Lynch (2001).
contexts. However, they also acknowledge that these models are not well-suited to capture
the dynamics of agents' wealth. Normandin and St-Amour (2002, 2005) test whether
portfolio models, similar to ours, are able to replicate the dynamics of consumption-wealth
ratios and optimal portfolio choices between equities and bonds in the U.S. and in Canada.
They obtain portfolio allocations consistent with actual data, but recognize the difficulty in
replicating the empirical process of consumption shares.
According to equation (1.10), the total portfolio return is the main channel through
which portfolio shares affect the dynamics of wealth. These portfolio returns can be high
when portfolio shares are large. Therefore, wealth grows too rapidly. Transaction costs
proportional to wealth could minimize the problem. However, they would not solve this
issue, given the size of quarterly portfolio returns. Developing a model with financial
constraints, such as borrowing and short-selling constraints, could potentially minimize the
problem of large predicted portfolio shares and, therefore, obtain a better fit for wealth
dynamics.
These models of dynamic portfolio allocation, including ours, predict reasonable
dynamics for consumption shares: an investor wants more wealth in states when the
marginal utility is higher. However, they predict low consumption-wealth ratios and
relatively low consumption volatility. For example, consumption-wealth ratios implied by
these models are around 2% p.a., whereas the actual data for the U.S. suggests values
around 10% p.a., according to Normandin and St-Amour (2005). Furthermore, the
implications of a model with financial constraints for the optimal consumption path are
ambiguous. Although the average portfolio return falls, potentially causing an increase in
average consumption, the standard deviation of the consumption-wealth ratio tends to fall
in comparison to the unconstrained portfolio allocation, assuming binding constraints. 33
Thus, a portfolio allocation model with financial constraints is not a panacea. Given our
focus on changes in the optimal portfolio allocation as an explanation for changes in the
33 See for example Campbell et al. (2001) for an analysis of a two-asset world.
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current account, we believe that our model is still appropriate. It effectively captures the
dynamics of optimal portfolio allocation caused by changes in investment opportunities.
1.4.7. Predicted Portfolio Allocation: Further Analysis
The empirical evidence reported in Section 1.4.5 suggests that our model captures changes
in optimal portfolio allocation consistent with movements in the bilateral current account,
although it does not succeed at fitting wealth dynamics. Therefore, in order to further test
whether the mechanism in our model is empirically relevant, we construct a hybrid version
of equation (1.17). Depending on data availability, we combine the predicted portfolio
shares with actual data on total post-consumption wealth or domestic savings. We then
compare these new measures of the bilateral current account with the actual data.
Wealth data is only available on an annual basis. On the other hand, savings and
consumption data are available on a quarterly basis. Thus, we need to adapt our theoretical
framework to use quarterly data. We can rewrite equation (1.17) in the following way:
BCAHF, HA (W, " -C A(W -C 1 ,) W, -CH/ I A(W F, - C,)
y, Y, )+ a, yH y, )H +ta,
If we assume that W, /Y, and W, /Y," are constant (K+J and KF+1, respectively),
we can write this last equation as a function of the savings rate and GNP:
BCAHF~ *,H KIK Sy (1.26)
B =, a I H at S  + AaI' K - Aa"K Y, (1.26)
YH I ItH r 
Table 1.7 reports the regressions of the actual bilateral current account on these
predicted values. These regressions use our quarterly sample based on equation (1.26). We
have assumed K and KF equal to their sample averages, given the data availability on
wealth. The top panel shows the regressions for a relative risk aversion parameter of 10. As
discussed in the previous section, more risk averse investors hold smaller portfolio shares.
Furthermore, the evidence presented in Section 1.4.4 shows that the dynamics of portfolio
holdings are independent of the level of risk aversion. Thus, in the bottom panel of Table
1.7, we report these same regressions for an extreme value of the relative risk aversion
parameter, 2000 - the largest value used in the literature on optimal portfolio allocation.
The results are robust to the level of risk aversion: positive changes in the predicted values
are strongly associated with improvements in the current account. Moreover, the estimated
coefficients are significantly larger in the bottom panel of the table. It suggests that if our
model could endogenously generate smaller portfolio shares for reasonable risk aversion
parameters, we would be able to better explain the level of the current account.
Lastly, Figure 1.6 shows the actual and the predicted bilateral current account based
on annual regressions.34 Our estimated model for the bilateral current account between the
U.S. and Japan can effectively explain the movements of the actual bilateral current
account for the majority of our sample, although it is not able to fully capture the stock
market bubble in the mid-80s. Thus, the quantitative analysis presented here in Section 1.4
provides strong support for the mechanism highlighted in this chapter. Variations in
investment opportunities change agents' optimal portfolios in a direction consistent with
actual bilateral current account movements. Furthermore, changes in the predicted bilateral
current account are associated with positive changes in the actual bilateral current account.
1.5. Conclusion
The current account is essentially an issue of portfolio allocation. In this chapter, we focus
on this asset allocation aspect by analyzing the current account as a portfolio choice
problem with uncertainty. We explore the recent empirical evidence on the dynamics of
countries' portfolios. More specifically, we evaluate the implications of optimal time-
varying portfolio shares on the dynamics of the current account. We highlight the
importance of innovations in investment opportunities, captured by changes in expected
asset returns, as the main mechanism behind variations in countries' portfolios. Thus, the
main contribution of the chapter is to provide a theoretical framework and, most
significantly, to empirically test this mechanism on the current account dynamics.
34 These regressions are reported in Appendix C.
We propose a partial-equilibrium portfolio model of the current account to
empirically analyze our main hypothesis. We extend Merton's (1971) model of portfolio
allocation to obtain a structural model of the current account with dynamic portfolio choice.
We assume non-i.i.d. asset returns and exploit their predictability. We also depart from the
assumption of log utility and model agents with Epstein-Zin utility functions. Both
assumptions are important in obtaining optimal time-varying portfolio shares for investors
with long-term investment horizons. More specifically, we analyze optimal time-varying
portfolio shares caused by changes in investment opportunities. These innovations in the
investment opportunity set are captured by the dynamics of expected asset returns. Our
model allows us to obtain clear testable predictions for the current account. Therefore, our
approach highlights changes in expected asset returns as an important factor to explain
international capital flows.
In our empirical analysis, due mostly to data availability, we focus on two countries,
namely the U.S. and Japan, and analyze the model implications for their bilateral current
account. First, we show that changes in expected asset returns change agents' optimal
portfolios in a direction consistent with the actual bilateral current account movements.
Second, we compare the time series of the predicted bilateral current account with its
observed counterpart. Econometric tests provide robust evidence of a positive relation
between these two series, although the model does not fully capture the average level of
the bilateral current account. More specifically, we find that changes in the predicted
bilateral current account are significantly associated with improvements in the actual data.
Furthermore, we provide robust empirical evidence that predicted portfolio shares, if
combined with actual data on savings and consumption instead of the model's predictions,
are able to explain the dynamics of the bilateral current account. Therefore, our results
strongly suggest that changes in expected asset returns are an important factor behind
movements in the bilateral current account between the U.S. and Japan. In order to
improve the empirical results obtained, we need to further develop our theoretical
framework. Extensions to the model should be related to financial constraints, such as
short-sale constraints or limited ability to invest abroad in order to generate home bias in
countries portfolios.
Although we do not aim to obtain direct policy implications, our results can also
contribute to the current debate on global imbalances. Many competing explanations have
been developed. One of them relies on the argument of better investment opportunities in
the U.S. compared to other G7 countries, as in Cooper (2004), Backus and Lambert (2005),
Clarida (2005), and Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2005). Our model can be
understood as a formalization of this hypothesis. Given the similarities between the
dynamics of the U.S. bilateral current account with Japan and the total U.S. current account,
the empirical evidence in this chapter is a first step toward showing the relevance of this
explanation for the current account balance. We address only a subset of factors relevant to
the total U.S. current account. We would still need to extend our empirical analysis by
including asset returns from other G7 countries and emerging economies in order to fully
analyze the mechanism highlighted in this chapter for the U.S. current account.
Nonetheless, our results indicate that better investment opportunities in the U.S. can indeed
be an important explanation for the U.S. current account balance.
1.6. Appendices
1.6.1. Appendix A: Preliminary Empirical Evidence
In this chapter, we empirically analyze the relevance of time-varying investment
opportunities, captured by changes in expected returns, as an explanation for movements in
the current account. The following reduced form specification has been assumed as a
starting point: the bilateral current account depends linearly on domestic and foreign
expected returns (both in levels and in differences) and on domestic and foreign savings.
Equation (1.Al) summarizes this model:
BCA, = P + P, (E, R,+,) + 92(E, R+,) + 3(E, R,, - E,_, R,) + P,(ER, - E,_,R,')
185S: -168 (I.Al)
+ A ,s + A ,s
In Figure 1.2 in the main text, we also plotted the fitted results from an adaptation
of Kraay and Ventura's (2000) model. They use Merton's (1971) model to develop their
predictions for the current account. In their model, asset risk and return are constant over
time and agents have log-utilities, implying constant portfolio shares. Therefore, the
current account response to a temporary income shock depends on the (optimal) portfolio
allocation. In order to maintain its portfolio unchanged, the marginal unit of savings should
be invested as the average unit. The argument can be simplified as follows: define the
current account as in (1.A2):35
CA, = S, - I, (1.A2)
Investment is thus:
I, = K, - K,_,
= K (W,.C, )  K,-. (W,_,-C,.i)(W-,(W ,-C,.)
But Vi: a, = at i = a:
It = aA(W,-C,)
= aS,.
Substituting this expression for investment in (1.A2), we obtain the following:
CA, = S, -aS, = a*S, = (NFA/W)S,, (1.A3)
where a is the portfolio share allocated to domestic assets, a* is the portfolio share
allocated to foreign assets, and NFA is the home country's net foreign assets, i.e., a*W.
The analysis is extended to obtain predictions for the bilateral current account:
35 The authors assume that foreigners cannot hold domestic capital, and therefore, they focus on net capital
flows instead of gross flows.
CA, = a*S,
= (a,')S,,
where i represents foreign countries. Therefore, the bilateral current account between the
Home country (H) and the Foreign country (F) can be expressed in the following way:
BCA,,HF = a"HS, = P8a HS,, (1.A4)
where/p (a ,H ~ I/a*,H)
Under the assumption of constant portfolio shares, the net foreign asset position
between the U.S. and any other country is proportional to the net foreign asset position
between the U.S. and the rest of the world.
Appendix Table 1.1 shows the estimated regressions for the bilateral current
account between the U.S. and Japan from 1960 to 2005 (1970-2004 for annual data). The
first column reports the regression based on (1.A4) on an annual basis.36 However, because
we do not observe p, this specification does not provide us a test of this theory. The other
columns show the results for equation (1.A1), using both annual and quarterly data. The
coefficient on domestic savings is correctly signed and significant in all specifications. The
coefficient on foreign savings is also significant and correctly signed in the quarterly
regressions, but not significant in the annual regressions. Expected long-term and short-
term government bond returns have significant and correctly signed coefficients in most
specifications. However, when the two variables are simultaneously included in the same
regression, the coefficient on the short-term bond changes sign. The expected U.S. stock
return is not significant, except for one specification in which it is wrongly signed. The
expected Japanese stock return is usually not significant, but where it is, it is wrongly
signed. Changes in expected returns, when significant, have the same sign as their level
36 Kraay and Ventura (2002) and Ventura (2003) extend this analysis by introducing adjustment costs and are
better able to explain the time series variation of the current account.
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counterparts. Figure 1.2, in the main text, plots the fitted values from the regressions in
columns (1) and (5) of Appendix Table 1.1.
1.6.2. Appendix B: VAR Estimated Parameters
In this appendix, we describe how to obtain the coefficients of the system (1.13) for a U.S.
investor from the estimated VARs presented in Section 1.4.3. 37 I focus specifically on the
fourth VAR specification, with the nominal exchange rate in levels and the U.S. and
Japanese inflation rates. This is the most complicated case. An adaptation for the other
cases is straightforward and not shown here. In order to simplify the notation, I consider
only four assets, two from each country. An extension to eight assets, as estimated in the
main text, is simple. Japanese real asset returns are denoted with stars. s, includes both
U.S. and Japanese predictive variables. Thus, the following VAR system is estimated: 38
Z+ 1 = Ao + A IZ I + u, +,,
where Z,+, =-
r,t+l
r2,1t+
r2,t+1
S1t+1
e,+1
L t+i
(1.A5)
Considering a U.S. investor, notice that:
z,+, = BoZ,,+ + BIZ
,
, (1.A6)
where Bo and B, are defined as:
37 In a different context, Campbell, Viceira, and White (2003) perform a similar analysis.
38 Variables are in natural units.
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Therefore, replacing it in (1.A6):
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We can re-write (I.A5) in the following way:
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Using (1.A6) on the LHS and (1.A7) on the RHS, we have the desired relation
between the estimated VAR coefficients and the ones in the system of equations (1.13):
z,+, = BoA o +(BOA , + B1)(BoBo)-'B(1 - ý)z, + Bou,+,, (1.A8)
where 0 = BoA 0, , = (BOA, + B,)(BoBo)-' B0(1-2), v,+, = Bou,+, and ,, = BoEB o.
An analogous exercise should be conducted for the case of a Japanese investor. To save
space, we do not describe it here.
1.6.3. Appendix C: Empirical Evidence with Annual Data
In this appendix, we present the results reported in Sections 1.4.4, 1.4.5, and 1.4.7 using
annual samples instead of quarterly samples. Expected returns are calculated based on
quarterly data, but portfolio holdings at the end of the year are considered.
In Section 1.4.4, we provided empirical evidence based on model-predicted optimal
portfolio shares. In this appendix, Appendix Tables 1.2 and 1.3 display similar regressions
based on annual data instead of quarterly data. Once more, we show the results for
different values of the relative risk aversion parameter and for our five different VAR
specifications. We have no priors about the magnitude of these coefficients. However,
according to our model, summarized in equation (1.17), increases in the optimal portfolio
shares abroad should be associated with positive changes in the U.S. bilateral current
account with Japan, if a U.S. investor is considered. On the other hand, if a Japanese
investor is analyzed, it should be related to negative changes in the bilateral current
account. The results confirm these priors and are consistent with the tables shown in the
main text. In other words, variations in investment opportunities change agents' optimal
portfolios in a direction consistent with actual bilateral current account movements.
In Section 1.4.5, we presented some empirical evidence based on the predicted
bilateral current account. In this appendix, Appendix Table 1.4 reports similar regressions
based on annual data instead of quarterly data. Once more, four different regression
specifications are considered. As in the main text, we consider the results for a relative risk
aversion parameter of 10 only. The results in this appendix are also robust to different
parameter values of the time discount factor, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
and the risk aversion parameters. The results from the econometric analysis presented here
reinforce the evidence previously reported. Our predicted values can explain more than just
a trend in the actual data. Furthermore, positive changes in our predicted values are
associated with positive changes in the actual data. The estimated regression coefficients
are statistically significant and correctly signed in all specifications. In our third
specification, our lagged independent variable is also significant and negative, as equation
(1.17) would suggest.
Lastly, using annual data instead of quarterly data, we report in Appendix Table 1.5
results equivalent to those presented in Section 1.4.7. Thus, our regressions use wealth and
consumption data and are based on equation (1.17). The estimates shown here are also
significant and correctly signed. In addition, they are robust to the relative risk aversion
parameter. Thus, an improvement in the predicted bilateral current account is associated
with improvements in the actual values. Furthermore, as reported in the main text, the
estimated coefficients are also significantly larger in the bottom panel of the table.
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Figure 1.1. Real Return Differential in Long-Term Bonds and the Bilateral Current Account
The top panel of this figure shows the interest rate differential between U.S. and Japanese long-term government
bonds. Both actual and expected interest rate differentials are shown. Expected returns are calculated using a VAR
system with lagged asset returns and the real exchange rate. The data is shown in annualized percentage units. The
bottom panel shows the bilateral current account between the U.S. and Japan. The data is shown as a percentage of
U.S. GNP. Both panels show decade averages.
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Figure 1.2. Bilateral Current Account: U.S. and Japan
This figure shows the annual bilateral current account balance between the U.S. and Japan, from 1960 to 2005. It also shows the fitted
values representing an adaptation of Kraay and Ventura's (2000) model and the estimates of our reduced-form model. Values are
shown as a percentage of U.S. GNP.
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Figure 1.3. Current Account Balances
This figure shows annual current account balances by country from 1981 to 2006. Data is shown as a percentage of world GDP.
Source: World Economic Outlook (IMF).
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This figure shows the quarterly U.S. total current account balance and one of its components, the bilateral current account with Japan,
from 1960 to 2005. Values are shown as a percentage of U.S. GDP.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S. Department of Commerce).
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Figure 1.5. Optimal Portfolio Share Abroad by Investor Type
This figure plots the actual bilateral current account and the model-predicted optimal portfolio shares of foreign investments by investor type, from 1960 to 2005 Expected returns are calculated according to the second
specification of the VAR system. We plot the results for relative risk aversion coefficients of 10 and 100 The actual bilateral current account is scaled by U.S. GNP
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Figure 1.6. Actual vs. Predicted Bilateral Current Account with Actual Data for Consumption and Wealth
This figure plots the actual bilateral current account and the predicted bilateral current account based on annual regressions. Expected
returns are calculated according to the second specification of our VAR system. Actual data for consumption and wealth is used. Both
measures of the bilateral current account balance are scaled by U.S. GNP. We assume a relative risk aversion parameter equal to 10.
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Table 1.1. Current Account: Variance-Decomposition Analysis
Country R2 Portfolio Portfolio 2*cov(PR,PG) Portfolio Portfolio
Rebalancing Growth Rebalancing Growth
High-Income Countries
Australia 0.989 1.638 0.860 -1.498 66% 34%
Austria 0.938 1.689 0.462 -1.149 79% 21%
Belgium-Lux. 0.999 0.911 0.034 0.056 96% 4%
Canada 0.992 1.008 0.418 -0.423 71% 29%
Denmark 0.935 2.430 1.318 -2.749 65% 35%
Finland 0.819 4.248 3.461 -6.709 55% 45%
France 0.992 0.815 0.098 0.087 89% 11%
Germany 0.999 0.818 0.028 0.152 97% 3%
Ireland 0.951 2.295 1.030 -2.325 69% 31%
Israel 0.977 1.514 0.336 -0.850 82% 18%
Italy 0.985 1.015 0.083 -0.099 92% 8%
Japan 0.996 0.613 0.206 0.178 75% 25%
Netherlands 0.983 0.848 0.966 -0.814 47% 53%
New Zealand 0.986 1.389 0.804 -1.193 63% 37%
Norway 0.997 0.731 0.081 0.187 90% 10%
Singapore 0.997 0.599 0.144 0.257 81% 19%
Sweden 0.818 2.855 1.450 -3.304 66% 34%
Switzerland 0.994 0.927 0.590 -0.516 61% 39%
UK 0.996 0.842 0.075 0.082 92% 8%
U.S. 0.999 0.505 0.161 0.334 76% 24%
AVERAGE 76% 24%
Middle-Income Countries
Argentina 0.916 1.143 1.933 -2.076 37% 63%
Brazil 0.915 2.318 1.955 -3.273 54% 46%
Chile 0.885 2.717 1.671 -3.388 62% 38%
Costa Rica 0.930 3.098 2.321 -4.420 57% 43%
Greece 0.955 3.195 2.627 -4.824 55% 45%
Malaysia 0.998 0.895 0.075 0.029 92% 8%
Mauritius 0.958 1.739 0.520 -1.259 77% 23%
Mexico 0.982 1.390 0.775 -1.165 64% 36%
Oman 0.998 0.720 0.036 0.244 95% 5%
Peru 0.642 6.533 6.866 -12.40 49% 51%
Portugal 0.903 2.314 0.547 -1.860 81% 19%
South Africa 0.956 1.311 0.305 -0.616 81% 19%
South Korea 0.991 0.638 0.229 0.132 74% 26%
Spain 0.985 1.238 0.412 -0.649 75% 25%
Thailand 0.996 1.082 0 304 -0.385 78% 22%
Trinidad Tobago 0.878 1.632 0.278 -0.910 85% 15%
Turkey 0.865 2.160 1.084 -2.243 67% 33%
Venezuela 0.975 1.215 0.182 -0.397 87% 13%
AVERAGE 71% 29%
Low-Income Countries
Algeria 0.989 0.729 0.282 -0.011 72% 28%
Bolivia 0.987 1.455 0.275 -0.730 84% 16%
China 0.993 0.854 0.018 0.127 98% 2%
Colombia 0.992 1.054 0.180 -0.235 85% 15%
Cote D-lvoire 0.372 2.023 2.555 -3.578 44% 56%
Dominican Rep. 0.085 4.907 1.923 -5.829 72% 28%
Ecuador 0.964 2.052 1.294 -2.346 61% 39%
El Salvador 0.990 0.860 0.776 -0.636 53% 47%
Guatemala 0.968 0.922 1.645 -1.567 36% 64%
India 0.991 1.633 0.528 -1.161 76% 24%
Indonesia 0.967 1.567 0.455 -1.022 78% 22%
Jordan 0.980 0.798 0.884 -0.682 47% 53%
Morocco 0.962 1.638 0.587 -1.224 74% 26%
Pakistan 0.759 6.347 6.113 -11.463 51% 49%
Philippines 0.991 1.115 0.350 -0.465 76% 24%
Sri Lanka 0.981 1.851 1.423 -2.274 57% 43%
Syria 0.970 1.012 0.231 -0.242 81% 19%
Tunisia 0.981 2.221 1.028 -2.249 68% 32%
AVERAGE 67% 33%
This table reports the variance-decompositon analysis based on equation (4) in the main text. The first column reports
how much of the variation of the current account can be explained by the portfolio growth and portfolio rebalancing
components. The next three columns report the three RHS components of equation (4), scaled by the LHS variable. Thus,
these three columns should sum up to one. The last two columns report the relative size of the portfolio rebalancing and
portfolio growth components. The top-panel shows the results for high-income countries. The middle-panel reports the
results for middle-income countries.The bottom-panel shows the results for low-income countries. This country
classification follows the official World Bank classification of countries according to their income levels.
Table 1.2. Summary Statistics
Variables
U.S. Short-term Government Bond
U.S. Long-term Government Bond
U.S. Stock
U.S. ROE
Japanese Short-term Government Bond
Japanese Long-term Government Bond
Japanese Stock
Japanese ROE
U.S. CPI-Inflation
Japanese CPI-Inflation
Real Exchange Rate (Change)
Mean Std. Dev.
1.8 2.9
2.6 3.1
7.1 29.8
1.3 3.9
0.4
2.1
7.6
0.8
4.3
3.9
-2.0
4.0
4.3
34.1
4.5
3.6
5.6
24.5
This table shows the summary statistics of quarterly real returns from 1960 to 2005.
The assets considered in the analysis are: short-term government bonds, long-term
government bonds, stocks, and ROE for both the U.S. and Japan. It also shows the
sample summary statistics of the CPI-inflation rates and the real exchange rate. Real
returns are reported in local currency. Data is in annual percentage units.
Source: Global Financial Database.
Table 1.3. VAR Estimation
ussb, uslb t uss, usroet ustbill t uspet usspreadt jpsbt jplbt jpst jproet jptbillt jppe, jpspreadt rert R
US Short-term Bond ussb,l 0.43 -1 11 0.01 081 1 58 0.00
[0.30] [0.42] [0.01] [0.22] [0.29] [0.00]
US Long-term Bond uslb,.l 0.19 -0.73 0.01 0.67 1.36 0.00
[0.28] [0.40] [0.01] [0 21] [0.28] [0.00]
US Stock usst, -7.72 9.61 0.04 -1.56 -3.23 -0.02
[3.59] [5.13] [0 08] [2 77] [3.60] [0.01]
US ROE usroe,, 0.14 -1.68 0.00 1.65 1.42 0.00
[0.30] [0.43] [0.01] [0.23] [030] [0.00]
US T-Bill Yield ustbill 1t 0.09 -0.15 0.00 0.08 0 89 0.00
[0.11] [0.15] [0.001 [0.082] [.11] [0.001
US P/E Ratio uspetl -15.58 51.84 0.12 -34.14 -53.38 0.84
[23.66] [33.78] [0.51] [18.24] [23.70] [0.04]
US Spread usspreadt 1  0.01 0.18 0.00 -0 18 -0.11 0.00
[0.08] [0.12] [0 00] [0 06] [0 08] [0 00]
JP Short-term Bond jpsbt,l -0.57 1.37 -001 -0.42 -0.04 0.00
00 [0.45] [0.64] [0.01] [0.35] [0.45] [000]
JP Long-term Bond jplb.,l -0.63 1.57 -001 -0 52 -0.21 0.00
[0.45] [0.65] [0.01] [0.35] [0.45] [0.00]
JP Stock jpst.+ 0.45 4.71 0.27 -3 92 -6.02 -0.01
[3.52] [5.03] [0.08] [2 72] [3.531 [0.01]
JP ROE jproe,÷l -0.68 1.45 -0.01 -0.39 0.02 0.00
[0.46] [0.66] [0.01] [035] [0.46] [0.00]
JP T-Bill Yield jptbilll 0.04 -0.06 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00
[0.04] [0 06] [0 .00] [0.03] [0 04] [0 .00]
JP P/E Ratio jppet., 90.59 -13.02 1.82 -72.43 -78.65 -0.15
[70.42] [100.56] [1.50] [54.30] [70.55] [0.11]
JP Spread jpspread+tl -0.05 0.20 0.00 -0.11 -0.19 0.00
[0.06] [0.09] [0.00] [0 05] [0 06] [0 00]
Real Exchange Rate rer.,1 0.53 1.94 -0.03 -1 24 -1.87 -0.01
[2.67] [3.81] [0.06] [2 06] [2.67] [0.00]
1.71
[0.49]
2.13
[0.47]
-10.70
[6.02]
2.23
[0.51]
0.21
[0.18]
-83.73
[39.69]
0.58
[0 14]
-1.05
[0.76]
-1.25
[0.76]
-5.91
[5.91]
-1.05
[0.77]
0.02
[0.07]
-9.49
[118.18]
-0.23
[0.10]
-6.75
[4.47]
-0.59 0.92 0.00 -0.32 -0.13 0.00
[0.36] [0.44] [0.01] [0.20] [0.23] [0.00]
-0.73 1.41 0.00 -0.64 -037 0.00
[0.35] [0.42] [0 01] [0.20] [0.22] [0.00]
1.52 4.18 -0.12 -4.80 -6.30 0.00
[4.46] [5.47] [0 07] [2.52] [2 81] [0.00]
-0.91 1.73 0.00 -0.79 -0.51 0.00
[0.37] [0.46] [001] [0.21] [0.24] [0.00]
0.17 -0.47 0.00 0.31 0.22 0.00
[0.13] [0.16] [0 00] [0.07] [0.08] [0.00]
11.52 33.85 -0.68 -39.49 -46.94 -0.01
[29.37] [36.02] [0.47] [16.60] [18.53] [0.01]
-0.07 0.31 0.00 -0.25 -0.18 0.00
[0.10] [0.13] [0.00] [0.06] [0.07] [0.00]
-1.35 2.63 0.00 -1.26 -1.28 0.00
[0.56] [0.69] [0.01] [0.32] [0.35] [0.00]
-2.01 3.26 0.01 -1.23 -123 0.00
[0.56] [0.69] [0.01] [0 32] [0.36] [0.00]
-1.19 2.77 0 29 -0.74 -4.52 0.00
[4.37] [5 36] [0.07] [2 47] [2.76] [0.00]
-2.29 2.78 0.01 -0.46 -1.49 0.00
[0.57] [0.70] [0 01] [0.32] [0.36] [0.00]
-0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.13 1.09 0.00
[0.05] [0.06] [0 .00] [0.03] [0.03] [0.00]
-78.49 229.13 1.31 -143.27 -181.45 0.89
[87.45] [107.25] [1 39] [49.43] [55 17] [0.03]
0.20 -0.26 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.00
[0.08] [0.09] [0.00] [0 04] [0.05] [0.00]
0.74 -0.75 0.01 001 -2.78 0.00
[3.31] [4.06] [0.05] [1.87] [2.09] [0.00]
-0.46 -0.02 0.37
[0.36] [0.01] [0.00]
-0.88 -0.01 0.50
[0.35] [0.01] [0.00]
-724 -0.07 0.17
[4.46] [0.10] [0.01]
-109 -0.01 0.65
[0.37] [0.01] [0.00]
0.42 0.00 0.90
[0.13] [0.00] [0.00]
-70.38 -0.07 0.93
[29.39] [29 39] [0.00]
-0.33 0.00 0.71
[0. 10] [0.001 [0.00]
-2 27 -0.02 0.29
[0.56] [0.01] [0.00]
-2.11 -0.02 0.33
[0.56] [0.01] [0.00]
-4.23 -0.10 0.27
[4.37] [0.10] [0.00]
-2.44 -0.03 0.42
[0.57] [001] [0.00]
0.13 0.00 0.98
[0.05] [0.00] [0.00]
-236.42 -3.91 0 94
[87.49] [2.021 [0.00]
1.08 0.00 0.88
[0.08] [0.00] [0.00]
0.41 0.02 0.12
[3.31] [0.08] [0.05]
This table shows the results of our VAR estimation with log real asset returns on a quarterly basis from 1960 to 2005. The following asset returns are included in the estimation: short-term government bonds, long-
term government bonds, stocks, and ROE. Other state variables include: T-Bill nominal yields, price-earnings ratios, term spreads, and the real exchange rate. Each row corresponds to one equation. The table also
shows the R-squared for each equation (with p-values of the F-test of joint significance in brackets). I-statistics for coefficient estimates are shown in brackets.
Table 1.4. Summary Statistics of Expected Real Asset Returns
Basic VAR BVAR + RER in
(BVAR) Levels
Assets Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
U.S. Short-term Govt. Bond 1.75 1.74 1.75 1.77
U.S. Long-term Govt. Bond 2.63 2.21 2.63 2.22
U.S. Stocks 3.37 12.37 3.38 12.51
U.S. ROE 1.27 3.18 1.27 3.19
Japanese Short-term Govt. Bond
Japanese Long-term Govt. Bond
Japanese Stocks
Japanese ROE
0.32
2.02
3.67
0.74
2.18
2.47
16.50
2.91
0.32
2.02
3.70
0.74
2.23
2.51
16.76
2.96
BVAR + RER in
Differences
Mean Std. Dev.
1.74 1.78
2.61 2.25
3.46 12.33
1.24 3.20
0.32
2.00
3.52
0.76
2.22
2.51
16.41
2.94
BVAR + NER in
Levels and
Inflation Rates
Mean Std. Dev.
1.75 1.81
2.63 2.25
3.47 13.21
1.27 3.24
0.32
2.02
3.77
0.74
2.23
2.51
17.29
2.96
BVAR + NER in
Differences and
Inflation Rates
Mean Std. Dev.
1.74
2.61
3.56
1.24
0.32
2.00
3.59
0.76
1.81
2.28
13.06
3.25
2.21
2.50
16.92
2.94
This table shows the summary statistics of predicted real asset returns from 1960 to 2005 based on VAR estimations. The assets considered in the analysis
are: short-term government bonds, long-term government bonds, stocks, and ROE for both the U.S. and Japan. The control variables are: nominal yield on
T-Bills, price-earnings ratio, and the term spread. Depending on the specification, the nominal exchange rate (NER), the real exchange rate (RER), or the
U.S. and Japanese CPI-inflation rates are included. The values are real returns in local currency. Data is shown in annual percentage units.
Table 1.5A. Regression Analysis: Actual Bilateral Current Account vs. Optimal Portfolio Shares
U.S. Investors
Basic Specification (BS) BS + Time Trend BS + Lagged BCA
Alpha L.Alpha Alpha L.Alpha Alpha L.Alpha
Relative Risk Aversion: 5
Basic VAR 0.002 *** -0.000 0.001 ** -0.001 0.000 * -0.000 *
+ RER in Levels 0.002 *** -0.000 0.001 ** -0.001 0.000 -0.000 *
+ RER in Differences 0.002 *** -0.000 0.001 ** -0.001 0.000 * -0.000 *
+ Infl., NER in Levels 0.001 *** -0.000 0.001 ** -0.001 0.000 -0.000
+ Infl., NER in Differences 0.002 *** -0.000 0.001 *** -0.001 0.000 -0.000 *
Relative Risk Aversion: 10
Basic VAR 0.004 *** -0.000 0.002 ** -0.002 0.001 * -0.001 *
+ RER in Levels 0.003 *** -0.000 0.002 ** -0.001 0.001 * -0.001 *
+ RER in Differences 0.004 *** -0.000 0.002 ** -0.001 0.001 * -0.001 *
+ Infl., NER in Levels 0.003 *** -0.000 0.002 ** -0.001 0.001 * -0.001
+ Infl., NER in Differences 0.003 *** -0.000 0.002 *** -0.001 0.001 -0.001 *
Relative Risk Aversion: 30
Basic VAR 0.011 *** -0.000 0.006 ** -0.005 0.002 * -0.002 *
+ RER in Levels 0.009 *** -0.001 0.006 ** -0.004 * 0.002 * -0.002 *
+ RER in Differences 0.011 *** -0.000 0.006 ** -0.004 0.002 * -0.002 *
+ Infl., NER in Levels 0.008 *** -0.001 0.006 *** -0.004 * 0.002 * -0.002
+ Infl., NER in Differences 0.010 *** 0.001 0.006 *** -0.003 0.002 -0.002 *
Relative Risk Aversion: 100
Basic VAR 0.037 *** -0.000 0.021 ** -0.016 0.008 * -0.008 *
+ RER in Levels 0.030 *** -0.005 0.021 *** -0.014 * 0.007 * -0.006 *
+ RER in Differences 0.036 *** -0.000 0.021 ** -0.014 0.007 * -0.007 *
+ Infl., NER in Levels 0.027 *** -0.004 0.019 *** -0.012 * 0.006 * -0.005
+ Infl., NER in Differences 0.034 *** 0.002 0.020 *** -0.011 0.006 -0.006 *
This table shows the regression results of the bilateral current account on the model-predicted portfolio shares. It shows the
results for a U.S. investor. Three different regressions are reported: our basic specification that regresses the bilateral
current account on contemporaneous and lagged optimal portfolio shares (alpha and L.alpha, respectively), the basic
specification with a time trend, and the basic specification including a lagged dependent variable. The results are shown for
different values of the relative risk aversion parameter: 5, 10, 30, and 100. Different series of model-predicted portfolio
shares are considered based on our five VAR specifications used to calculate expected asset returns. The bilateral current
account data is expressed as a percentage of GNP. * means significant at 10%, ** at 5%., and *** at 1% levels.
Table 1.5B. Regression Analysis: Actual Bilateral Current Account vs. Optimal Portfolio Shares
Japanese Investors
Basic Specification (BS) BS + Time Trend BS + Lagged BCA
Alpha L.Alpha Alpha L.Alpha Alpha L.Alpha
Relative Risk Aversion: 5
Basic VAR -0.002 *** 0.000 -0.001 ** 0.001 * -0.000 0.000
+ RER in Levels -0.002 *** 0.000 -0.001 ** 0.001 * -0.000 0.000
+ RER in Differences -0.002 *** 0.000 -0.001 ** 0.001 -0.000 0.000
+ Infl., NER in Levels -0.002 *** 0.000 -0.001 ** 0.001 * -0.000 ** 0.000 **
+ Infl., NER in Differences -0.002 *** 0.000 -0.001 ** 0.001 -0.000 ** 0.000 **
Relative Risk Aversion: 10
Basic VAR -0.004 *** 0.000 -0.002 ** 0.002 * -0.001 0.001
+ RER in Levels -0.004 *** 0.000 -0.002 ** 0.002 * -0.001 0.000
+ RER in Differences -0.004 *** 0.000 -0.002 ** 0.002 -0.001 0.001
+ Infl., NER in Levels -0.003 *** 0.000 -0.002 ** 0.001 * -0.001 ** 0.001 **
+ Infl., NER in Differences -0.004 *** 0.000 -0.002 ** 0.001 -0.001 ** 0.001 **
Relative Risk Aversion: 30
Basic VAR -0.012 *** 0.000 -0.007 ** 0.005 -0.002 0.002
+ RER in Levels -0.010 *** 0.002 -0.007 ** 0.005 * -0.002 0.001
+ RER in Differences -0.011 *** 0.000 -0.007 ** 0.005 -0.002 0.002
+ Infl., NER in Levels -0.009 *** 0.001 -0.006 *** 0.004 * -0.002 ** 0.002 **
+ Infl., NER in Differences -0.011 *** 0.000 -0.006 ** 0.004 -0.003 ** 0.003 **
Relative Risk Aversion: 100
Basic VAR -0.040 *** 0.001 -0.023 ** 0.017 -0.006 0.006
+ RER in Levels -0.034 *** 0.006 -0.024 *** 0.016 * -0.006 0.005
+ RER in Differences -0.038 *** 0.001 -0.022 ** 0.016 -0.006 0.006
+ Infl., NER in Levels -0.030 *** 0.005 -0.021 *** 0.014 * -0.008 ** 0.007 **
+ Infl., NER in Differences -0.035 *** -0.001 -0.021 ** 0.014 -0.009 ** 0.009 **
This table shows the regression results of the bilateral current account on the model-predicted portfolio shares. It shows the
results for a Japanese investor. Three different regressions are reported: our basic specification that regresses the bilateral
current account on contemporaneous and lagged optimal portfolio shares (alpha and L.alpha, respectively), the basic
specification with a time trend, and the basic specification including a lagged dependent variable. The results are shown for
different values of the relative risk aversion parameter: 5, 10, 30, and 100. Different series of model-predicted portfolio
shares are considered based on our five VAR specifications used to calculate expected asset returns. The bilateral current
account data is expressed as a percentage of GNP. * means significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1% levels.
Table 1.6. Regression Analysis: Actual vs. Predicted Bilateral Current Account
Basic Specification BS + Lagged Vars.
(BS) BS + Time Trend PBCA L.PBCA Vars. in Diff.
Basic VAR 0.004 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ** -0.001 ** 0.001 **
+ RER in Levels 0.003 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 * -0.001 * 0.001 *
+ RER in Differences 0.004 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 * -0.001 * 0.001 *
+ Infl., NER in Levels 0.003 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ** -0.001 * 0.001 *
+ Infl., NER in Differences 0.004 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ** -0.001 ** 0.001 **
This table shows the results of four different regression specifications: a basic specification that regresses the actual bilateral
current account on the predicted bilateral current account (PBCA), the basic specification with a time trend, the basic
specification including lagged values of both the dependent and independent variables, and a fourth specification with both
variables in differences. The results are reported for different series of model-predicted portfolio shares: our five VAR
specifications are considered to calculate expected asset returns. The regressions use quarterly data. Actual data is scaled by U.S.
GNP and the predicted data is scaled by model-based U.S. wealth. A relative risk aversion coefficient of 10 has been assumed. *
means significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1% levels.
Table 1.7. Regression Analysis: Actual vs. Hybrid Predicted Bilateral Current Account
Basic Specification BS + Lagged Vars.
(BS) BS + Time Trend HPBCA L.HPBCA Vars. in Diff.
Relative Risk Aversion: 10
Basic VAR 0.002 *** 0.001 ** 0.000 * -0.000 0.000 **
+ RER in Levels 0.003 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 * -0.000 0.000 **
+ RER in Differences 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 * -0.000 0.000 **
+ Infl., NER in Levels 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 ** -0.000 * 0.000 ***
+ Infl., NER in Differences 0.002 *** 0.001 ** 0.000 ** -0.000 ** 0.000 ***
Relative Risk Aversion: 2000
Basic VAR 0.603 *** 0.205 *** 0.069 ** -0.045 0.058 **
+ RER in Levels 0.294 *** 0.124 *** 0.053 *** -0.036 0.045 **
+ RER in Differences 0.599 *** 0.198 *** 0.065 ** -0.042 0.055 **
+ Infl., NER in Levels 0.310 *** 0.126 *** 0.061 *** -0.040 ** 0.052 ***
+ Infl., NER in Differences 0.544 *** 0.150 ** 0.077 ** -0.051 * 0.065 ***
This table shows the results of four different regression specifications: a basic specification that regresses the actual bilateral
current account on our hybrid measure (HPBCA), the basic specification with a time trend, the basic specification including
lagged values of both the dependent and independent variables, and a fourth specification with both variables in differences. Our
hybrid bilateral current account uses actual data on wealth, consumption, and savings. The results are based on different series of
model-predicted portfolio shares: our five VAR specifications are considered to calculate expected asset returns. The regressions
use quarterly data. Both measures of the bilateral current account are scaled by U.S. GNP. The results are shown for a relative
risk aversion coefficient of 10 and 2000 in the top and bottom panel, respectively. * means significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and ***
at 1% levels.
Appendix Table 1.1. Determinants of the Bilateral Current Account
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant
Dom. Savings*(NFA/W)
Dom. Savings
For. Savings
US Long-term Bond
US Short-term Bond
US Stocks
JP Long-term Bond
JP Short-term Bond
JP Stocks
D.US Long-term Bond
D.US Short-term Bond
D.US Stock
D.JP Long-term Bond
D.JP Short-term Bond
D.JP Stock
Observations
R-squared
-0.006
[11.119]
0.265
[3.192]
-0.003 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.011 -0.015 -0.014 -0.009
[1.912] [3.805] [4.904] [2.649] [4.631] [6.959] [6.256] [3.727]
0.241
[2.905]
0.025
[1.563]
-0.234
[2.960]
0.153
[2.411]
0.244
[2.411]
-0.233
[2.241]
-0.047
[0.528]
-0.024
[0.338]
0.048
[0.566]
-0.044
[0.522]
0.297
[3.625]
0.021
[1.073]
-0.017
[0.826]
0.003
[0.542]
0.013
[1.369]
-0.006
[1.296]
0.057
[1.003]
0.006
[1.136]
0.014
[1.899]
-0.001
[0.180]
35 34 34
0.24 0.68 0.57
0.302
[3.280]
0.017
[0.810]
-0.004
[0.209]
0.002
[0.439]
0.011
[1.0041
-0.006
[1.230]
0.027
[0.542]
0.006
[1.076]
0.018
[1.537]
-0.002
[0.418]
34
0.54
0.152
[2.065]
0.019
[1.0551
-0.272
[3.966]
0.179
[3.176]
0
[0.065]
0.377
[3.369]
-0.349
[3.065]
-0.01
[2.415]
-0.092
[1.103]
0.077
[1.166]
0.002
[0.616]
0.146
[1.2971
-0.13
[1.181]
0.000
[0.109]
34
0.82
0.058
[4.346]
-0.014
[2.615]
-0.126
[5.551]
0.08
[4.011]
0.038
[1.538]
-0.029
[1.201]
-0.049
[3.167]
0.057
[1.910]
0.056
[1.331]
-0.053
[1.244]
180
0.60
0.078
[7.764]
-0.023
[4.146]
-0.033
[3.920]
0.002
[1.355]
0.007
[2.763]
-0.006
[4.762]
-0.006
[0.477]
0.000
[0.139]
0.004
[1.250]
-0.003
[2.350]
180
0.62
0.075
[6.686]
-0.028
[5.159]
-0.016
[2.194]
0.002
[1.164]
0.005
[1.761]
-0.006
[4.901]
-0.019
[0.753]
-0.001
[0.290]
0.002
[0.570]
-0.003
[2.340]
180
0.59
0.043
[3.423]
-0.023
[4.476]
-0.131
[6.068]
0.094
[4.915]
0.004
[2.690]
0.058
[2.526]
-0.042
[1.850]
-0.007
[5.455]
-0.041
[2.793]
0.093
[3.171]
0.002
[1.105]
0.101
[2.478]
-0.094
[2.279]
-0.004
[3.055]
180
0.67
This table reports the regressions of the bilateral current account between Japan and the U.S. on: domestic and foreign savings, expected
asset returns, and changes in expected asset returns. Expected asset returns are obtained from the VAR estimation presented in Table 2. The
bilateral current account and the domestic and foreign savings are expressed as a percentage of GNP. Net foreign asset positions, taken from
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005), are expressed as a percentage of U.S. total wealth. Expected asset returns are denominated in U.S. dollars.
The table also shows the R-squared for each equation and the number of observations. t-slatislics are shown in brackets.
Appendix Table 1.2. Actual Bilateral Current Account vs. Optimal Portfolio Shares
U.S. Investors
Basic Specification (BS) BS + Time Trend BS + Lagged BCA
Alpha L.Alpha Alpha L.Alpha Alpha L.Alpha
Relative Risk Aversion: 5
Basic VAR 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 ** -0.000 0.001 *** -0.001 ***
+ RER in Levels 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 ** -0.000 0.000 ** -0.000 ***
+ RER in Differences 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 ** -0.000 0.001 *** -0.001 ***
+ Infl., NER in Levels 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 ** -0.000 0.000 ** -0.000 ***
+ Infl., NER in Differences 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 *** -0.000 0.001 *** -0.001 ***
Relative Risk Aversion: 10
Basic VAR 0.003 *** 0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001 *** -0.001 ***
+ RER in Levels 0.002 *** 0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 ***
+ RER in Differences 0.003 *** 0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001 *** -0.001 ***
+ Infl., NER in Levels 0.002 *** 0.000 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001 ** -0.001 ***
+ Infl., NER in Differences 0.003 *** 0.001 0.001 *** -0.000 0.001 *** -0.001 ***
Relative Risk Aversion: 30
Basic VAR 0.009 *** 0.003 0.004 ** -0.002 0.004 *** -0.004 ***
+ RER in Levels 0.007 *** 0.001 0.004 ** -0.002 0.002 ** -0.002 ***
+ RER in Differences 0.008 *** 0.003 0.004 ** -0.002 0.003 *** -0.004 ***
+ Infl., NER in Levels 0.006 *** 0.001 0.004 ** -0.002 0.002 *** -0.002 ***
+ Infl., NER in Differences 0.008 *** 0.003 0.004 *** -0.001 0.003 *** -0.003 ***
Relative Risk Aversion: 100
Basic VAR 0.029 *** 0.009 0.012 ** -0.007 0.012 *** -0.012 ***
+ RER in Levels 0.022 *** 0.003 0.013 ** -0.006 0.008 *** -0.008 ***
+ RER in Differences 0.028 *** 0.009 0.012 ** -0.006 0.012 *** -0.012 ***
+ Infl., NER in Levels 0.021 *** 0.002 0.013 ** -0.006 0.007 *** -0.007 ***
+ Infl., NER in Differences 0.027 *** 0.009 0.013 *** -0.004 0.011 *** -0.011 ***
This table shows the regression results of the bilateral current account on the model-predicted portfolio shares on an annual
basis. It shows the results for a U.S. investor. Three different regressions are reported: our basic specification that regresses
the bilateral current account on contemporaneous and lagged optimal portfolio shares (alpha and L.alpha, respectively), the
basic specification with a time trend, and the basic specification including a lagged dependent variable. The results are shown
for different values of the relative risk aversion parameter: 5, 10, 30, and 100. Different series of model-predicted portfolio
shares are considered based on our five VAR specifications used to calculate expected asset returns. The bilateral current
account data is expressed as a percentage ofGNP. * means significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1% levels.
Appendix Table 1.3. Actual Bilateral Current Account vs. Optimal Portfolio Shares
Japanese Investors
Basic Specification (BS) BS + Time Trend BS + Lagged BCA
Alpha L.Alpha Alpha L.Alpha Alpha L.Alpha
Relative Risk Aversion: 5
Basic VAR -0.002 *** 0.000 -0.001 ** 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.001 ***
+ RER in Levels -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 ** 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 ***
+ RER in Differences -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 ** 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.001 ***
+ Infl., NER in Levels -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 ** 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 ***
+ Infl., NER in Differences -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 ** 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.001 ***
Relative Risk Aversion: 10
Basic VAR -0.003 *** -0.001 -0.001 ** 0.001 -0.001 *** 0.001 ***
+ RER in Levels -0.003 *** -0.001 -0.001 ** 0.001 -0.001 ** 0.001 ***
+ RER in Differences -0.003 *** -0.001 -0.001 ** 0.001 -0.001 *** 0.001 ***
+ Infl., NER in Levels -0.002 *** 0.000 -0.001 ** 0.001 -0.001 ** 0.001 ***
+ Infl., NER in Differences -0.003 *** -0.001 -0.001 *** 0.001 -0.001 *** 0.001 ***
Relative Risk Aversion: 30
Basic VAR -0.009 *** -0.003 -0.004 ** 0.002 -0.004 *** 0.004 ***
+ RER in Levels -0.007 *** -0.001 -0.004 ** 0.002 -0.003 *** 0.003 ***
+ RER in Differences -0.009 *** -0.003 -0.004 ** 0.002 -0.004 *** 0.004 ***
+ Infl., NER in Levels -0.007 *** -0.001 -0.004 ** 0.002 -0.002 ** 0.002 ***
+ Infl., NER in Differences -0.008 *** -0.003 -0.004 *** 0.002 -0.003 *** 0.003 ***
Relative Risk Aversion: 100
Basic VAR -0.030 *** -0.010 -0.013 ** 0.007 -0.012 *** 0.012 ***
+ RER in Levels -0.024 *** -0.003 -0.014 ** 0.007 -0.009 *** 0.008 ***
+ RER in Differences -0.029 *** -0.010 -0.012 ** 0.006 -0.012 *** 0.012 ***
+ Infl., NER in Levels -0.022 *** -0.002 -0.013 ** 0.006 -0.008 *** 0.007 ***
+ Infl., NER in Differences -0.027 *** -0.009 -0.012 *** 0.005 -0.011 *** 0.011 ***
This table shows the regression results of the bilateral current account on the model-predicted portfolio shares on an annual
basis. It shows the results for a Japanese investor. Three different regressions are reported: our basic specification that
regresses the bilateral current account on contemporaneous and lagged optimal portfolio shares (alpha and L.alpha,
respectively), the basic specification with a time trend, and the basic specification including a lagged dependent variable.
The results are shown for different values of the relative risk aversion parameter: 5, 10, 30, and 100. Different series of
model-predicted portfolio shares are considered based on our five VAR specifications used to calculate expected asset
returns. The bilateral current account data is expressed as a percentage of GNP. * means significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and
Appendix Table 1.4. Regression Analysis: Actual vs. Predicted Bilateral Current Account
Basic Specification BS + Lagged Vars.
(BS) BS + Time Trend PBCA L.PBCA Vars. in Diff.
Basic VAR 0.004 *** 0.001 * 0.001 *** -0.001 ** 0.001 ***
+ RER in Levels 0.003 *** 0.001 * 0.001 *** -0.001 *** 0.001 ***
+ RER in Differences 0.004 *** 0.001 ** 0.001 *** -0.001 ** 0.001 ***
+ Infl., NER in Levels 0.003 *** 0.001 ** 0.001 *** -0.001 *** 0.001 ***
+ Infl., NER in Differences 0.004 *** 0.001 ** 0.001 *** -0.001 ** 0.001 ***
This table shows the results of four different regression specifications: a basic specification that regresses the actual bilateral
current account on the predicted bilateral current account (PBCA), the basic specification with a time trend, the basic
specification including lagged values of both the dependent and independent variables, and a fourth specification with both
variables in differences. The results are reported for different series of model-predicted portfolio shares: our five VAR
specifications are considered to calculate expected asset returns. The regressions use annual data. Actual data is scaled by U.S.
GNP and the predicted data is scaled by model-based U.S. wealth. A relative risk aversion coefficient of 10 has been assumed. *
means significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1% levels.
Appendix Table 1.5. Regression Analysis: Actual vs. Hybrid Predicted Bilateral Current Account
Basic Specification BS + Lagged Vars.
(BS) BS + Time Trend HPBCA L.HPBCA Vars. in Diff.
Relative Risk Aversion: 10
Basic VAR 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 ** -0.000 0.000
+ RER in Levels 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.000 ** -0.000 0.000 **
+ RER in Differences 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 ** -0.000 0.000
+ Infl., NER in Levels 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.000 *** -0.000 0.000 ***
+ Infl., NER in Differences 0.001 * 0.000 * 0.001 *** -0.000 0.000 **
Relative Risk Aversion: 2000
Basic VAR 0.188 ** 0.104 * 0.104 ** -0.006 0.06000
+ RER in Levels 0.102 *** 0.039 ** 0.028 ** -0.014 0.023
+ RER in Differences 0.189 ** 0.099 * 0.099 ** -0.002 0.056
+ Infl., NER in Levels 0.102 *** 0.039 ** 0.028 ** -0.014 0.023
+ Infl., NER in Differences 0.186 *** 0.092 ** 0.088 ** -0.026 0.064 **
This table shows the results of four different regression specifications: a basic specification that regresses the actual bilateral current
account on our hybrid measure (HPBCA), the basic specification with a time trend, the basic specification including lagged values of
both the dependent and independent variables, and a fourth specification with both variables in differences. Our hybrid bilateral
current account uses actual data on wealth, consumption, and savings. The results are based on different series of model-predicted
portfolio shares: our five VAR specifications are considered to calculate expected asset returns. The regressions use annual data.
Both measures of the bilateral current account are scaled by U.S. GNP. The results are shown for a relative risk aversion coefficient
of 10 and 2000 in the top and bottom panel, respectively. * means significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1% levels.
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This chapter studies the lack of perfect international diversification by analyzing unique
micro data on U.S. institutional investors' foreign holdings. It focuses on two questions
related to international investment and access to international capital markets. First, does
the structural change in the U.S. mutual fund industry toward more "aggregation"
(favoring funds that invest globally over funds that invest in specific countries or regions)
affect firms in other countries? And second, are investors forgoing gains from international
diversification by shifting toward more global funds? We find that the answer is yes to
both questions. In particular, we find that mutual fund managers tend to invest in a finite -
and rather small - number of stocks almost independently of the level of country
aggregation. In other words, the number of stocks in a mutual fund portfolio does not tend
to rise significantly as funds have a broader mandate to invest in more countries. We also
show that there are unexploited diversification gains to be made, even when the both
Specialized and Global funds are all part of the same mutual fund family. The work has
several important implications for emerging and transitional economies trying to attract
foreign capital and trying to develop their own institutional investor bases. It sheds light on
the scope of action that government and companies have when attracting funds from
international institutional investors.
2.1. Introduction
One of the most studied and well known puzzles in international economics is that
portfolio holdings are home biased. It simply states that investors are not nearly as
internationally diversified as their consumption and income path would imply. This has
profound implications for both individuals (who supply funds) and firms and countries
(which demand funds).
For individuals, the presence of home bias means that they could do better in terms
of risk diversification by holding more international assets, for a given level of expected
returns (or, alternatively, they could increase returns for a given level of risk). This is
especially important nowadays as many countries are adopting defined contribution
pension systems, according to which individuals need to save for retirement by investing
locally and globally through institutional investors. Among other things, less home bias
would help improve the performance of the savings invested in mutual and pension funds,
boosting pension benefits.
For borrowers (firms and governments), specially in developing countries,
imperfect international diversification in developed countries means that international
capital is not available to everyone, even as domestic fundamentals improve. This might
present a serious constraint, since capital is expected to flow from rich to poor countries to
finance investment in higher return projects in the developing world. Home bias might
then lead to problems of access to finance as some firms and countries are unable to tap
international capital at "reasonable" costs. For governments, home bias also presents a
challenge as they try both to foster capital market development (attracting foreign savings)
and to promote domestic savings (allowing residents to invest abroad).
The literature has advanced several explanations for the lack of international
diversification, starting with the seminal work by French and Poterba (1991). It has
mentioned the existence of non-tradable goods, the prevalence of frictions in international
transactions, the costly collection of information, and the limited information handling by
fund managers among other sources of the home bias. All these explanations have proven
to be successful in accounting for some of the observed patterns in the data. See, for
example, Lewis (1999), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001), Pesenti and van Wincoop (2002), and
Engel and Matsumoto (2005) for the role of non-tradables; Portes and Rey (2005) for
frictions in international transactions; Brennan and Cao (1997), Ahearne, Griever and
Warnock (2004), and Hatchondo (2005) for the effects of asymmetric information; Fidora,
Fratzscher, and Thimann (2006) for the role of bilateral real exchange rate volatility; and
Strong and Xu (2003) for bias in relative optimism among fund managers toward their
home market. Lewis (1999) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003) provide a detailed survey of the
literature on home bias. The empirical evidence has mostly concentrated on aggregate
variables. One exception is Cai and Warnock (2005).
We propose a different approach to study the lack of perfect international
diversification, by analyzing unique micro data on institutional investors' international
holdings. In particular, we study how U.S. mutual funds established to purchase assets
around the world invest in other countries. We also assess the implicit costs, if any,
involved in their investment strategies.
The first advantage of working with mutual funds is that they manage a significant
portion of world savings. In particular, they constitute a mature industry with a strong
presence in international markets. In 2005, there were 8,044 U.S. mutual funds with
market capitalization of US$8 trillion (69% of U.S. GDP). In fact, out of US$13 trillion of
assets invested in the U.S. retirement market, 24% of it is invested through mutual funds.
European mutual funds are also equally developed. In 2005, there were 28,500 European
mutual funds (EU15), with market capitalization of US$5 trillion (44% of GDP in 2004).
Mutual funds also have a strong presence in developing countries. For instance, in Latin
America and Asia (ex-Japan), mutual fund assets represent 16 and 18% of GDP,
respectively, and they account for 6% of GDP in Eastern Europe. The second advantage is
data availability. Mutual funds are required to disclose their portfolio on a regular basis.
We can thus track their investment behavior over time. This characteristic of the mutual
fund industry contrasts with other types of investors such as hedge funds, many pension
funds, and individual international investors, for which data is not publicly available.
Lastly, we choose the U.S. industry because it is the largest one in the world; it is a large
provider of funds to developed and developing countries alike; it has very clear reporting
rules; and we have access to historical reports. Furthermore, lessons derived from the U.S.
mutual fund industry tend to apply to other countries, as they foster their own institutional
investors. Also, U.S. mutual funds tend to be replicated abroad, so whatever this industry
does has spillover effects on other countries. Finally, U.S. mutual funds are held not only
by U.S. investors but also by foreigners.
In this chapter, we focus on two questions related to international investment and
access to international capital markets. The first question arises from the fact that the U.S.
mutual fund industry is moving toward higher levels of "aggregation," favoring large funds
that invest globally (Global funds) over smaller funds that invest in more specific regions
or countries (Specialized funds). This shift toward higher aggregation has probably been
prompted by financial crises, which induced mutual funds to try to avoid constraints in
their investment decisions. So a natural question that arises is: to what extent this structural
change in the U.S. mutual fund industry affects firms in other countries?
We start by evaluating the degree of international diversification among mutual
funds across and within fund families (a mutual fund company for most cases) for different
investment spans. In particular, the U.S. mutual fund industry is organized by splitting
funds according to their scope of investment. There are five distinct classes: World Stock,
Foreign Stock, Emerging Market, Regional, and Country funds. These different classes
indicate what type of stocks they are aiming at: World Stock funds can invest everywhere;
Foreign Stock funds can invest everywhere except the U.S.; Emerging Market funds are
supposed to invest only in emerging markets; Regional and Country funds invest only in a
particular region or country, respectively. This classification can be understood as the
different degrees of aggregation of the investment portfolio. For instance, World Stock
funds aggregate Foreign Stock and U.S. funds, Foreign Stock funds aggregate several
Emerging Market, Regional, and Country funds, and so forth. Thus, we compare the
degree of international diversification by comparing the different degrees of investment
specialization within the same mutual fund family. In principle, as the level of aggregation
increases, funds should be able to hold more assets across countries and diversify risk
better.
To clarify our strategy, it is convenient to concentrate on a particular fund family:
Fidelity Group. Fidelity Group has a Regional fund for South East Asia, and has Country
funds for China and Japan (there are more, but let's just keep the example as simple as
possible). These funds are supposed to be investing in different countries/regions, and
therefore their holdings are unlikely to intersect. And indeed, they had no stocks in
common in 2005. Fidelity Group also has a mutual fund for Asia. This fund has access to
all assets that the Regional and Country funds have, and to many other assets as well.
Therefore, we should expect that some of the holdings from the Regional and Country
funds are also present in the Asian fund. Furthermore, Fidelity has a World Stock fund and
Foreign Stock fund, which also include Specialized funds as part of their investment
possibilities - as depicted in Figure 2.1.
Thus, our first question is simply: what is the likelihood that a stock that is held by
a Specialized fund also belongs to the portfolio of Global funds? We find, very
surprisingly, that the likelihood is small. More than 70% of the holdings of Specialized
funds are not shared by their Global counterparts. In other words, as their scope of
investment becomes broader, mutual funds invest in fewer stocks within each region of
exposure. Therefore, the trend in international investing favoring more aggregate funds is
at the expense of some firms (and possibly countries) not having access to those funds. The
latter are likely small firms and small countries, which do not tend to be attractive to large
funds.39
Of course, it is possible to argue that the optimal Specialized fund portfolio should
include a specific asset, but the optimal Global fund portfolio would have a zero weight on
the same asset - maybe because another asset in the world already provides the
diversification benefits that this asset was providing at the regional level. This motivates
our second question. Are investors forgoing gains from international diversification by the
shift toward more global funds? Or, in our example, can Fidelity Asia improve its
performance by investing in Fidelity China? Not any form of investment is assumed; we
only allow a buy and hold strategy, with no short-selling.
Notice that this is a very restrictive question. We are not asking Fidelity Asia to
invest in any possible stock available in Asia. We are asking Fidelity Asia to buy and hold
Fidelity China. If the gains are negligible, it means that the additional stocks in the Fidelity
China fund are not necessarily useful for Fidelity Asia - at least not in the same
proportions as they are currently held in Fidelity China. It could also mean that firms (and
countries) excluded from the investment decisions of more aggregate funds might find it
difficult to attract international capital in the future. Nonetheless, we find conclusive
evidence of the opposite. Fidelity Asia would enormously benefit from investing in
Fidelity China.
In sum, we find that, even within the same fund company, more aggregate funds
(Global funds) are not diversified enough - even though the information costs about
particular stocks have already been paid by the mutual fund company once a Specialized
fund holds them. We study in detail different definitions of what "better performance"
means. They depend on expected returns, variance, and benchmarks to which a fund is
39 See Agaarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki (2005) for an analysis of country level and firm level characteristics
that affect the cross-section of U.S. mutual fund holdings in emerging markets in 2002.
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compared. We are more precise in the empirical section; however, independent of the
definition, we do find significant benefits to diversifying within a mutual fund family.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes our data. Section 2.3
discusses our stylized fact regarding the shift toward more aggregate funds. It also presents
the empirical evidence on the extent of international diversification by analyzing mutual
fund portfolio holdings. Section 2.4 studies whether there are potential gains from further
international diversification by Global funds. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2. Data Description
In this chapter, we focus on U.S. equity mutual funds that are established to purchase
assets around the world. Funds that focus primarily on a debt-equity allocation are
excluded from the analysis, even though they do invest a significant share of their
portfolios in foreign stocks. We use two types of data in our empirical analysis: mutual
fund holdings data and mutual fund price data.
Mutual fund holdings data is available from Morningstar International Equity
Mutual Funds, a private company that collects mutual fund data, and from the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Reports are published on a monthly basis
since 1992. 40 However, mutual funds do not disclose their holdings as frequent. They do so,
at most, on a quarterly basis, and typically bi-annually. Given this heterogeneity in the
releases of holdings, we construct our database with the last reported portfolio information
for each fund for any given year. For example, our sample of mutual fund holdings for
2005 contains portfolio data for the Fidelity Worldwide fund, with portfolio holdings as of
October 2005, and portfolio data for Scudder Global fund, with portfolio holdings as of
December 2005. We collect detailed information on portfolio holdings: stock names,
amount invested in each stock by each fund, and country of origin of these holdings on a
yearly basis.
40 We analyze Morningstar reports from March 1992 to June 2006.
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A difficulty in constructing this database is that holdings for each fund are reported
separately. Moreover, stock identifiers are rarely available, and if so, are not always unique.
We do match these holdings across mutual funds over time based on the country of origin
and the stock name for each security holding.41 We can thus determine whether the same
stocks appear in different mutual fund portfolios over time, across and within fund families.
The top panel of Table 2.1 describes the dataset. We collect data on about 8,000 fund-year
portfolio holdings over the period 1991 to 2005, covering 505 different families of mutual
funds. Each mutual fund family has on average 6 different mutual funds.42 Within each
family, funds are classified as: World Stock funds, Foreign Stock funds, Emerging Market
funds, Latin America and the Caribbean funds, Asia and Pacific funds, Europe funds, and
Country funds. Funds in the first two classifications, World Stock and Foreign Stock, are
also called Global funds throughout this chapter. All other fund types are denominated
Specialized funds, as they invest in a subset of assets that can be held by Global funds.
The other type of data collected is return/price data on mutual funds themselves,
over time. This dataset allows us to assess issues related to the gains from international
diversification at different levels of portfolio aggregation by mutual funds. The data is
available from Bloomberg from September 1989 to June 2006 on a daily basis. As reported
in Table 2.1, we collect data for the largest 36 mutual fund families, including all funds
within a given family of funds. On average, each family has 10 different mutual funds. 43
2.3. The Extent of International Diversification by U.S. Mutual Funds
2.3.1. Recent Trends: Increased Importance of Global Funds
4' The country of origin is available for the 1997-2005 period only. We thus do not attempt any matching of
holdings for earlier periods.
42 Some families sell the same portfolio to investors under different names depending on their fee structure.
Here, we count them as one. For example, Fidelity Advisors Funds had the following funds in 2005: Fidelity
Advisors Latin America A, Fidelity Advisors Latin America B, Fidelity Latin America T, etc. These funds
have a different fee structure and are thus treated differently by Morningstar. However, because they all hold
the same portfolio, we consider them as being the same fund for our purposes.
43 See Appendix Table 2.1 for a detailed description of the sample coverage of the price/returns data for each
mutual fund family.
The total number of funds has increased dramatically in the last two decades. For instance,
in 1991 there were less than 200 U.S. mutual funds established to invest in international
equity, while in 2005, there are almost 800 funds, more than a four-fold increase. This
marked increase is not restricted to a specific type of mutual fund. Figure 2.2A shows the
number of mutual funds from 1991 to 2005 by fund type. Foreign Stock funds are the ones
with the most noticeable increase: from 61 funds in 1991 to 388 in 2005. Emerging market
funds also follow a similar trend: they were almost inexistent in 1991 and there are roughly
75 funds in 2005, although most of this increase happened in the late 1990s. Regional
funds also experience a sizeable growth up to the end of 1990s as well, but have been
decreasing since then. In Figure 2.2B, we aggregate mutual funds into Global and
Specialized funds. Although the number of both fund types has grown four times between
1991 and 2005, there are almost three times as many Global funds as Specialized funds.
Once the size of these funds is taken into account, Global funds are even more
important than Specialized funds, being almost four times as large as Specialized funds in
2005. Global funds manage US$787 billion, whereas Specialized funds have net assets
under management around US$162 billion. Moreover, these fund types have been growing
at different rates. Global funds, especially Foreign Stock funds, have grown much faster
than Specialized funds, as shown in Figures 2.2A and 2.2B. Notice that after 2000,
although the speed at which funds are growing in number has declined, the net assets under
management have continued to increase, and significantly so for Global funds. This
empirical evidence thus shows a clear trend in the U.S. mutual fund industry toward more
aggregate funds (Global funds) over funds that invest in specific regions or countries
(Specialized funds).
2.3.2. Size of Potential Holdings and Actual Holdings
A first step to understand the extent of international diversification by mutual funds is to
analyze the universe of assets that can be held by the sample of mutual funds analyzed in
this chapter. As already highlighted, they can potentially invest in stocks anywhere in the
world. Table 2.2A reports the size of this universe of stocks in 1997 and in 2004.44,45 It
shows the total number of listed stocks across different regions for both developed and
developing countries. These potential holdings are larger in developing countries than in
developed countries. However, this difference has fallen over time. The number of stocks
has grown 40% during the period in developed countries, but "only" 20% in developing
countries - mostly concentrated in developing Europe.
This universe of potential holdings is large, and not surprisingly, mutual funds only
invest in a fraction of these assets. Table 2.2A reports the actual number and size of mutual
fund holdings. In 1997, funds invested in around 9,000 different firms. In developed
countries, they held around 6,800 firms, an average of 50% of the available assets, and
invested US$204 billion on these firms. However, in developing countries, these numbers
are much smaller: they held only 2,271 firms, or 13% of the available stocks, that
amounted to an investment of US$30 billion. To further analyze this evidence, Figure 2.3
reports the distribution of these investment ratios across countries, averaged over the 1997-
2004 period.46 Countries are sorted by the extent of foreign investments they receive
measured by the ratio of number of assets held by mutual funds over the total number of
listed stocks. Countries are divided in five equally-sized groups (quintiles). Reinforcing the
previous evidence, this figure shows that mutual fund holdings are not evenly spread
across countries. Half of the countries in the sample have investment ratios of 20% or less.
For example, only developed countries appear in the highest quintile. Among developing
countries, Mexico is the one with the largest ratio (44%), whereas among developed
44 Assets in the U.S. and Canada have been excluded from this table as we focus on the international holdings
of mutual funds. Offshore centers have also been excluded from this table as firms usually only have offices
in these centers, but their main operations are somewhere else.
45 This number is an underestimation of the true universe of assets that can be purchased by mutual funds.
First, mutual funds occasionally hold assets that are not listed in stock exchanges and therefore would not
show up in these aggregate numbers. This is the case when they buy government bonds for example. And
second, there are a number of firms, especially from developing countries, with headquarters and operations
in one country but with stock exchange listings in another, usually in financial centers such as London, U.K.
Thus, they would also not be counted in the number of total listed firms in its own country, but actually in
another one.
46 The reported numbers are an overestimation of the true values, for the same reasons why the total number
of listed stocks is an underestimation of the true values.
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countries, Netherlands has the largest ratio (77%). In the bottom two percentiles, there are
24 developing countries but only four developed countries. In sum, mutual funds tend to
hold a larger fraction of listed firms from developed countries than from developing
countries.
Although the universe of listed companies has increased between 1997 and 2004,
there has been a considerable fall in the number of mutual fund holdings during this period,
as shown in Table 2.2A. These holdings are spread across 1,085 different firms in
developing countries and around 5,200 in developed countries in 2004. These numbers
represent a decline in holdings that has not been concentrated in any particular region, but
has been more accentuated in developing countries - a fall of 52% is observed, evenly
spread across the different regions. In developed countries, the number of holdings decline
24%. Notice however that the amount invested in these foreign firms has increased
significantly over time. Mutual funds invest 119% more in developed countries in 2004
than they did in 1997. Similarly, in developing countries, the amount invested increases by
106%, to US$62 billion. Thus, this evidence implies that a smaller subset of firms is
receiving a growing amount of investments from these institutional investors.
As shown in Table 2.2B, a similar pattern emerges when we focus on Global funds
only, the mutual fund type that has grown more significantly in recent years. In 1997, they
held 4,953 different firms in developed countries, an average 38% of the number of
potential stocks available. This is a smaller fraction than the average in the U.S. mutual
fund industry as a whole. In 2004, these holdings have decreased to 4,799 firms, only 26%
of the available assets. In developing countries, the number of holdings fell approximately
46%, from 1,314 to 711 firms, or equivalently, from 8% to only 3% of the number of
available stocks. This fraction is also smaller than the industry average.
Although the number of holdings has been falling, the amount invested in these
stocks has grown significantly, in both developed and developing countries. Investments in
developed countries have increased from US$178 billion to US$392 billion, more than
doubling during this period. In developing countries, investments have increased from
US$17 billion in 1997 to US$31 billion in 2004. Thus, the evidence for Global funds
reinforces our previous results: a growing amount of funds is being invested in fewer firms,
and more significantly so in developing countries.
2.3.3. Actual Holdings: Further Evidence
In this section, we explore if and how mutual fund holdings vary across different fund
types. In other words, we evaluate the extent of international diversification among mutual
funds across and within fund families for different investment spans. In principle, as the
level of aggregation increases, funds should be able to hold more assets across countries
and diversify risk better. However, if this turns out not to be the case, the trend in
international investing favoring more aggregate funds will be at the expense of some firms,
and possibly even countries, not having access to funds from this pool of investors.
Figure 2.4 shows the average number of holdings for different mutual fund types
from 1991 to 2005. The top panel reports these averages for the following fund types:
World Stock funds (with and without U.S. holdings), Foreign Stock funds, Emerging
Market funds, and Regional funds. The average number of holdings is surprisingly stable
over time and similar across fund types. Global funds hold on average between 100 and
190 stocks, with no trend clearly observed over time. Holdings of Emerging Market funds
fluctuate between 70 and 170 stocks, very similar to the number of holdings of Foreign
Stock funds. Regional funds hold slightly less stocks, on average between 90 and 120. In
the bottom panel of Figure 2.4, Regional funds are expanded into its three categories: Latin
America and the Caribbean funds, Asia and Pacific funds, and Europe funds. The average
number of holdings for Country funds is also shown. The same pattern is observed for all
these funds: there is no clear trend and the number of stocks is similar across the different
types.
Although we present some evidence that the number of holdings is relatively stable
over time and across fund types, we have not yet shown how important are family effects.
Figures 2.5A and 2.5B show the average number of holdings within the largest mutual
fund families, averaged across all funds within a given family. The figures suggest that
there is a great variance in these numbers across families. Some families, e.g. GAM Funds
and Oppenheimer Funds, hold on average a lot less than 200 stocks, while others hold at
least two times more, e.g. Dreyfus Founders and Vanguard Group. There is also
heterogeneity in the number of holdings within mutual fund families. In some families,
there is almost no variance in the number of holdings across different funds, e.g. Smith
Barney Group and Goldman Sachs Management Group, whereas in others there is a large
difference, e.g. DFA Investment Dimensions Group and Morgan Stanley Funds. Thus,
family effects do seem large and potentially important.
Next, we compare how important are family effects versus time and fund type
effects to explain the number of holdings across mutual funds over time. In Table 2.3, we
report a summary of regressions of the number of holdings, as our dependent variable, on
year, fund type, and family dummies. The dummy coefficients are not reported, although
they are usually significant at 1% confidence level. Seven different specifications are
reported. In the first specification only year dummies are considered. In this case, less than
1% of the variance in these mutual fund holdings can be explained. Next, we report a
regression with fund type dummies alone. Once more, a small percentage of the variance
of our dependent variable, only 3%, can be explained by these dummies. If an interaction
between family and year dummies are considered, as in specification three, the R-square
increases to 0.05, still a small number though. Next, in the fourth specification, we include
family dummies. In this case, 46% of the variance in the number of holdings across funds
over time can be explained by family effects, a much greater percentage than what was
explained by fund type and year effects alone. The last three reported regressions include
family dummies and: fund type dummies; or fund type and year dummies; or alternatively,
dummies with the interactions between family and year effects. In all these cases, there is
only a slight increase in the R-squared. Therefore, family effects indeed seem to be the
relevant ones to explain mutual fund holdings. Lastly, given the importance of family
effects, Figure 2.6 illustrates the size of the family effect. It shows the distribution of the
estimated coefficients for family dummies in specification four of Table 2.3. The estimated
coefficients are sorted from the lowest to the highest value. There is large heterogeneity in
family effects, reinforcing our previous evidence.
In sum, we have shown so far that mutual fund managers tend to invest in a finite -
and rather small - number of stocks almost independently of the level of country
aggregation. In other words, the number of stocks in a fund's portfolio does not tend to rise
significantly as funds have a broader mandate to invest in more countries. However, there
is a lot of heterogeneity in mutual fund holdings that can be partly explained by mutual
fund family effects.
2.3.4. International Diversification by Mutual Funds
In this section, we extend the evidence presented so far by addressing a more specific
question: what is the likelihood that a stock held by a Specialized fund also belongs to the
portfolio of Global funds, within the same family of funds? Do Global funds hold only a
subset of the assets that Specialized funds hold? Or do they hold a completely different
portfolio? We are thus trying to shed light on the portfolio composition of funds with
different scope of investments.
To answer these questions, we compute frequency counts in our sample. In other
words, we count the number of observations for pairs of fund types in which: either a stock
is held by a certain fund type but not held by the other; or a stock is held by both types of
funds; or a stock is not held by either of these two types, but some other fund type holds it.
This comparison is made between the following pairs of funds: World Stock vs. Foreign
Stock funds; Global vs. Specialized Funds; World Stock vs. Specialized funds; and
Foreign Stock vs. Specialized funds. Given the large heterogeneity in holdings across
mutual fund families, these frequency counts are done within mutual fund families. Hence,
if a given family does not have both types of funds analyzed, it is excluded from the
frequency count. Each observation is thus a family-year-stock observation. The results are
shown in Table 2.4A, for all foreign holdings in the sample, and Table 2.4B, for holdings
in developing countries. Each of these tables is divided into four sub-tables, representing
the different comparisons between fund types. In each of these sub-tables, we report
relative frequencies of each cell, i.e., the unconditional probabilities.
First, we analyze the composition of portfolios within Global funds, i.e. the
comparison between World Stock and Foreign Stock funds reported in Table 2.4A.47 In our
sample, there is a 15% probability that a stock is held by both World Stock and Foreign
Stock funds, conditional on a family having both types of Global funds. Moreover,
conditional on being held by a Foreign Stock fund, there is a 24% probability that a stock
is also held by a World Stock fund. On the other hand, if a stock is held by a World Stock
fund, there is 56% probability that it would also be held by the Foreign Stock fund.
Therefore, being held by a Foreign Stock fund suggests a high probability that a Global
fund can also invest in this firm, but the opposite is not the case. The results suggest that
Foreign Stock funds hold more assets than World Stock funds. Nevertheless, they also
have a significant number of common stock holdings - there is a 15% probability that this
is indeed the case.
Next, we analyze the portfolio holdings of Global funds versus Specialized funds.
Given that Global funds are growing a lot faster than Specialized funds, this comparison
can shed light on the consequences of this trend to foreign firms (and countries) trying to
attract capital from these institutional investors. The evidence in Table 2.4A suggests that
these funds do share some of their holdings - 16% of actual holdings are shared by both
fund types. For example, conditional on being held by a Specialized fund, there is a
probability of 33% that a Global fund would hold the asset as well. These funds also have
a significant share of their portfolios in a different subset of assets. For instance, 25% of
the observations imply holdings by only Global Funds, although there is a Specialized fund
that could potentially invest in these assets. On the other hand, 32% of the observations
imply holdings to Specialized funds alone even though these families do have Global funds.
It should be noted though that there is a subset of assets, 27% of the observations, that are
held by Global funds alone because there is no Specialized fund covering that region.
47 U.S. assets are excluded from the analysis here.
These numbers suggest that, conditional on the existence a Specialized fund covering a
particular region, Specialized funds would actually hold a larger set of assets than Global
funds. But if absolute numbers are considered, then Global funds might actually invest in a
greater number of assets.
However, if only holdings in developing countries are analyzed, as reported in
Table 2.4B, these results become stronger: 76% of the observations imply holdings by only
Specialized funds, whereas the same number for Global funds is only 10%. The set of
assets held by Global funds alone because of no Specialized fund decreases significantly to
less than 2%. Moreover, if conditional probabilities are analyzed, these numbers are even
more striking. Conditional on being held by a Specialized fund, there is a 91% probability
that a stock is not held by a World Stock fund and an 87% that it is not held by a Foreign
Stock fund. As expected, these funds also have common holdings in developing countries
- 13% of them are shared. In sum, the vast majority of the mutual fund holdings in firms
from developing countries are done through Specialized funds and not through Global
funds. This evidence also implies that the results from Table 2.4A are being driven by
holdings in developed countries - Global funds seem to be holding a larger set of firms in
developed countries than Specialized funds, but mostly because there are not many
Specialized funds covering these countries.
We have also distinguished between the different types of Global funds, namely
World Stock and Foreign Stock funds, and compared them with Specialized funds. The
results reported in the bottom sub-tables of Tables 2.4A and 2.4B reinforce the evidence
above. It suggests that there is not a significant difference on portfolio holdings across
Global funds: Specialized funds invest in a wider set of assets than both World Stock and
Foreign Stock funds. They also have holdings in common assets. However, once all
holdings are analyzed, the difference in the portfolio composition between World Stock
and Foreign Stock funds made above is apparent. Conditional on being held by a
Specialized fund, there is a 16% probability that a World Stock fund would also hold this
asset. This probability increases to 30% if Foreign Stock funds are considered. In other
words, the intersection of portfolio holdings between Specialized funds and Foreign Stock
funds is significantly larger than with World Stock funds. This last result is being driven
by portfolio holdings the larger number of holdings of Foreign Stock funds than that of
World Stock funds.
The evidence reported in this section suggests that there is some intersection among
the holdings of different mutual fund types. But the size of this commonality varies
according to the different fund types in question and the different investment regions. We
find that more almost 70% of the holdings of Specialized funds are not shared by their
Global counterparts. This number is even larger if only holdings in developing countries
are considered. On the other hand, the number of Global fund holdings not shared by their
Specialized counterparts is small in developing countries. This suggests that in developing
countries, Global funds tend to hold a subset of what Specialized funds hold. In developed
countries, they do share some of the same assets; however a considerable part of Global
fund portfolios is kept in different assets than the ones in Specialized fund portfolios. This
result is being driven though by the lack of Specialized funds covering these countries.
In broad terms, the evidence in this section suggests that as their scope of
investment becomes broader, mutual funds invest in fewer stocks (and possibly fewer
countries) within each region of exposure. Therefore, the trend in international investing
favoring more aggregate funds are at the expense of some firms not having access to those
funds. The latter are likely small firms (and small countries), which do not tend to be
attractive to large funds.
2.3.5. Entropy Measures
In the previous section, we analyzed the portfolio composition of funds with different
scopes of investment. We focused on how similar mutual fund portfolios are. However, we
have not addressed for example the size of investments in common assets. We have
presented evidence that Global funds hold only a small subset of the stocks that
Specialized funds hold. But if the loadings on those stocks are high, the portfolios would
actually be more similar than they appear right now. Therefore, in this section, we study
entropy or similarity/commonality measures to analyze how similar mutual fund
investments actually are.
The entropy measure is constructed as follows:
ZNA V,,,I, + Z NA V,',
s = Common Assets, s = Common Assets,
Entropy,, = -= FundType i j= FundType j
SNA V
s = All Assets,
f= FundTypes i, j
Where:
NA Vs,,/, is the net asset value of investments in stock s, by funds in family f, at time t;
i, j e {Global, World Stock, Foreign Stock, Specialized).
In words, for a given pair of fund types, it is the ratio between the sum of mutual
fund investments in assets common to the portfolio of these two fund types over the total
net assets of the same two fund types in a given year for a given family. This measure is
constructed within families, given the large family effects on the number of holdings. As
reported in the previous section, the following pairs of fund types are analyzed: World
Stock and Foreign Stock funds, Global and Specialized funds, World Stock and
Specialized funds, and Foreign Stock and Specialized funds.
The summary statistics for this entropy measure are reported in the top panel of
Table 2.5. In the bottom panel of Table 2.5, we constructed this entropy measured based
only on holdings in developing countries. The results are very similar in the two cases.
Within Global Funds, World Stock and Foreign Stock funds do share 50% of their
portfolio investments in common assets. This suggests that their portfolios are more similar
than the previous section had pointed to. Between Global and Specialized funds, the
entropy measure also implies more similar portfolios, although the numbers are not as high:
on average, 36% of investments are made in common assets. This number is only slightly
higher if developing countries alone are considered. If World Stock funds and Foreign
Stock funds are separately compared to Specialized funds, then the entropy measures
indicate a lower degree of commonality in portfolio investments, 26% and 28%,
respectively. Nevertheless, the standard deviation in all these comparisons is high,
indicating that family and time effects can be large.
In Figure 2.7, we evaluate time effects. The figure shows the evolution of our
entropy measures, averaged across families. Surprisingly, these measures seem to be
falling over time. A decrease in these measures indicates that mutual fund portfolios are
becoming less similar. In other words, they have been investing a smaller share of their
portfolios in assets that are common across fund types.
Next, we evaluate the relative importance of time and family effects to explain
variations in our entropy measures of portfolio similarities. We regress the four different
measures on year and family dummies. The results are shown Table 2.6. For each pair of
funds analyzed, three regression specifications are reported: the first one with time
dummies, the second with only family dummies, and the third with both time and family
dummies. The results are comparable across the different pairs of fund types: time effects
explain around 3% of the variance in the entropy measures; family effects alone explain a
significantly larger proportion of this variance, around 75%. When both family and time
effects are considered, approximately 80% of the variance in the entropy measures can be
explained. This outcome is similar to the evidence reported in Section 2.3.3.
In sum, we find that a considerably large proportion of the number holdings of
Specialized funds are not shared by their Global counterparts. Moreover, once the size of
mutual fund investments is considered, this number remains significantly high. In other
words, as their scope of investment becomes broader, mutual funds invest a growing
amount of funds in fewer stocks (and possibly fewer countries) within each region of
exposure, especially in developing countries. One possible reason for this lack of
international diversification in the portfolio of more aggregate funds is the existence of
transaction costs. It is possible that Global funds are relatively large, and thus, are unable
to buy and hold some of the smaller stocks in emerging markets without incurring in large
transactions costs. Another reason could be costly information gathering. However, if there
is any communication at all within mutual fund families, this cannot be the case. Even
worse, this information is actually supposed to be public. So, there is no reason (at least
legally) why Specialized funds don't just simply print out their holdings and share them
with the Global fund manager. Of course, one reason could be that there are actually no
benefits to this diversification. This is the theme of the following section.
2.4. Gains from International Diversification
In the second part of the chapter, we explore two alternative explanations for why, during
the process of expanding the scope of investment, mutual funds drop stocks that are held at
the regional level. First, we analyze the hypothesis that there are no gains from further
international diversification for Global funds. We find actually that there are significant
gains from the extra diversification, although there is heterogeneity among different fund
families. We show that relatively cheap strategies, such as buy and hold, provide large
gains that should compensate for transaction costs. Next, we test whether benchmark
effects would justify the portfolio of choice of Global funds. Managers are generally
evaluated on their performance relative to benchmark indices. Thus, portfolio decisions
should incorporate these managerial incentives. We assess whether this extra constraint is
sufficient to eliminate the gains from further diversification, as found in the previous
exercise. Our results suggest that benchmark effects cannot explain the empirical evidence
described in Section 2.3. Moreover, based on the results of the two tests we also conjecture
that transaction costs are not large enough to offset the large gains from international
diversification found. However, further tests are required for a definitive answer.
2.4.1. Empirical Strategy
In this section, we test different hypothesis for why, during the process of expanding the
scope of investment, mutual funds drop stocks that are held at the regional level. Our first
hypothesis is that Global funds do not need to increase their number of holdings. They
already obtain the diversification provided by these extra assets by holding assets not
available to Regional funds. We thus ask: how can we evaluate the gains from
diversification that Global funds lose by not holding the stocks that Regional fund hold?
The first possibility is to construct a portfolio that includes all the stocks in the
investment universe of a fund. We could then evaluate the performance of this new
portfolio in several dimensions, preferably out-of-sample. This exercise almost surely will
show that there are huge gains from diversification that have not been exploited. Indeed,
the exercise is too unrestrictive and with too many degrees of freedom, which make
unlikely the fact that it cannot improve upon the performance of the Global fund.
A second possibility is to restrict this portfolio to include only the stocks dropped
within the mutual fund family, allowing any position on that stock. This strategy is more
restrictive than the previous one; however there are still too many degrees of freedom.
When you drop 100 stocks from different Specialized funds, it is still too easy to improve
upon the performance of the Global fund.
Therefore, we have chosen a more conservative strategy to test the existence of
further gains from international trade. We allow Global funds to invest in a portfolio that
replicates exactly Specialized fund holdings, within the same mutual fund family. In other
words, we are not asking Global funds to design their own strategies, but to follow exactly
the portfolio that Specialized funds hold - portfolio that indeed is public information.
Furthermore, we do not allow shorting of any of the Specialized funds.
There is an important advantage in concentrating these simulated portfolios at the
family level - we can easily argue that the cost of collecting information has already been
paid. In other words, if there is a cost to collect information about a particular country, or
about a particular stock, then the fact that one mutual fund within a family of funds is
already holding the asset is an indication that at least someone in the company has already
paid for those costs. Therefore, if another fund within this same family is not holding the
asset, it cannot be because the information cost has not been paid.
2.4.2. Optimization Strategies
There are several ways in which a portfolio can be constructed and evaluated. In this
section we describe the ones we have focused on. The following restrictions are imposed:
1. Portfolios can be constructed for a specific fund type (among Global funds)
using the respective fund itself and funds within the same mutual fund family
with lower degrees of aggregation (Specialized funds).
2. Strategies can only be buy and hold.
3. Funds cannot be shorted.
4. The performance evaluation is always conducted out-of-sample.
5. The portfolio is optimized on a daily basis.
For instance, assume that there is a Global fund whose return history we observe
and that we identify it as G. Assume that this Global fund is comprised of several
Specialized funds, whose returns are denoted S,. We can then construct a portfolio P,
which puts non-negative weights on all Specialized mutual funds and on the Global fund
itself. This portfolio P is the optimal portfolio that minimizes its own variance but it is
constrained at achieving at least the same expected return as the Global fund itself. The
optimization problem is described by (2.1) and (2.2). As already mentioned, this portfolio
is constructed and evaluated out of sample - i.e. portfolio shares are computed at time t and
held for the next period. We call this simulation approach our active strategy because we
re-optimize portfolio weights every period.
Min var(P)= x'Tx , (2.1)
x
100
such that:
E(P) 2 E(G)
0 x < 1 (2.2)
-x, <1
i
i i
There is a multitude of possibilities, and therefore, almost by construction this
exercise is limited. Although it is incomplete in many dimensions, most mutual funds are
compared and evaluated along two dimensions, once administrative aspects and their
investment objective has been determined: returns and variances. In other words, Global
mutual funds are evaluated according to their return and variance, after costs and loads
have been taken into account. What we are doing in the exercise described above is to keep
the return "constant", i.e. with the same objective, and to try to find a better portfolio in
terms of its volatility.
Alternatively, another exercise we perform is to keep the variance "constant" and to
maximize the expected return. This also active strategy is described as:
Max E(P) (2.3)
x
such that:
var(P) 5 var(G)
0 5 x, 5 1 (2.4)
yx, <1
P = (1 - x,) * G + ,x, * S,
i i
Furthermore, we can perform these exercises at several degrees of aggregation. We
thus compare Specialized and World Stock funds, Specialized and Foreign Stock funds,
Specialized funds and a portfolio of World Stock funds, and Specialized funds and a
portfolio of Foreign Stock funds. Portfolios of either World Stock or Foreign Stock funds
exist when more than one fund in a mutual fund family is classified as a Global fund but
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their main objective is either value, growth, or blend strategies. These funds aim at
different sets of assets than "plain" Global funds. However, Specialized funds usually do
not clearly state these investment strategies. We are thus trying to make a fairer
comparison by putting together these Global funds. Regarding comparisons within
Specialized funds, e.g. compare Regional and Emerging Market funds, we cannot make
them because their scope of investment (or their aggregation) across fund types does not
perfectly overlap, as in the studied cases.
Finally, and probably the most important benefit of these strategies is that we do
not need to identify the exact stocks dropped across different mutual funds. In other words,
the only information we need to perform this exercise is mutual fund returns and fund
characteristics, i.e. the type of investments they are supposed to follow. This allows us to
extend the time horizon of the data to start in the late 80's.
The summary statistics of these simulations are shown in two tables. In Table 2.7A
we report the best simulation for each Global fund. These simulations typically include the
largest possible number of Specialized funds, but generally do not have a very long time
span due to data availability on mutual fund returns. In Table 2.7B we report the longest
simulation for each Global fund - typically fewer Specialized funds are available within
each of one of them, but a longer time span is covered. The following statistics are
presented: the annualized returns for both Global fund and the constructed portfolio (called
"active strategy"), the annualized improvement in returns if the constructed portfolio is
compared with the Global fund, daily standard deviation of returns, and the number of
simulations. We report averages across mutual fund families.
In the top panel of these tables, we report the summary statistics of portfolios built
based on equations (2.1) and (2.2). The tables with the best simulations show that using
our active strategy the average annualized return of the portfolio increases by 509 basis
points per year for the World Stock funds, by 404 basis points for the Foreign Stock funds,
and by 1,159 and 397 basis points for the portfolio of World Stock and Foreign Stock
funds, respectively. With these increases in expected returns, it is hard to justify the lack of
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diversification on transaction costs! Again, this is assuming that they invest in other funds
within the same family of funds - so there is no extra cost on acquiring information.
Moreover, the daily standard deviation of the constructed portfolio returns is also smaller
than the one on the Global fund. It falls by 9 basis points for the World Stock funds, by 6
basis points for the Foreign Stock funds, and by 8 and 6 basis points for the portfolio of
World Stock and Foreign Stock funds, respectively. Although this number seems small, it
is important to remember that this is the reduction in the daily standard deviation.48
If the longest possible simulations are considered, the results are still surprising.
For example, the average improvement in returns is around 289 basis points per year and
the improvement in the daily standard deviation of returns is 7 basis points. The results are
more modest though than the ones reported on Table 2.7A. The reason is that fewer
Specialized funds are available when the longest simulations are considered. This implies
that there is less scope for improvement than in the other case.
In the bottom of Tables 2.7A and 2.7B, we report the summary statistics of
portfolios constructed based on equations (2.3) and (2.4), i.e. maximization of the portfolio
expected return holding its variance constant. 49 Considering the simulations with the
greater number of Specialized funds, the improvements in annualized returns are around
161 basis point, whereas the improvement in the daily standard deviation is almost
negligible at less than 1 basis point. If the longest simulations are considered, the
improvement in returns is around 80 basis points and the improvement in the daily
standard deviation is at 1 basis point, on average.
Therefore, the results on these simulations allow us to reject our first hypothesis:
there are gains from further diversification to be made in both dimensions - return and
48 We computed these tables at the family level as well. The results are shown in Appendix Table 2.2A for
the best simulations, and in Appendix Table 2.2B for the longest simulation for each mutual fund. As
expected, there is a lot of heterogeneity among them.
49 The results at the mutual fund family level are reported on Appendix Tables 2.3A and 2.3B. There is a lot
of heterogeneity in the results across mutual fund families.
103
volatility, although there is some heterogeneity in the results depending on the strategy
used.5°
2.4.3. Benchmarking
The optimization strategies described in the previous section are perhaps a little bit
unrestricted because the objective of most mutual funds is not necessarily to minimize the
variance given some expected return, or to maximize returns given some variance. The
performance of mutual funds is actually evaluated in comparison to benchmark indexes.
Moreover, managers are usually compensated according to this relative performance. Thus,
portfolio decisions should incorporate these managerial incentives. We test whether these
benchmark effects would justify the portfolio of choice of Global funds. In other words,
we assess whether this extra constraint is sufficient to eliminate the gains from further
diversification found in the previous exercise.
In the case of the first strategy, the variance minimization one, we modify the
objective function to take into consideration a benchmark index. The benchmark is the
appropriate MSCI index, specific for each Global fund as described in the Morningstar
database. Instead of minimizing the variance of the portfolio, we minimize the variance of
the difference between the portfolio and the benchmark index. Thus, equation (2.5)
replaces equation (2.1) for this strategy. The constraints of this problem are unchanged and
remain as stated in (2.2):
Min var(P - Bench). (2.5)
For our second strategy, the maximization of expected returns, we impose an
additional restriction: the variance of the difference between the portfolio and the
benchmark index has to be at most the same as the variance of the difference between the
Global fund and the benchmark index. Equation (2.6) states this additional restriction:
50o For robustness purposes, we try these simulations with a more restricted sample. We use rolling windows
of 240 business days. The results are robust. They are reported in Appendix Tables 2.4A and 2.4B.
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var(P - GfBench) < var(G - Gench,) (2.6)
The results of these new simulations are reported on Table 2.8A for simulations
with the greatest number of Specialized funds for each Global fund, and on Table 2.8B for
the longest simulations for each Global fund, and thus fewer Specialized funds. Once more,
the tables report averages across mutual fund families.
For simulations that minimize the variance of the portfolio, the results are similar to
the ones reported in the previous section. For simulations with the greatest number of
Specialized funds, reported on the top panel of Table 2.8A, there is an improvement in
annualized returns of 375 basis points for World Stock funds, 397 basis points for Foreign
Stock funds, 735 basis points for portfolio of World Stock funds, and 334 for portfolios of
Foreign Stock Funds. Thus, even for this strategy with benchmarking considerations, the
increase in expected returns is large and hard to justify the lack of diversification based on
transaction costs. Improvements in the standard deviation are also observed. On average,
the daily standard deviation falls 4 basis points. If the longest simulations are considered,
as reported in the top panel of Table 2.8B, the results are consistently robust. There is an
increase in annualized expected returns of 262 basis points on average across the different
simulations, and a decrease in daily standard deviations of 3 basis points.
If the second strategy is considered, the results are even stronger than before. In
Table 2.8A, we report an improvement in annualized returns of 251 basis points on
average across mutual fund families and an improvement in daily standard deviations of 4
basis points. In Table 2.8B, where fewer Specialized funds are included in portfolio
simulations, the improvement in returns is 168 basis points, but reaches 544 basis points
for the portfolio of World Stock funds. The improvement in daily standard deviations is
also considerable: 10 basis points on average across mutual fund families.
Therefore, our results suggest that benchmark effects cannot explain the empirical
evidence described in Section 2.3. We find that even within the same fund company more
aggregate funds are not nearly internationally diversified enough. Although we do use
restrictions in our simulations, including benchmarking restrictions, it is important to
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highlight that these simulations are far from fully satisfactory. Other restrictions can be
used, and should be implemented, to evaluate the robustness of our results. For instance,
we could include a value-at-risk constraint in which we limit the maximum loss the
portfolio can bear. We can also evaluate the insurance they provide against some particular
shock, or market condition.
2.5. Conclusion
In this chapter we study the old question of international diversification. Using a novel data
set that describes in detail all stock holdings of U.S. mutual funds that invest in
international stocks, we find two main results. First, Global mutual funds are not nearly
diversified enough. Second, there are gains from further international diversification that
can be achieved by simply replicating portfolios that are already being implemented within
the same family of funds.
In the first part of the chapter, we find that as their scope of investment becomes
broader, mutual funds invest in fewer stocks (and possibly fewer countries) within each
region of exposure. Therefore, the identified trend in international investing favoring more
aggregate funds is at the expense of some firms not having access to these funds. It is
likely that small firms (and small countries), which do not tend to be attractive to large
funds, are the ones being excluded from the portfolio of Global funds. However, further
research is needed to better understand the characteristics of stocks (and perhaps countries)
dropped by Global funds. If indeed stocks are being consistently excluded from the
portfolio of Global funds, then these firms (and even countries) will have more difficulty in
raising capital from foreign investors.
In the second part of the chapter, we test two alternative hypotheses regarding the
reasons behind the empirical regularities documented in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. We find that,
even within the same mutual fund company, more aggregate funds can gain substantially
from further international diversification. Moreover, the costly information gathering
hypothesis cannot explain this finding because supposedly mutual fund families have
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already paid for the information cost about particular stocks once their Specialized funds
are investing in them. One hypothesis is that mutual fund managers have a limited capacity
to manage information, and therefore, they can only handle a maximum number of assets.
This has important implications for the optimal portfolios of investors willing to achieve
optimal international diversification. Another possibility is the existence of an insurance
premium in the returns of Global funds - there might be some gains during turbulent times
achieved through the extra flexibility available to them. Investors might be willing to pay
something for this benefit. We leave the analysis of these possibilities for future research.
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Figure 2.1. An Example of the Structure of the U.S. Mutual Funds Industry: Fidelity Group
This figure shows the structure of a family of funds analyzed in this paper - Fidelity Group. (This figure does not include all funds within this
family.) This is just an example to characterize the organization of U.S. mutual fund families that invest in foreign assets. See description in the
main text for more details. The figure also clarifies our classification between Global and Specialized Funds. Global Funds include both World
Stock and Foreign Stock funds. Specialized funds include: Emerging Market funds, Regional funds, and Country funds.
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Figure 2.2A. Total Number of U.S. Mutual Funds and Total Assets under Management by Fund Type
This figure shows the total number of U.S. mutual funds and their total assets under management by fund type from 1991 to 2005. World Stock
funds are allowed to invest anywhere in the world, Foreign Stock funds are also allowed to invest in all countries in the world with the exception
of the U.S., Emerging Market funds can invest in emerging markets, Regional funds invest in specific regions, and Country funds, in specific
countries. Thus, for World Stock funds, the value of assets under management that are invested in non-U.S. assets is also shown (data available
after 1997 only). The following Regional funds are included in this figure: Latin America and Caribbean, Europe, and Asia and Pacific funds.
Data on assets under management are in US$ billions. The data source is Morningstar International Equity Mutual Funds.
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Figure 2.2B. Total Number of U.S. Mutual Funds and Total Assets under Management by Fund Type
This figure shows the total number of U.S. mutual funds and their total assets under management by fund type from 1991 to 2005. Global funds
include both World Stock and Foreign Stock funds. Specialized funds include: Emerging Market funds, Regional funds, and Country funds. For
Global funds, the value of assets under management that are invested in non-U.S. assets is also shown (data available after 1997 only). The
following Regional funds are included in this figure: Latin America and Caribbean, Europe, and Asia and Pacific funds. Data on assets under
management are in US$ billions. The data source is Morningstar International Equity Mutual Funds.
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Figure 2.3. Mutual Fund Holdings as a Proportion of the Total No. of Listed Stocks: Distribution across Countries
This figure shows the number of mutual find holdings as a percentage of the total number of listed stocks by country. Countries are sorted sccording to their average ratio in the 1997-2004 period. Countries 
are
divided into five equaly-sized groups (quintiles); the average and maximum values for each quintile are reported. The U.S. and Canada are excluded from figure. The data sources are Momingstar International
Equity Mutual Funds and Global Financial Database, * "All China' includes the following countries: China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan-
200
150
100
50
V
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
World Stock World Stock - Ex-U.S. Holdings
- - - - - Foreign Stock Emerging Market
Regional
Regional and Country Funds
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Latin America and the Caribbean = - Asia and Pacific
.- I Europe 
---- Country Funds
Figure 2.4. Average Number of Holdings by Fund Type
This figure shows the average number of holdings by mutual fund type between 1991 and 2005. The following
mutual fund types are shown in the top panel of the figure: World Stock, Foreign Stock, Emerging Market, and
Regional funds. The average number of foreign holdings of World Stock mutual funds is also shown. In the
bottom panel, Regional funds are divided into three different categories, namely: Latin America and Caribbean,
Europe, and Asia and Pacific funds. The average number of holdings for Country funds is also reported in the
bottom panel. The data source is Morningstar International Equity Mutual Funds.
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Figure 2.5. Average No. of Holdings by Mutual Fund Families
This figure shows the average number of holdings (thick line) by mutual fund family from 1991 to 2005 It also shows +/- one standard deviation from this average (dotted lines) The
data source is Morningstar International Equity Mutual Funds
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
Columbia Funds
800
600
400
200
0
-200
I
i
-200
N~tnQ~~C ~ 5R
-2C
J.P. Morgan Funds
Merril Lynch Group
800
600
4001 -+ +
200 .
-200
ggggg g o~ooooe~
MFS Family of Funds
800
600
400 soo --- "-"4-- -" +.
200
-200
Morgan Stanley Funds
600
400 + + -+200
0
-200
0' 0 n 0 0' ggg
Oppenheimer Funds
8oos
600
- , -
P  
400
+ 0
-200
C, 01 CC, a, C
- Putnam Funds
(c, 
- - -
600
400
200
-200 -
-
-200 - - - --- -
T. Rowe Price Funds
Sccuder Funds Smith Barney Group
Templeton Group Vanguard Group
Figure 2.5. (Cont'd.) Average No. of Holdings per Mutual Fund Family
This figure shows the average number of holdings (thick line) by mutual fund family from 1991 to 2005. It also shows +/- one standard deviation from this average (dotted lines). Thedata source is Morningstar International Equity Mutual Funds.
· ·
Janus
Opehemr 
ud
800o~l~l
io
~Pf~~fi F i i~
1,000 . .. . . . . . . . . . ..------- - -. ... . .  .
800
600
400
200
-200
-400 ...
Figure 2.6. Family Fixed Effects
This figure shows the estimated coefficients on family fixed effects of the regression reported on
column (4) of Table 4. The estimated coefficients are ordered from the smallest to the largest value.
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Figure 2.7. Evolution of Entropy Measures
This figure shows the evolution of our entropy meaures from 1997 to 2005. The thick line is the average across families in a given year. The
figure also shows +/- one standard deviation from this average (dotted grey lines).The four different measures based on the pairs of mutual
fund types are considered: World Stock and Foreign Stock funds (left-top panel), Global and Specialized funds (right-top panel), World Stock
and Specialized funds (left-bottom panel), and Foreign Stock and Specialized funds (right-bottom panel). Specialized funds include:
Emerging Market, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and Pacific, Europe, and Country funds. In each of these tables, if any given family
does not have both types of funds analyzed, it is excluded. U.S. holdings are not included in these figures.
-- 
------ 
-
Stocks Common to Global and Specialized Funds
Table 2.1. Data Coverage
Holdings Data
Sample 1991-2005
Frequency Annual
No. of Families 505
Average Number of Funds per Family 6
Price Data
Sample 09/18/1989 - 06/12/2006
Frequency Daily
No. of Families 36
Average Number of Funds per Family 10
This table describes the two datasets used in this paper. The source of the
mutual fund holdings is Morningstar International Equity Mutual Funds. The
source of the mutual fund price/return dataset is Bloomberg.
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Table 2.2A. U.S. Mutual Fund Holdings
Mutual Fund Holdings Mutual Fund
No. Listed Amount Invested Holdings (% of all
Companies No. of Holdings (US$ Billions) listed stocks)
1997
Total 30,319 9,086 234 30%
Developed Countries 12,987 6,815 204 52%
Asia & Pacific 5,760 3,249 54 56%
Europe 6,392 3,459 149 54%
Middle East 802 87 1 11%
Developing Countries 17,332 2,271 30 13%
Asia & Pacific 10,089 1,304 8 13%
Europe 2,697 319 3 12%
Latin America & Caribbean 2,196 399 17 18%
Middle East & Africa 2,350 249 2 11%
2004
Total 39,061 6,289 508 16%
Developed Countries 18,282 5,204 446 28%
Asia & Pacific 7,758 2,748 149 35%
Europe 9,817 2,392 294 24%
Middle East 686 45 1 7%
Developing Countries 20,779 1,085 62 5%
Asia & Pacific 10,444 566 22 5%
Europe 6,279 184 9 3%
Latin America & Caribbean 1,525 195 25 13%
Middle East & Africa 2,531 140 7 6%
This table shows the number of stocks that can be potentially held by U.S. equity mutual funds in 1997 (top panel) and in 2004
(bottom panel). The first column shows the total number of listed stocks in the main stock exchange in each country within each
region. This is the universe of stocks that can be held by mutual funds. The second column shows the number of stocks actually
held by U.S. mutual funds in these regions. The third column shows the size of these investments in US$ billions. The fourth
column shows the proportion of stocks held by mutual funds as a percentage of the universe of stocks available. Developed
countries include high-income countries and developing countries are non-high-income countries, according to the World Bank
income classification of countries. The United States, Canada, and offshore centres are exlcuded from the analysis. The data
source is Claessens and Schmukler (2007) and Global Financial Database for the total number of listed companies, and
Morningstar International Equity Mutual Funds for actual mutual fund holdings.
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Table 2.2B. Global Fund Holdings
Global Fund Holdings Global Fund
No. Listed Amount Invested Holdings (% of all
Companies No. of Holdings (US$ Billions) listed stocks)
1997
Total 30,319 6,267 195 21%
Developed Countries 12,987 4,953 178 38%
Asia & Pacific 5,760 2,246 45 39%
Europe 6,392 2,635 132 41%
Middle East 802 54 1 7%
Developing Countries 17,332 1,314 17 8%
Asia & Pacific 10,089 693 4 7%
Europe 2,697 167 2 6%
Latin America & Caribbean 2,196 297 11 14%
Middle East & Africa 2,350 157 1 7%
2004
Total 39,061 5,510 423 14%
Developed Countries 18,282 4,799 392 26%
Asia & Pacific 7,758 2,429 120 31%
Europe 9,817 2,315 270 24%
Middle East 686 37 1 5%
Developing Countries 20,779 711 31 3%
Asia & Pacific 10,444 394 11 4%
Europe 6,279 114 4 2%
Latin America & Caribbean 1,525 141 14 9%
Middle East & Africa 2,531 62 2 2%
This table shows the number of stocks that can be potentially held by U.S. equity mutual funds in 1997 (top panel) and in 2004
(bottom panel). The first column shows the total number of listed stocks in the main stock exchange in each country within each
region. This is the universe of stocks that can be held by mutual funds. The second column shows the number of stocks actually
held by Global funds in these regions. The third column shows the size of these investments in US$ billions. The fourth column
shows the proportion of stocks held by mutual funds as a percentage of the universe of stocks available. Developed countries
include high-income countries and developing countries are non-high-income countries, according to the World Bank income
classification of countries. The United States, Canada, and offshore centres are exlcuded from the analysis. The data source is
Claessens and Schmukler (2007) and Global Financial Database for the total number of listed companies, and Morningstar
International Equity Mutual Funds for actual mutual fund holdings.
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Table 2.3. No of Holdings: Importance of Year, Fund Type, and Family Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Independent Variables:
Year Dummies Yes No No No No Yes No
Fund Type Dummies No Yes No No Yes Yes No
Interaction Dummies:
Fund Types and Years No No Yes No No No Yes
Family Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 8,543 8,543 8,543 8,543 8,543 8,543 8,543
R-squared 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.49
This table shows the R-squared of regressions of the number of holdings by mutual funds on year dummies, fund type
dummies, and family dummies. Seven different specifications are shown. See the main text for a description. The following
fund types are considere in the analysis: World Stock, Foreign Stock, Emerging Market, Regional, and Country funds. Regional
Funds include the following fund types: Latin America and Caribbean, Asia and Pacific, and Europe funds.
Table 2.4A. Probabilities of Being Held by a Mutual Fund
Foreign Stock Funds Not Being
Probability of Held
Being
Held
Total
Specialized Funds Not Being
Probability of Held
Being
Held
No Specialized Fund
Total
World Stock Funds
Probability of:
Not Being Held Being Held
24.9% 11.9%
48.3% 14.9%
73.2% 26.8%
World Stock Funds
Probability of:
Not Being Held
22.4%
40.4%
11.9%
74.7%
Being Held
9.4%
7.5%
8.4%
25.3%
Total
36.8%
63.2%
100.0%
[265,744]
Total
31.8%
47.9%
20.3%
100.0%
[233,655]
Specialized Funds Not Being
Probability of Held
Being
Held
No Specialized Fund
Total
Specialized Funds Not Being
Probability of: Held
Being
Held
No Specialized Fund
Total
Global Funds
Probability of:
Not Being Held Being Held
0.0% 25.1%
32.3% 15.7%
0.0% 26.9%
32.3% 67.8%
Foreign Stock Funds
Probability of:
Not Being Held
3.2%
33.4%
2.1%
38.7%
Being Held
21.9%
14.5%
24.9%
61.3%
This table reports the frequency tables for mutual fund holdings. The
observations is reported in brackets in the "Total" column of each table.
cell percentage is reported. Each observation is a family-year-stock observation. The total number of
The table thus reports the probability of being held (or not) by certain types of mutual fund, given that a
fund family has both fund types. If in a given family-year observation, a Global fund holds an asset in a country not covered by Specialized funds within that family, then this
observation is counted in the "No Specialized Fund" line. In each of these tables, if any given family does not have both types of funds being analyzed, it is excluded.
Specialized funds include Country, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and Pacific, Europe, and Emerging Market funds. U.S. holdings are not included in these tables.
Total
25.1%
48.0%
26.9%
100.0%
[399,281]
Total
25.2%
47.9%
27.0%
100.0%
[395,493]
Table 2.4B. Probabilities of Being Held by a Mutual Fund - Excluding Holdings in Developed Countries
Foreign Stock Funds Not Being
Probability of: Held
Being
Held
Total
Specialized Funds Not Being
Probability of Held
Being
Held
No Specialized Fund
Total
World Stock Funds
Probability of:
Being Held I Being Held
64.9% 10.0%
18.2% 6.9%
83.1% 16.9%
World Stock Funds
Probability of:
Not Being Held
6.0%
78.4%
1.2%
85.6%
Being Held
5.2%
8.0%
1.1%
14.4%
Total
74.9%
25.1%
100.0%
[51,901]
Total
11.3%
86.4%
2.3%
100.0%
[49,146]
Specialized Funds Not Being
Probability of: Held
Being
Held
No Specialized Fund
Total
Specialized Funds Not Being
Probability of Held
Being
Held
No Specialized Fund
Total
Global Funds
Probability of:
Not Being Held Being Held
0.0% 9.6%
75.6% 13.2%
0.0% 1.6%
75.6% 24.4%
Foreign Stock Funds
Probability of:
Not Being Held
2.1%
77.6%
0.3%
80.0%
Being Held
7.5%
11.3%
1.2%
20.0%
This table reports the frequency tables for mutual fund holdings. The cell percentage is reported. Each observation is a family-year-stock observation. The total number of
observations is reported in brackets in the "Total" column of each table. The table thus reports the probability of being held (or not) by certain types of mutual fund, given that a
fund family has both fund types. If in a given family-year observation, a Global fund holds an asset in a country not covered by Specialized funds within that family, then this
observation is counted in the "No Specialized Fund" line. In each of these tables, if any given family does not have both types of funds being analyzed, it is excluded. Specialized
funds include Country, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and Pacific, Europe, and Emerging Market funds. Holdings in developed countries are not included in these
tables. Developed countries are all high-income countries according to the World Bank country classification by income level.
Total
9.6%
88.8%
1.6%
100.0%
[92,355]
Total
9.6%
88.9%
1.5%
100.0%
[91,263]
Table 2.5. Entropy Measures: Summary Statistics
Holdings in All Countries in the Sample
Standard
Average Median Deviation
Stocks Common to Portfolios of:
World Stock and Foreign Stock Funds 0.50 0.52 0.29
Global and Specialized Funds 0.36 0.32 0.27
World Stock and Specialized Funds 0.26 0.20 0.21
Foreign Stock and Specialized Funds 0.28 0.17 0.26
Holdings in Developing Countries
Standard
Average Median Deviation
Stocks Common to Portfolios of:
World Stock and Foreign Stock Funds 0.50 0.51 0.31
Global and Specialized Funds 0.42 0.41 0.26
World Stock and Specialized Funds 0.24 0.19 0.21
Foreign Stock and Specialized Funds 0.35 0.30 0.26
This table reports the summary statistics of our entropy meaure: given a pair of fund types, it is the ratio of the
sum of net assets allocated to assets common to the portfolio of these two types of funds over the total net
assets of the same two types of funds in a given year for a given family. The top panel shows the results for all
holdings in the sample - we only exclude assets from the United States. In the bottom panel, the entropy
measure was constructed based on holdings in developing countries only. The following pairs of fund types
are considered: World Stock and Foreign Stock funds, Global and Specialized funds, World Stock and
Specialized funds, and Foreign Stock and Specialized funds. Specialized funds include: Emerging Market,
Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and Pacific, Europe, and Country funds. In each of these measures, if
any given family does not have both types of funds analyzed, it is excluded.
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Table 2.6. Entropy Measures: Importance of Year and Family Effects
World Stock and Foreign Global and Specialized World Stock and Foreign Stock and
Stock Funds Funds Specialized Funds Specialized Funds
Independent Variables:
Year Dummies Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Family Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
No. of Observations 516 516 516 371 371 371 373 373 373 711 711 711
R-Squared 0.03 0.75 0.77 0.04 0.79 0.82 0.02 0.71 0.74 0.01 0.76 0.78
This table shows the R-squared of the regressions of our four entropy meaures on family and year dummies. Three specifications are reported for each one
of the entropy meaures - see main text for details. The four different measures based on pairs of mutual fund types analyzed are: World Stock and Foreign
Stock funds, Global and Specialized funds, World Stock and Specialized funds, and Foreign Stock and Specialized funds. Specialized funds include:
Emerging Market, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and Pacific, Europe, and Country funds. Each observation is a family-year observation. In each of
these tables, if any given family does not have both types of funds analyzed, it is excluded. U.S. holdings are not included in these tables.
Table 2.7A. Simulations: Best Result for Each Fund
Mininmizing the Variance
Average Return (p.y.) Improvement in Returns (p.y.) Standard Deviation of Daily Returns
Type of Global Fund Global Fund Active Strategy Daily Accumulated Global Fund Active Strategy No. of Sims.
World Stock 6.05% 11.08% 4.87% 5.09% 0.89% 0.80% 60
Foreign Stock 6.40% 10.40% 3.88% 4 04% 0.96% 0.90% 72
Portfolio of World Stock Funds 22.54% 36.41% 11.40% 11.59% 0.79% 0.71% 3
Portfolio of Foreign Stock Funds 9.18% 13.22% 3.84% 3.97% 0.89% 0.83% 21
Total 6.92% 11.49% 4.40% 4.58% 0.92% 0.85% 156
Maximizing Expected Returns
Average Return (p.y.) Improvement in Returns (p.y.) Standard Deviation of Daily Returns
Type of Global Fund Global Fund Active Strategy Daily Accumulated Global Fund Active Strategy No. of Sims.
World Stock 6.05% 7.93% 1.92% 1.91% 0.89% 0.89% 60
Foreign Stock 6.40% 6.85% 0 45% 0.46% 0.96% 0.96% 73
Portfolio of World Stock Funds 22.54% 34.83% 10.14% 10.10% 0.79% 0.81% 3
Portfolio of Foreign Stock Funds 9.18% 12.65% 3.46% 3.46% 0.89% 0.89% 20
Total 6.92% 8.51% 1.61% 1.61% 0.92% 0.92% 156
This tables shows the results of the following simulations: minimization of the variance of returns subject to restrictions on expected returns (top panel) and maximization of expected returns subject to a restiction
on the variance of returns (bottom panel). Realized returns of the simulated portfolio are calculated out-of-sample, as described in the main text. The best simulation for each main fund in each family is
considered. The main funds are World Stock funds, Foreign Stock funds, portfolios of World Stock funds, and portfolios of Foreign Stock funds. Portfolios of World Stock funds are composed of several World
Stock funds within the same family but of different objectives, e.g. World Stock Value funds and World Stock Growth funds. Portfolios of Foreign Stock funds are similarly formed, e.g. Foreign Stock Value funds
and Foreign Stock Growth funds. The strategy considered is an active one, in which portfolio weights are updated every day. Simulations use all previous data available at each point in time.
Table 2.7B. Simulations: Longest Available Sample, But Fewer Regional Funds
Mininmizing the Variance
Average Return (py.) Improvement in Returns (p.y.) Standard Deviation of Daily Returns
Type of Global Fund Global Fund Active Strategy Daily Accumulated Global Fund Active Strategy No. of Sims.
World Stock 8.05% 10.83% 2.65% 2.84% 1.15% 1.08% 60
Foreign Stock 5.52% 7.97% 2.41% 2.55% 0.97% 0.92% 73
Portfolio of World Stock Funds 2.29% 12.35% 9.93% 10.37% 1.04% 0.88% 3
Portfolio of Foreign Stock Funds 8.77% 11.91% 3.02% 3.15% 0.92% 0.86% 20
Total 6.84% 9.65% 2.73% 2.89% 1.04% 0.97% 156
Maximizing Expected Returns
Average Return (p.y.) Improvement in Returns (p.y.) Standard Deviation of Daily Returns
Type of Global Fund Global Fund Active Strategy Daily Accumulated Global Fund Active Strategy No. of Sims.
World Stock 8.05% 8.14% 0.09% 0.08% 1.15% 1.15% 60
Foreign Stock 5.52% 5.77% 0.24% 0.24% 0.97% 0.97% 73
Portfolio of World Stock Funds 2.29% 16.32% 13.86% 14.03% 1.04% 0.99% 3
Portfolio of Foreign Stock Funds 8.77% 11.75% 3.01% 3.02% 0.92% 0.92% 20
Total 6.84% 7.63% 0.80% 0.80% 1.04% 1.03% 156
This tables shows the results of the following simulations: minimization of the variance of returns subject to restrictions on expected returns (top panel) and maximization of expected returns subject to a restiction
on the variance of returns (bottom panel). Realized returns of the simulated portfolio are calculated out-of-sample, as described in the main text. The longest simulation for each main fund in each family is
considered. The main funds are World Stock funds, Foreign Stock funds, portfolios of World Stock funds, and portfolios of Foreign Stock funds. Portfolios of World Stock funds are composed of several World
Stock funds within the same family but of different objectives, e.g. World Stock Value funds and World Stock Growth funds. Portfolios of Foreign Stock funds are similarly formed, e.g. Foreign Stock Value funds
and Foreign Stock Growth funds. The strategy considered is an active one, in which portfolio weights are updated every day. Simulations use all previous data available at each point in time.
Table 2.8A. Benchmarking: Best Simulation Result for Each Fund
Mininmizing the Variance
Average Return (p.y.) Improvement in Returns (p.y.) Standard Deviation of Daily Returns
Type of Global Fund Global Fund Active Strategy Daily Accumulated Global Fund Active Strategy No. of Sims.
World Stock 8.45% 12.24% 3.59% 3.75% 0.91% 0.86% 54
Foreign Stock 6.35% 10.36% 3.90% 3.97% 0.96% 0.94% 72
Portfolio of World Stock Funds 22.54% 31.39% 7.26% 7.35% 0.79% 0.75% 3
Portfolio of Foreign Stock Funds 9.00% 12.34% 3.25% 3.34% 0.90% 0.86% 20
Total 7.77% 11.69% 3.77% 3.87% 0.93% 0.89% 149
Maximizing Expected Returns
Average Return (p.y.) Improvement in Returns (p.y.) Standard Deviation of Daily Returns
Type of Global Fund Global Fund Active Strategy Daily Accumulated Global Fund Active Strategy No. of Sims.
World Stock 8.45% 11.60% 3.00% 3.18% 0.91% 0.85% 54
Foreign Stock 6.35% 8.63% 2.22% 2.28% 0.96% 0.94% 72
Portfolio of World Stock Funds 22.54% 24.44% 1.56% 1.59% 0.79% 0.78% 3
Portfolio of Foreign Stock Funds 9.00% 10.74% 1.63% 1.66% 0.90% 0.88% 20
Total 7.77% 10.29% 2.41% 2.51% 0.93% 0.89% 149
This tables shows the results of the following simulations: minimization of the variance of returns, net of the benchmark index, subject to restrictions on expected returns (top panel) and maximization of expected
returns subject to a restiction on the variance of returns, net of the benchmark index (bottom panel). Realized returns of the simulated portfolio are calculated out-of-sample, as described in the main text The best
simulation for each main fund in each family is considered. The main funds are World Stock funds, Foreign Stock funds, portfolios of World Stock funds, and portfolios of Foreign Stock funds. Portfolios of
World Stock funds are composed of several World Stock funds within the same family but of different objectives, e.g. World Stock Value funds and World Stock Growth funds. Portfolios of Foreign Stock funds
are similarly formed, e.g. Foreign Stock Value funds and Foreign Stock Growth funds. The strategy considered is an active one, in which portfolio weights are updated every day. Simulations use all previous data
available at each point in time.
Table 2.8B. Benchmarking: Simulations With The Longest Available Sample, But Fewer Regional Funds
Mininmizing the Variance
Average Return (p.y.) Improvement in Returns (p.y.) Standard Deviation of Daily Returns
Type of Global Fund Global Fund Active Strategy Daily Accumulated Global Fund Active Strategy No. of Sims.
World Stock 9.04% 11.63% 2.46% 2.59% 1.15% 1.11% 60
Foreign Stock 5.49% 7.70% 2 19% 2.24% 0.97% 0.95% 73
Portfolio of World Stock Funds 2.29% 11.68% 9.19% 9.51% 1.04% 0.93% 3
Portfolio of Foreign Stock Funds 8.53% 11.58% 2.99% 3.08% 0.93% 0.89% 19
Total 7.16% 9.76% 2.53% 2.62% 1.03% 1.00% 155
Maximizing Expected Returns
Average Return (p.y.) Improvement in Returns (p.y.) Standard Deviation of Daily Returns
Type of Global Fund Global Fund Active Strategy Daily Accumulated Global Fund Active Strategy No. of Sims.
World Stock 9.04% 10.08% 1.20% 1.87% 1.15% 0.91% 60
Foreign Stock 5.49% 6.98% 1.45% 1.52% 0.97% 0.95% 73
Portfolio of World Stock Funds 2.29% 7.56% 5.21% 5.44% 1.04% 0.96% 3
Portfolio of Foreign Stock Funds 8.53% 9.67% 1.07% 1.11% 0.93% 0.91% 19
Total 7.16% 8.51% 1.38% 1.68% 1.03% 0.93% 155
This tables shows the results of the following simulations: minimization of the variance of returns, net of the benchmark index, subject to restrictions on expected returns (top panel) and maximization of expected
returns subject to a restiction on the variance of returns, net of the benchmark index (bottom panel). Realized returns of the simulated portfolio are calculated out-of-sample, as described in the main text. The
longest simulation for each main fund in each family is considered. The main funds are World Stock funds, Foreign Stock funds, portfolios of World Stock funds, and portfolios of Foreign Stock funds. Portfolios
of World Stock funds are composed of several World Stock funds within the same family but of different objectives, e.g. World Stock Value funds and World Stock Growth funds. Portfolios of Foreign Stock
funds are similarly formed, e.g. Foreign Stock Value funds and Foreign Stock Growth funds. The strategy considered is an active one, in which portfolio weights are updated every day. Simulations use all
previous data available at each point in time.
Appendix Table 2.1. Price Data on Mutual Funds
Sample
Family No. of Funds Beginning End
I AIM Family of Funds 17 08-Apr-92 18-Jul-05
2 AllianceBernstein 10 24-Dec-99 09-Jun-06
3 Allianz Funds 4 20-Dec-04 18-Jul-05
4 American Funds Group 7 13-Mar-02 09-Jun-06
5 Columbia Funds 8 17-Oct-00 09-Jun-06
6 Credit Suisse 8 21-Dec-01 09-Jun-06
7 DFA Investment Dimensions Group 9 08-Mar-93 18-Jul-05
8 Dreyfus Founders II 01-Jul-96 09-Jun-06
9 Eaton Vance Group 7 21-Sep-99 18-Jul-05
10 Evergreen Funds 5 07-Sep-94 09-Jun-06
11 Excelsior Funds 4 20-Sep-93 18-Jul-05
12 Fidelity Advisors Funds 14 21-Dec-00 09-Jun-06
13 Fidelity Group 18 18-Sep-89 18-Jul-05
14 GAM Funds 7 09-Jan-90 18-Jul-05
15 Gartmore 5 02-Jul-04 09-Jun-06
16 GMO LLC 17 29-Jan-99 18-Jul-05
17 Goldman Sachs Asset Management Group 11 30-Oct-98 18-Jul-05
18 Hartford Mutual Funds 10 02-May-01 09-Jun-06
19 ING Funds Trust 12 29-Nov-94 18-Jul-05
20 Ivy Mackenzie Management 9 06-May-99 18-Jul-05
21 J.P. Morgan Funds 10 30-Jul-02 09-Jun-06
22 Janus 12 19-Oct-98 09-Jun-06
23 Merrill Lynch Group 15 30-Nov-94 18-Jul-05
24 MFS Family of Funds 11 28-Jun-96 09-Jun-06
25 Morgan Stanley Funds 26 18-Oct-94 18-Jul-05
26 Oppenheimer Funds 9 10-Sep-04 09-Jun-06
27 Putnam Funds 6 08-Nov-91 18-Jul-05
28 RiverSource (former AXP) 9 13-Jul-90 18-Jul-05
29 Scudder Funds 18 17-Jun-98 18-Jul-05
30 Seligman Group 4 12-Jun-03 09-Jun-06
31 Smith Barney Group 6 03-Mar-98 09-Jun-06
32 T. Rowe Price Funds 14 04-Jun-92 18-Jul-05
33 Templeton Group 20 20-Nov-92 18-Jul-05
34 UBS Funds 6 01-Mar-01 09-Jun-06
35 Vanguard Group 11 17-Jul-00 09-Jun-06
36 Wells Fargo Advantage 5 09-Oct-97 18-Jul-05
This table describes the sample of mutual fund price data by funds families. It shows the number of funds in
each family covered. It also shows the beginning and the end of the sample. The data source is Bloomberg.
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Appendix Table 2.2A. Simulations: Best Result for Each Fund
Mininmizing the Variance
Improvement in Returns Standard Deviation of
Average Return (p.y.) (p.y.) Daily Returns No. of
Family Global Fund Active Strategy Daily Accumulated Global Fund Active Strategy Sims.
I Allianz Funds 0.95% -3.05% -3.94% -3.91% 0.66% 0.65% 2
2 AllianceBernstein 10.89% 14.76% 3.51% 3.59% 0.90% 0.86% 9
3 American Funds Group 10.57% 13.93% 3.06% 3.33% 0.87% 0.74% 4
4 AIM Family of Funds 8.37% 20.92% 11.71% 12.08% 0.95% 0.82% 10
5 Columbia Funds 17.52% 21.06% 3.14% 3.32% 0.85% 0.77% 3
6 Credit Suisse 8.46% 12.15% 3.40% 3.63% 0.95% 0.85% 2
7 DFA Investment Dimensions 3.15% 1.22% -1.85% -1.70% 0.91% 0.84% 4
Group
8 Dreyfus Founders 4.75% 11.96% 6.99% 7.33% 0.95% 0.83% 6
9 Evergreen Funds 5.76% 5.56% -0.19% -0.21% 1.07% 1.08% 2
10 Eaton Vance Group -0.75% 15.22% 16.10% 16.91% 1.08% 0.79% 2
11 Excelsior Funds 3.95% 7.15% 3.09% 3.13% 0.89% 0.87% 2
12 Fidelity Group 5.97% 9.42% 3.29% 3.59% 1.02% 0.91% 7
13 Fidelity Advisors Funds 7.76% 11.86% 3.84% 4.09% 0.87% 0.77% 6
14 GAM Funds -1.42% 3.04% 4.53% 3.67% 1.04% 1.43% 2
15 Gartmore 22.30% 18.99% -2.68% -2.62% 0.81% 0.78% 3
16 GMO LLC 6.65% 8.05% 1.37% 1.36% 0.76% 0.77% 8
17 Goldman Sachs Asset 1.63% 6.80% 5.12% 5.42% 1.04% 0.94% 3
Management Group
18 Hartford Mutual Funds 14.82% 18.72% 3.40% 3.50% 0.91% 0.86% 2
19 ING Funds Trust -4.77% 0.10% 5.34% 5.71% 1.11% 1.01% 6
20 Ivy Mackenzie Management -0.56% 4.80% 5.41% 5.73% 0.94% 0.81% 3
21 Janus -7.01% 0.08% 7.65% 7.60% 0.67% 0.70% 5
22 J.P. Morgan Funds 22.11% 24.06% 1.60% 1.68% 0.90% 0.87% 4
23 MFS Family of Funds 20.70% 39.09% 15.78% 15.93% 0.88% 0.81% 3
24 Merrill Lynch Group 10.35% 13.01% 2.46% 2.64% 0.99% 0.93% 9
25 Morgan Stanley Funds 1.87% 6.83% 4.91% 5.28% 0.98% 0.84% 9
26 Oppenheimer Funds 10.45% 9.72% -0.64% -0.69% 0.82% 0.84% 3
27 Putnam Funds 4.86% 5.53% 0.65% 0.74% 1.08% 1.05% 5
28 RiverSource (former AXP) 13.45% 22.06% 7.63% 7.87% 0.84% 0.73% 2
29 Scudder Funds 6.31% 13.19% 6.49% 6.75% 1.00% 0.90% 6
30 Smith Barney Group 2.03% 2.35% 0.31% 0.30% 0.94% 0.94% 1
31 Seligman Group 14.45% 15.89% 1.26% 1.26% 0.82% 0.82% 2
32 Templeton Group 1.13% 2.46% 1.34% 1.55% 0.83% 0.73% 8
33 T. Rowe Price Funds 19.58% 32.17% 10.64% 10.71% 0.85% 0.82% 6
34 UBS Funds 4.41% 7.30% 2.77% 2.88% 0.89% 0.84% 1
35 Vanguard Group 7.77% 10.39% 2.43% 2.54% 0.96% 0.92% 4
36 Wells Fargo Advantage 5.22% 11.69% 6.16% 6.65% 0.98% 0.78% 2
Total 6.92% 11.49% 4.40% 4.58% 0.92% 0.85% 156
This tables shows the results of the following simulation: minimization of the variance of returns subject to restrictions on expected
returns. The results are shown per family. Realized returns of the simulated portfolio are calculated out-of-sample, as described in the main
text. The best simulation for each main fund in each family is considered. The main funds are World Stock funds, Foreign Stock funds,
portfolios of World Stock funds, and portfolios of Foreign Stock funds. Portfolios of World Stock funds are composed of several World
Stock funds within the same family but of different objectives, e.g. World Stock Value funds and World Stock Growth funds. Portfolios of
Foreign Stock funds are similarly formed, e.g. Foreign Stock Value funds and Foreign Stock Growth funds. The strategy considered is an
active one, in which portfolio weights are updated every day. Simulations use all previous data available at each point in time.
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Appendix Table 2.2B. Simulations: Longest Available Sample, But Fewer Regional Funds
Mininmizing the Variance
Improvement in Returns Standard Deviation of
Average Return (p.y.) (p.y.) Daily Returns No. of
Family Global Fund Active Strategy Daily Accumulated Global Fund Active Strategy Sims.
1 Allianz Funds 0.95% -3.05% -3.94% -3.91% 0.66% 0.65% 2
2 AllianceBernstein 9.49% 13.26% 3.46% 3.54% 0.90% 0.87% 9
3 American FundsGroup 10.57% 13.93% 3.06% 3.33% 0.87% 0.74% 4
4 AIM Family of Funds 9.43% 20.69% 10.47% 10.86% 0.99% 0.85% 10
5 Columbia Funds 14.11% 17.02% 2.64% 3.03% 0.92% 0.77% 3
6 Credit Suisse 8.46% 12.15% 3.40% 3.63% 0.95% 0.85% 2
7 DFA Investment Dimensions 3,15% 1.22% -1.85% -1.70% 0.91% 0.84% 4
Group
8 Dreyfus Founders 4.71% 7.83% 3.05% 3.33% 1.02% 0.92% 6
9 Evergreen Funds 5.76% 5.56% -0.19% -0.21% 1.07% 1.08% 2
10 Eaton Vance Group -4.98% 8.94% 14.69% 15.46% 1.13% 0.87% 2
11 Excelsior Funds 1.58% 1.67% 0.09% 0.10% 0.99% 0.99% 2
12 Fidelity Group 6.89% 8.09% 1.13% 1.36% 0.95% 0.86% 7
13 Fidelity Advisors Funds 7.40% 10.14% 2.59% 2.85% 0.93% 0.82% 6
14 GAM Funds 41.57% 45.05% 2.51% 1.43% 8.19% 8.66% 2
15 Gartmore 22.30% 18.99% -2.68% -2.62% 0.81% 0.78% 3
16 GMO LLC 6.65% 8.05% 1.37% 1.36% 0.76% 0.77% 8
17 Goldman Sachs Asset 1.63% 6.80% 5.12% 5.42% 1.04% 0.94% 3
Management Group
18 Hartford Mutual Funds 6.10% 8.06% 1.85% 2.17% 1.04% 0.91% 2
19 ING Funds Trust 0.66% 4.26% 3.74% 4.09% 1.05% 0.94% 6
20 Ivy Mackenzie Management 0.89% 5.81% 4.91% 5.25% 0.99% 0.86% 3
21 Janus 4.97% 7.82% 2.78% 2.75% 0.88% 0.87% 5
22 J.P. Morgan Funds 22.11% 24.06% 1.60% 1.68% 0.90% 0.87% 4
23 MFS Family of Funds 12.47% 16.07% 3.22% 3.19% 0.80% 0.82% 3
24 Merrill Lynch Group 5.09% 6.49% 1.39% 1.57% 1.03% 0.96% 9
25 Morgan Stanley Funds 2.58% 5.83% 3.23% 3.49% 0.98% 0.88% 9
26 Oppenheimer Funds 12.61% 11.27% -1.18% -1.22% 0.79% 0.81% 3
27 Putnam Funds 4.86% 5.53% 0.65% 0.74% 1.08% 1.05% 5
28 RiverSource (former AXP) 3.46% 3.15% -0.30% -0.28% 1.14% 1.13% 2
29 Scudder Funds 3.78% 8.29% 4.37% 4.55% 1.01% 0.94% 6
30 Smith Barney Group 2.03% 2.35% 0.31% 0.30% 0.94% 0.94% 1
31 Seligman Group 14.45% 15.89% 1.26% 1.26% 0.82% 0.82% 2
32 Templeton Group 4.07% 4.14% 0.07% 0.21% 0.78% 0.71% 8
33 T. Rowe Price Funds 5.04% 10.10% 4.92% 5.07% 0.98% 0.92% 6
34 UBS Funds 4.41% 7.30% 2.77% 2.88% 0.89% 0.84% 1
35 Vanguard Group 5.40% 7.05% 1.58% 1.68% 0.99% 0.95% 4
36 Wells Fargo Advantage 6.44% 8.39% 1.87% 2.18% 1.01% 0.88% 2
Total 6.84% 9.65% 2.73% 2.89% 1.04% 0.97% 156
This tables shows the results of the following simulation: minimization of the variance of returns subject to restrictions on expected
returns. The results are shown per family. Realized returns of the simulated portfolio are calculated out-of-sample, as described in the main
text. The longest simulation for each main fund in each family is considered. The main funds are World Stock funds, Foreign Stock funds,
portfolios of World Stock funds, and portfolios of Foreign Stock funds. Portfolios of World Stock funds are composed of several World
Stock funds within the same family but of different objectives, e.g. World Stock Value funds and World Stock Growth funds. Portfolios of
Foreign Stock funds are similarly formed, e.g. Foreign Stock Value funds and Foreign Stock Growth funds. The strategy considered is an
active one, in which portfolio weights are updated every day. Simulations use all previous data available at each point in time.
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Appendix Table 2.3A. Simulations: Best Result for Each Fund
Maximizing Expected Returns
Improvement in Returns Standard Deviation of
Average Return (p.y.) (p.y.) Daily Returns No. of
Family Global Fund Active Strategy Daily Accumulated Global Fund Active Strategy Sims.
1 Allianz Funds 0.95% 0.95% 0.00% 0.00% 0.66% 0.66% 2
2 AllianceBemstein 10.89% 10.90% 0.01% -0.01% 0.90% 0.90% 9
3 American Funds Group 10.57% 10.78% 0.19% 0.18% 0.87% 0.87% 4
4 AIM Family of Funds 8.37% 12.94% 4.46% 4.47% 0.95% 0.95% 10
5 Columbia Funds 17.52% 16.06% -1.23% -1.21% 0.85% 0.84% 3
6 Credit Suisse 8.46% 8.39% -0.07% -0.06% 0.95% 0.95% 2
7 DFA Investment Dimensions 3.15% 3.85% 0.69% 0.73% 0.91% 0.88% 4
Group
8 Dreyfus Founders 4.75% 6.27% 1.51% 1.56% 0.95% 0.93% 6
9 Evergreen Funds 5.76% 5.76% 0.00% 0.00% 1.07% 1.07% 2
10 Eaton Vance Group -0.75% 0.69% 1.45% 1.50% 1.08% 1.06% 2
11 Excelsior Funds 3.95% 3.95% 0.01% 0.01% 0.89% 0.89% 2
12 Fidelity Group 5.97% 6.10% 0.12% 0.11% 1.02% 1.03% 7
13 Fidelity Advisors Funds 7.76% 7.45% -0.28% -0.27% 0.87% 0.87% 6
14 GAM Funds -1.42% -2.18% -0.76% -0.72% 1.04% 1.03% 2
15 Gartmore 22.30% 22.30% 0.00% 0.00% 0.81% 0.81% 3
16 GMO LLC 6.65% 7.50% 0.81% 0.74% 0.76% 0.79% 8
17 Goldman Sachs Asset 1.63% 1.55% -0.08% -0.08% 1.04% 1.04% 3
Management Group
18 Hartford Mutual Funds 14.82% 14.82% 0.00% 0.00% 0.91% 0.91% 2
19 ING Funds Trust -4.77% 4.83% 10.70% 10.82% 1.11% 1.08% 6
20 Ivy Mackenzie Management -0.56% 3.70% 4.31% 4.57% 0.94% 0.84% 3
21 Janus -7.01% 11.09% 19.58% 19.43% 0.67% 0.74% 5
22 J.P. Morgan Funds 22.11% 21.52% -0.48% -0.48% 0.90% 0.90% 4
23 MFS Family of Funds 20.70% 20.40% -0.25% -0.25% 0.88% 0.88% 3
24 Merrill Lynch Group 10.35% 11.17% 0.75% 0.68% 0.99% 1.03% 9
25 Morgan Stanley Funds 1.87% 2.19% 0.32% 0.31% 0.98% 0.98% 9
26 Oppenheimer Funds 10.45% 9.70% -0.67% -0.68% 0.82% 0.82% 3
27 Putnam Funds 4.86% 4.96% 0.10% 0.11% 1.08% 1.08% 5
28 RiverSource (former AXP) 13.45% 13.45% 0.00% 0.00% 0.84% 0.84% 2
29 Scudder Funds 6.31% 7.83% 1.47% 1.45% 1.00% 1.01% 6
30 Smith Barney Group 2.03% 2.41% 0.37% 0.37% 0.94% 0.94% 1
31 Seligman Group 14.45% 14.44% -0.01% 0.00% 0.82% 0.81% 2
32 Templeton Group 1.13% 1.06% -0.06% -0.08% 0.83% 0.83% 8
33 T. Rowe Price Funds 19.58% 19.77% 0.16% 0.16% 0.85% 0.85% 6
34 UBS Funds 4.41% 4.41% 0.00% 0.00% 0.89% 0.89% 1
35 Vanguard Group 7.77% 7.50% -0.25% -0.24% 0.96% 0.96% 4
36 Wells Fargo Advantage 5.22% 6.03% 0.78% 0.87% 0.98% 0.95% 2
Total 6.92% 8.51% 1.61% 1.61% 0.92% 0.92% 156
This tables shows the results of the following simulation: maximization of expected returns subject to a restiction on the variance of
returns. The results are shown per family. Realized returns of the simulated portfolio are calculated out-of-sample, as described in the main
text. The best simulation for each main fund in each family is considered. The main funds are World Stock funds, Foreign Stock funds,
portfolios of World Stock funds, and portfolios of Foreign Stock funds. Portfolios of World Stock funds are composed of several World
Stock funds within the same family but of different objectives, e.g. World Stock Value funds and World Stock Growth funds. Portfolios of
Foreign Stock funds are similarly formed, e.g. Foreign Stock Value funds and Foreign Stock Growth funds. The strategy considered is an
active one, in which portfolio weights are updated every day. Simulations use all previous data available at each point in time.
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Appendix Table 2.3B. Simulations: Longest Available Sample, But Fewer Regional Funds
Maximizing Expected Returns
Improvement in Returns Standard Deviation of
Average Return (p.y.) (p.y.) Daily Returns No. of
Family Global Fund Active Strategy Daily Accumulated Global Fund Active Strategy Sims.
1 Allianz Funds 0.95% 0.95% 0.00% 0.00% 0.66% 0.66% 2
2 AllianceBernstein 9.49% 9.48% -0.01% -0.01% 0.90% 0.91% 9
3 American Funds Group 10.57% 10.78% 0.19% 0.18% 0.87% 0.87% 4
4 AIM Family of Funds 9.43% 15.72% 6.04% 6.07% 0.99% 0.98% 10
5 Columbia Funds 14.11% 12.69% -1.24% -1.21% 0.92% 0.91% 3
6 Credit Suisse 8.46% 8.39% -0.07% -0.06% 0.95% 0.95% 2
7 DFA Investment Dimensions 3.15% 3.85% 0.69% 0.73% 0.91% 0.88% 4
Group 4.71% 4.84% 0.12% 0.13% 1.02% 1.02% 6
8 Dreyfus Founders 5.76% 5.76% 0.00% 0.00% 1.07% 1.07% 2
9 Evergreen Funds -4.98% -4.41% 0.59% 0.59% 1.13% 1.13% 2
10 Eaton Vance Group 1.58% 1.54% -0.05% -0.05% 0.99% 0.99% 2
11 Excelsior Funds 6.89% 6.85% -0.04% -0.04% 0.95% 0.95% 7
12 Fidelity Group 7.40% 6.81% -0.55% -0.54% 0.93% 0.93% 6
13 Fidelity Advisors Funds 41.57% 40.49% -0.76% -0.72% 8.19% 8.17% 2
14 GAM Funds 22.30% 22.30% 0.00% 0.00% 0.81% 0.81% 3
15 Gartmore 6.65% 7.50% 0.81% 0.74% 0.76% 0.79% 8
16 GMO LLC 1.63% 1.55% -0.08% -0.08% 1.04% 1.04% 3
17 Goldman Sachs Asset
Management Group 6.10% 6.10% 0.00% 0.00% 1.04% 1.04% 2
18 Hartford Mutual Funds 0.66% 5.36% 5.26% 5.32% 1.05% 1.03% 6
19 ING Funds Trust 0.89% 5.14% 4.24% 4.53% 0.99% 0.88% 3
20 Ivy Mackenzie Management 4.97% 4.94% 0.00% -0.05% 0.88% 0.88% 5
21 Janus 22.11% 21.52% -0.48% -0.48% 0.90% 0.90% 4
22 J.P. Morgan Funds 12.47% 12.18% -0.26% -0.26% 0.80% 0.80% 3
23 MFS Family of Funds 5.09% 6.11% 0.99% 0.98% 1.03% 1.04% 9
24 Merrill Lynch Group 2.58% 3.33% 0.74% 0.70% 0.98% 1.00% 9
25 Morgan Stanley Funds 12.61% 11.85% -0.67% -0.67% 0.79% 0.80% 3
26 Oppenheimer Funds 4.86% 4.96% 0.10% 0.11% 1.08% 1.08% 5
27 Putnam Funds 3.46% 3.46% 0.00% 0.00% 1.14% 1.14% 2
28 RiverSource (former AXP) 3.78% 4.88% 1.06% 1.03% 1.01% 1.02% 6
29 Scudder Funds 2.03% 2.41% 0.37% 0.37% 0.94% 0.94% 1
30 Smith Barney Group 14.45% 14.44% -0.01% 0.00% 0.82% 0.81% 2
31 Seligman Group 4.07% 4.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.78% 0.78% 8
32 Templeton Group 5.04% 5.20% 0.15% 0.15% 0.98% 0.98% 6
33 T. Rowe Price Funds 4.41% 4.41% 0.00% 0.00% 0.89% 0.89% 1
34 UBS Funds 5.40% 5.13% -0.25% -0.24% 0.99% 0.99% 4
35 Vanguard Group 6.44% 6.11% -0.31% -0.27% 1.01% 1.00% 2
36 Wells Fargo Advantage
6.84% 7.63% 0.80% 0.80% 1.04% 1.03% 156
Total 6.84% 9.65% 2.73% 2.89% 1.04% 0.97% 156
This tables shows the results of the following simulation: maximization of expected returns subject to a restiction on the variance of
returns. The results are shown per family. Realized returns of the simulated portfolio are calculated out-of-sample, as described in the
main text. The longest simulation for each main fund in each family is considered. The main funds are World Stock funds, Foreign Stock
funds, portfolios of World Stock funds, and portfolios of Foreign Stock funds. Portfolios of World Stock funds are composed of several
World Stock funds within the same family but of different objectives, e.g. World Stock Value funds and World Stock Growth funds.
Portfolios of Foreign Stock funds are similarly formed, e.g. Foreign Stock Value funds and Foreign Stock Growth funds. The strategy
considered is an active one, in which portfolio weights are updated every day. Simulations use all previous data available at each point in
time.
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Appendix Tabble 2.4A. Simulations: Best Result for Each Fund
Mininmizing the Variance (Rolling Windows: 240 Business Days)
Average Return (p.y.) Improvement in Returns (p.y.) Standard Deviation of Daily Returns
Type of Global Fund Global Fund Active Strategy Daily Accumulated Global Fund Active Strategy No. of Sims.
World Stock 8.86% 14.08% 5.10% 5.12% 0.88% 0.78% 53
Foreign Stock 6.53% 10.37% 3.69% 3.96% 0.96% 0.89% 70
Portfolio of World Stock Funds 14.77% 20.74% 6.60% 4.09% 0.71% 0.65% 3
Portfolio of Foreign Stock Funds 12.19% 13.70% 1.98% 1.37% 0.85% 0.78% 18
Total 8.25% 12.35% 4.06% 4.06% 0.91% 0.83% 144
Maximizing Expected Returns (Rolling Windows: 240 Business Days)
Average Return (p.y.) Improvement in Returns (p.y.) Standard Deviation of Daily Returns
Type of Global Fund Global Fund Active Strategy Daily Accumulated Global Fund Active Strategy No. of Sims.
World Stock 8.86% 9.81% 1.03% 0.79% 0.88% 0.88% 53
Foreign Stock 6.53% 7.40% 0.85% 0.91% 0.96% 0.97% 70
Portfolio of World Stock Funds 14.77% 21.87% 8.32% 6.76% 0.71% 0.76% 3
Portfolio of Foreign Stock Funds 12.19% 12.08% 0.52% -0.30% 0.85% 0.86% 18
Total 8.25% 9.15% 1.03% 0.84% 0.91% 0.92% 144
This tables shows the results of the following simulations: minimization of the variance of returns subject to restrictions on expected returns (top panel) and maximization
of expected returns subject to a restiction on the variance of returns (bottom panel). Realized returns of the simulated portfolio are calculated out-of-sample, as described in
the main text. The best simulation for each main fund in each family is considered. The main funds are World Stock funds, Foreign Stock funds, portfolios of World Stock
funds, and portfolios of Foreign Stock funds. Portfolios of World Stock funds are composed of several World Stock funds within the same family but of different
objectives, e.g. World Stock Value funds and World Stock Growth funds. Portfolios of Foreign Stock funds are similarly formed, e.g. Foreign Stock Value funds and
Foreign Stock Growth funds. The strategy considered is an active, in which portfolio weights are updated every day. Simulations use information based on the previous 240
business days only at each point in time.
Appendix Table 2.4B. Simulations: Longest Available Sample, But Fewer Regional Funds
Mininmizing the Variance (Rolling Windows: 240 Business Days)
Average Return (p.y.) Improvement in Returns (p.y.) Standard Deviation of Daily Returns
Type of Global Fund Global Fund Active Strategy Daily Accumulated Global Fund Active Strategy No. of Sims.
World Stock 8.24% 10.82% 2.56% 2.65% 0.90% 0.81% 59
Foreign Stock 5.79% 8.44% 2.56% 2.78% 0.97% 0.91% 71
Portfolio of World Stock Funds 6.91% 17.38% 9.64% 10.51% 1.04% 0.83% 3
Portfolio of Foreign Stock Funds 11.92% 13.34% 1.90% 1.25% 0.87% 0.80% 18
Total 7.48% 10.11% 2.62% 2.70% 0.93% 0.86% 151
Maximizing Expected Returns (Rolling Windows: 240 Business Days)
Average Return (p.y.) Improvement in Returns (p.y.) Standard Deviation of Daily Returns
Type of Global Fund Global Fund Active Strategy Daily Accumulated Global Fund Active Strategy No. of Sims.
World Stock 8.24% 8.45% 0.28% 0.14% 0.90% 0.90% 59
Foreign Stock 5.79% 6.06% 0.23% 0.28% 0.97% 0.98% 71
Portfolio of World Stock Funds 6.91% 15.83% 8.50% 8.87% 1.04% 0.96% 3
Portfolio of Foreign Stock Funds 11.92% 11.89% 0.59% -0.29% 0.87% 0.88% 18
Total 7.48% 7.86% 0.46% 0.33% 0.93% 0.93% 151
This tables shows the results of the following simulations: minimization of the variance of returns subject to restrictions on expected returns (top panel) and maximization
of expected returns subject to a restiction on the variance of returns (bottom panel). Realized returns of the simulated portfolio are calculated out-of-sample, as described in
the main text. The longest simulation for each main fund in each family is considered. The main funds are World Stock funds, Foreign Stock funds, portfolios of World
Stock funds, and portfolios of Foreign Stock funds. Portfolios of World Stock funds are composed of several World Stock funds within the same family but of different
objectives, e.g. World Stock Value funds and World Stock Growth funds. Portfolios of Foreign Stock funds are similarly formed, e.g. Foreign Stock Value funds and
Foreign Stock Growth funds. The strategy considered is an active, in which portfolio weights are updated every day. Simulations use information based on the previous 240
business days only at each point in time.
Chapter 3
Information Asymmetry and
Institutional Investor Mandates:
Evidence from U.S. Mutual Fund
Foreign Holdings
The literature on home bias and portfolio choice has identified both a foreign bias and an
institutional investor bias. The first bias is characterized by foreign investors holding larger
firms than domestic investors, whereas the second one goes one step further and state that
this is actually a feature of institutional investors, independent of their nationality.
Moreover, firm size is interpreted as a proxy for information asymmetries. In this chapter,
we further analyze this institutional investor bias. The hypothesis is that there is actually
heterogeneity in the institutional investor bias across investors with different investment
mandates. Our main argument relies on managers with different mandates facing different
costs and benefits in gathering and processing information. As the investment mandate
becomes broader, informational costs for a specific region becomes higher and benefits
lower. Therefore, Global fund managers would prefer to invest in larger firms, less prone
to information asymmetries, than Specialized fund managers. After controlling for
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transaction costs, liquidity, and other direct and indirect barriers to international capital
flows, we find strong evidence in favor of our hypothesis. Hence, our results suggest that
information asymmetries vary across institutional investor mandates, being significantly
more pronounced for funds with broader mandates.
3.1. Introduction
It is well known that investors have not been nearly as internationally diversified as their
consumption and income path would imply. The literature has advanced several
explanations for this lack of international diversification, also known as the home bias.
Most arguments can be classified into two categories: deviations from the international
CAPM affecting foreign asset holdings, and foreign investors facing barriers in selecting
and investing in assets abroad.
Arguments based on departures from the mean-variance optimization suggest that
investors build their portfolios to hedge themselves against unanticipated changes in their
consumption and investment opportunities. For example, investors might want to hedge
against changes in the return on their human capital or protect the purchasing power of
their currency. In this case, it is possible to obtain, optimally, incomplete international
diversification in a setup with fully integrated international capital markets. However, a
tilting of portfolios toward foreign assets is the standard outcome of arguments based on
hedging demands.'
The second set of explanations involves both explicit and implicit barriers to
international investments. Explicit barriers are directly observable and quantifiable. They
include but are not restricted to capital controls, restrictions on foreign exchange
transactions, and withholding taxes. These barriers have fallen over time but have not been
accompanied by a significant reduction in home bias, as argued by Tesar and Werner
(1995) for example. They are thus not sufficient to explain the home bias. Hence, the
recent literature has emphasized the implicit barriers to international capital flows.
See for example Uppal (1993), Baxter and Jermann (1993), and Baxter, Jermann, and King (1994).
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These non-observable implicit barriers include political or country risks that differ
for resident and non-resident investors. For instance, foreign investors face a positive
probability that they might have difficulties in repatriating their investments or that their
holdings might be expropriated altogether. Foreign investors thus have lower expected
returns and might appear less diversified than domestic investors, especially if these risks
do not materialize. The other type of implicit barriers to international investments is
information asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors. There are several
potential sources for these asymmetries, most of them focusing to some extent on the
different costs of acquiring and processing information across investors. For example, if
non-residents face higher informational costs, they would consequently be less informed
about a country and its firms. Moreover, because of a higher variance of their predictive
distribution, foreign investors would also invest less in that country than its domestic
residents. Investors might also process information differently because of cognitive and
behavioral biases. One possible behavioral bias is explored by Shiller, Kon-ya, and Tsutsui
(1990). They provide survey evidence that domestic investors are generally more
optimistic regarding expected returns in their own market than foreign investors. This
would clearly imply a pattern of home bias in cross-country investments. Another bias is
explored by Merton (1987) and Huberman (2001). They argue that investors tend to invest
in firms that they are familiar with. If this were indeed the case, we could expect foreign
investors to hold more assets from firms well-known abroad, e.g. large exporters.
Although somewhat successful in explaining some feature of the home bias puzzle,
not all these explanations can address the firm-level aspect of international portfolio choice.
Many arguments made in the literature have implications for investors' choice of assets
across countries only. For example, some direct barriers such as capital controls affect all
firms within a country in the same way. Therefore, it cannot explain differences in
portfolio holdings between domestic and foreign investors within a given country, a widely
documented fact.2 Alternatively, deviations from the international CAPM can only lead to
2 See for example Kang and Stulz (1997) for an analysis of Japanese markets and Dahlquist and Robertsson
(2001) for the Swedish market.
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predictions on firm-level investments if there are clearly stated and strong assumptions
about the reasons behind hedging demands.3 Even arguments using implicit barriers, such
as political risks, might have limited implications for investments at the firm-level.
Nonetheless, implicit barriers, and information asymmetries in particular, do play an
important role in explaining differences in firm-level investment patterns between
domestic and foreign investors.
An extensive literature documents a preference among foreign investors for large
firms, a characteristic interpreted as a proxy for information asymmetries. For example,
Kang and Stulz (1997) analyze differences in the portfolio composition of domestic and
foreign investors in Japan. They present some evidence that foreign investors prefer to
hold assets from larger firms, and controlling for size, from firms with higher export sales
and with greater share turnover. Moreover, they show that here is a cost to foreign
investors of over-investing in large firms - they face more volatile returns than if they held
the market portfolio. The results are interpreted as an indication that information
asymmetries are important, as a model in which foreigners know less about small firms
would be able to fit these findings. Similarly, also in favor of information asymmetry
stories, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) find evidence that U.S. investors prefer
geographically close investments. Focusing on institutional investors, Falkenstein (1996),
Gompers and Metrick (2001), and Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki (2003) document a
foreign bias as well - i.e. foreign investors' preference toward larger firms. Taken together,
these results suggest that foreign investors dislike information asymmetries.4 Nevertheless,
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) argue that these preferences for larger firms are not
particular to foreign investors, but distinctively of institutional investors. They analyze the
portfolio holdings of different types of investors in Sweden and find that institutional
investors, independent of their nationality, tend to hold assets from larger and more visible
firms. In other words, they document an institutional investor bias.
3 We are not aware of any well-specified hypothesis for state-variable risks predicting that investors hold
home biased portfolios.
4 See also Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2001), Covrig, Lau, and Ng (2005), Edison and Warnock (2004), Chan,
Covrig, and Ng (2005), among others.
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In this chapter, we investigate further this institutional investor bias. The hypothesis
is that there is actually heterogeneity in this bias across institutional investors with
different investment mandates. The analysis sheds light on the extent that information
asymmetries affect the portfolio decisions of different institutional investors. Chapter 2 of
this thesis documents the growing importance of Global funds in recent years. Thus,
understanding the market frictions that affect their portfolio choices and how these
frictions have evolved over time is important for both individuals (who supply funds) and
firms and countries (which demand funds). For individuals, it might help improve the
performance of their savings invested through mutual funds. For borrowers (firms and
governments) in developing countries, imperfect international diversification in developed
countries due to information asymmetries restricts the set of policies that can facilitate
access to foreign finance.
We focus on portfolio decisions by U.S. mutual funds from 1997 to 2004. In this
industry, managers have different mandates: there are Global funds, that can invest
anywhere in the world, and Specialized funds, that can invest in particular regions or
countries. These managers can be considered equally sophisticated and skilled, and hence
can be assumed to have similar preferences. However, they might not be equally informed
about the regions they are allowed to invest in. Managers with different mandates might
have different costs and benefits in gathering and processing information. For example, a
Global fund manager has lower benefits to learn about Latin America than the manager of
a Latin America fund (Specialized) because she does not have to invest 100% of her
portfolio in that region. Therefore, we test the hypothesis that information asymmetries are
more pronounced in the investment decisions of Global funds than in that of Specialized
funds. The empirical evidence presented here suggests that this is indeed the case.
Following an extensive literature, we use firm size as a proxy for information
asymmetries - the larger the firm, the less exposed to these frictions a firm is. However,
firm size, through its correlations with other variables, might be capturing other effects that
are not purely related to information asymmetries, and therefore need to be controlled for.
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First, firm size is positively correlated with liquidity. If institutions turnover their portfolio
often and are large relative to foreign stocks, they might prefer firms with high liquidity
and low transaction costs. 5 For example, Perold and Salomon (1991), Lowenstein (1997),
and Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2003) argue that a large asset base might erode
performance because of trading costs associated with liquidity or price impact. In this case,
firm size would not be capturing any effects related to information asymmetries. Therefore,
it is important to control for them. Second, we address other direct and indirect barriers to
international capital flows. Firm size is significantly correlated with foreign listings for
example - larger firms are more likely to have international activity. In other words, the
shares of large firms might be more easily available abroad through ADRs for example.6
This would imply that asset holders of large firms would face fewer indirect barriers to
international investments. Furthermore, firms adopting these discretionary policies also
make themselves more attractive to foreign investors by overcoming institutional
shortcomings of their home country. Hence, foreign investors could hold assets from these
firms because of improved shareholder protection or because of lower barriers. None of
these possibilities are directly related to information asymmetries and are thus controlled
for. Lastly, we also analyze whether firm size is capturing Merton's (1987) familiarity
effect. Firm size could be simply a proxy for visibility through their correlation with
exports: larger firms are also more well-known. Although an interesting point to be
analyzed, it is not essential to the main argument of the chapter because it is an
informational asymmetry argument.
Nevertheless, any residual effect of firm size on mutual fund portfolio choices is
interpreted as evidence of information asymmetries. For example, there are no controls in
the analysis that allow us to identify, or even capture, differences in costs related to
information acquisition and information processing across investors types. Firm size still
captures these effects. We thus test whether these residual effects are significant and
different across mutual fund mandates. As already explained, the argument relies on
5 See for example, Schwartz and Shapiro (1992).
6 American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are claims against the ordinary shares traded in the home market.
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managers with different mandates facing different costs and benefits in gathering and
processing information. As the investment mandate becomes broader, informational costs
for a specific region becomes higher and benefits lower. Therefore, Global fund managers
would prefer to invest in firms less prone to information asymmetries than Specialized
fund managers. We do find strong evidence that there is indeed a heterogeneous size effect
across investors' mandates. Hence, our results suggest that information asymmetries vary
across institutional investor mandates, being significantly more pronounced for funds with
broader mandates.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes our data. Section 3.3
presents a bivariate analysis of firm characteristics and mutual fund holdings. Section 3.4
reports the multivariate analysis with logit and poisson models with over-dispersion
(negative binomial models) of the determinants of mutual fund holdings. Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2. Data Description
In this chapter, we focus on U.S. equity mutual funds that are established to purchase
assets around the world. Funds that focus primarily on a debt-equity allocation are
excluded from the analysis, even though they do invest a significant share of their
portfolios in foreign stocks. We use two types of data in our empirical analysis: mutual
fund holdings data and data on firm attributes.
Mutual fund holdings data is available from Morningstar International Equity
Mutual Funds, a private company that collects mutual fund data, and from the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Reports are published on a monthly basis
since 1992.7 However, mutual funds do not disclose their holdings as frequent. They do so,
at most, on a quarterly basis, and typically bi-annually. Given this heterogeneity in the
releases of holdings, we construct our database with the last reported portfolio information
for each fund for any given year. For example, our sample of mutual fund holdings for
7 We analyze Morningstar reports from March 1992 to June 2006.
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2005 contains portfolio data for the Fidelity Worldwide fund, with portfolio holdings as of
October 2005, and portfolio data for Scudder Global fund, with portfolio holdings as of
December 2005. We collect detailed information on portfolio holdings: stock names,
amount invested in each stock by each fund, and country of origin of these holdings. 8,9
Mutual funds are classified according to their investment mandates: World Stock
funds, Foreign Stock funds, Emerging Market funds, Latin America and the Caribbean
funds, Asia and Pacific funds, Europe funds, and Country funds. World Stock funds can
invest anywhere in the world, whereas Foreign Stock funds can invest anywhere except the
U.S. Hence, funds classified as either World Stock or Foreign Stock funds, are also called
Global funds throughout this chapter. All other fund types, as their name suggest can
invest in a specific set of countries/regions, and are thus denominated Specialized funds, as
they invest in a subset of assets that can be held by Global funds.
The other type of data collected is firm characteristics on a yearly basis. We use
three types of data: balance sheet data, information on foreign activity (i.e. whether and
when a firm issues ADRs), and trading data. We collect firm-level balance sheet data from
Worldscope (Thomson Financial Company). This constitutes our "universe" of firms
covering the period 1997-2004.10
On foreign activity, we have data from the Bank of New York, which covers the
three major stock exchanges in the U.S.: NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. The Complete
DR Directory contains the list of current DR programs and the effective date of each
program. However, to account for DR programs that were terminated during the 1997-
8 Some families sell the same portfolio to investors under different names depending on their fee structure.
Here, we count them as one. For example, Fidelity Advisors Funds had the following funds in 2005: Fidelity
Advisors Latin America A, Fidelity Advisors Latin America B, Fidelity Latin America T, etc. These funds
have a different fee structure and are thus treated differently by Morningstar. However, because they all hold
the same portfolio, we consider them as being the same fund for our purposes.
9 A difficulty in constructing this database is that holdings for each fund are reported separately. Moreover,
stock identifiers are rarely available, and if so, are not always unique. We do match these holdings across
mutual funds over time based on the country of origin and the stock name for each security holding.
However, the country of origin is available for the 1997-2005 period only. We thus do not attempt any
matching of holdings for earlier periods.
10 Although data on U.S. mutual fund portfolios is available for 2005, we have limited access to firm-level
data from Worldscope for that year.
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2004 period, we use an additional database, also provided by the Bank of New York,
which lists all terminated DR programs. These two databases allow us to determine
whether a firm has issued ADRs on any year in our sample.
Lastly, firm-level domestic stock market trading data comes from Standard &
Poor's Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB), which was formerly collected by the
International Finance Corporation. The EMDB provides data on domestic market
capitalization and domestic value traded in current U.S. dollars by firm. Although the
EMBD is the most comprehensive database on firm-level trading of equities around the
world, the EMDB focuses on emerging markets and does not include 100 percent of local
firms (e.g., while varying by country, the EMDB typically covers about 70 percent of
market capitalization). Given the importance of trading activity for our analysis, we restrict
our sample to firms from developing countries. Therefore, the list of countries covered is
the following: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hong Kong,
Hungary, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovakia,
South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. It should be noted that Hong
Kong has been included in our database because of Chinese firms listed in its exchange.
However, the results documented here are robust to its exclusion from the sample.
3.3. Firm Characteristics and Mutual Fund Portfolio Holdings
In this section, we describe in more details our sample of mutual fund holdings, specify the
balance sheet variables considered, and analyze the relationship between mutual fund
holdings and firm characteristics, especially across mutual fund types.
Our sample of mutual fund portfolios was analyzed in great details in the previous
chapter. Nevertheless, Table 3.1 summarizes its main characteristics. As already mentioned,
we classify mutual funds as Global or Specialized funds. There are on average 727 funds in
any given year on our sample, out of which 471 are classified as Global funds, and 256 as
Specialized funds. Moreover, Global funds are also larger than Specialized funds. They
manage US$802 million on average, whereas Specialized funds have average net assets
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under management around US$222 million. Thus, once the size of these funds is taken into
account, Global funds are even more important than Specialized funds, being almost four
times as large as Specialized funds. Table 3.1 also reports the average number of mutual
fund holdings. Global funds usually hold more assets than Specialized funds, 179 vs. 122
holdings. However, in developing countries, the reverse is true. Specialized funds invest in
72 firms on average in any given year and Global funds invest in only 21 firms. In other
words, a considerably large proportion of the number holdings of Specialized funds in
developing countries are not shared by their Global counterparts. In the rest of the chapter,
we analyze to what extent the portfolio of these funds differ from one another and what it
implies about the market frictions that affect their portfolio choices.
To characterize the portfolio holdings of these mutual funds, we analyze balance
sheet data at the firm-level. Based on an extensive literature characterizing portfolio choice
with balance sheet data, the following attributes are considered: firm size measures (market
capitalization, total assets, and total sales), performance variables (price-to-book value
ratio and price-earnings ratio), a prudence variable (dividend yield), and financial health
variables (return on assets, leverage, and current ratio)." We have grouped these variables
into 4 categories according to their effect on portfolio choice.
1. Market capitalization: this is the market value of a firm's shares at the end of the fiscal
year, measured in US$ million. In the regressions, we consider the log of the market
capitalization.
2. Total assets: measured in US$ million. In the regressions, we consider the log of a
firm's total assets.
3. Total sales: measured in US$ million. In the regressions, we consider the log of a firm's
total sales.
4. Price-to-book value ratio: this is a valuation measure of the firm, capturing historical
returns. "Growth" firms typically have high price-to-book value ratios, whereas "value"
" See for example Falkenstein (1996), Kang and Stulz (1997), Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), and
Gompers and Metrick (2001), among many others.
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firms have low ratios. This ratio is defined as the market value of equity at year-end
divided by the book value of equity.
5. Price-earnings ratio: it is also a valuation measure of the firm calculated as the market
value per share divided by earnings per share. A high P/E ratio suggests that investors are
expecting higher earnings growth in the future in comparison to companies with a lower
price-earnings ratio.
6. Dividend yield: this is the value of dividends paid during the fiscal year divided by the
market value of the firm at year-end. Stocks paying higher dividend yields are considered
safer as they guarantee some income to its holders. Also, there might be institutional
restrictions on holdings of assets that do not pay dividends.
7. Return on assets: this is the net income divided by total assets at year-end.
8. Leverage: it captures a firm's financial vulnerability in the long run. It is calculated as
the ratio between total liabilities to total assets at year-end.
9. Current Ratio: this is a proxy for short-term financial distress, measuring a firm's
ability to meet its short-term payment requirements. It is calculated as current assets
divided by current liabilities at year-end.
Table 3.2A describes the attributes of firms on mutual fund portfolios. Our universe
of firms include 9,501 firms, out of which 1,982 have received investments from Global
funds and 3,710 firms have received investments from Specialized funds at some point in
the sample. This is simply re-states the evidence on mutual fund holdings presented in
Table 3.1 - Specialized funds invest in a greater number of firms in developing countries
than Global funds. The average firm size in our sample is US$417 million in market
capitalization, US$1,062 million in total assets, and US$385 million in total sales.
However, the average size of firms in mutual fund portfolios is significantly higher,
independent of the proxy considered. Global funds invest in firms with an average size of
US$1,460 million in market capitalization for example, more than three times as large as
the sample average. Specialized funds also hold significantly larger firms: US$1,013
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million in market capitalization. This data is consistent with the existence of an
institutional investor bias, as both fund types hold assets from firms that are significantly
larger than the market portfolio.
On the other hand, the two performance variables show that the typical firm in the
portfolio of mutual funds does not deviate significantly from the average firm. If dividend
yield is considered though, mutual funds invest in firms with slightly lower values than the
average firm in our database. The results on financial health variables are somewhat mixed.
Mutual funds pick firms lower leverage but higher current ratio, which suggests that they
give greater weight to financial vulnerabilities in the long run than in the short run. Mutual
funds also seem to prefer firms with higher return on assets. These results are consistent
with what has been reported in the literature. For example, Kang and Stulz (1997) and
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) also find that foreign investors prefer firms with low
dividends and firms with large cash positions on their balance sheets.
The results in Table 3.2A also provide preliminary evidence on our main
hypothesis of heterogeneity in foreign portfolio holdings across institutional investors with
different investment mandates. More specifically, we focus on the hypothesis that
information asymmetries are more pronounced in the investment decisions of Global funds
than in that of Specialized funds. Managers from both Global and Specialized funds can be
considered equally sophisticated and skilled, and hence are assumed to have similar
preferences. However, they might not be equally informed about the regions they are
allowed invest in. Managers with different mandates might have different costs and
benefits in gathering and processing information.
Following an extensive literature, firm size is a proxy for information
asymmetries. 12 As reported in Table 3.2A, Global funds hold assets from firms that are
significantly larger than that on the portfolio of Specialized funds, corroborating our initial
hypothesis. If other firm attributes are considered, Global funds prefer firms with higher
12 See for example Falkenstein (1996), Kang and Stulz (1997), Dahlquist and Robertsson, (2001), Edison and
Warnock (2004), and Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005), among many others.
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price-to-book values and higher leverage if compared with Specialized funds, although the
results are significant only at 10% level.
Next, we further explore the evidence on heterogeneous firm size across the
portfolios of mutual funds with different mandates. In Table 3.2B, we show the average
firm size in the portfolio of Global and Specialized funds on a yearly basis since 1997. The
top panel reports the average values for market capitalization, the middle one for total
assets, and the bottom one for total sales. These cross-sectional results support our
hypothesis as well. The average firm in the portfolio of Global funds is significantly larger
in than that on the portfolio of Specialized funds, the only exception being on 2004.
Moreover, the results are robust to the different measures of firm size.
This table also supports the existence of an institutional investor bias. Typically,
firms in the portfolio of mutual funds are on average significantly larger than the average
firm on our database." 3 It should be highlighted that the evidence in Table 3.2B also
suggests that information asymmetries might have become considerably worse in recent
years, especially in the last two years of our sample. In 1997, the average size of firms in
the portfolio of mutual funds was not even twice that of the average firm in the full sample,
independent of the proxy used. However, in 2004, mutual funds held firms that were at
least five times as large as those in our universe of firms!
3.4. Multivariate Analysis
To disentangle the various relationships found, we run multivariate regressions. Ideally, we
would like to analyze the impact of firm-level variables on ownership measures. The
standard ownership measure used in the literature is constructed as the number of shares
held by certain investors (e.g. domestic or foreign investors) divided by the total number of
outstanding shares at a given point in time. As described in Section 3.2, Worldscope
reports the number of outstanding shares on a yearly basis. However, our database on
holdings is not as consistent - portfolio holdings are reported on different dates. Therefore,
" Although not reported, results from these tests are available upon request.
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we are not able to construct an ownership measure given that numerator and denominator
are measured at different points in time. Hence, we focus on two other variables. First, we
focus on a dummy that equals one when a firm is held by a certain mutual fund type, and
zero otherwise. In this case, maximum-likelihood logit models are estimated. Alternatively,
we use count data: we count the number of funds with a certain mandate that holds assets
of a given firm in a certain year. This count data contains evidence of over-dispersion, and
thus negative binomial maximum-likelihood models are estimated. 14 Both variables
capture the relevant information for the purposes of the analysis conducted here. We are
able to quantify the impact of firm-level attributes on the portfolio choice of mutual funds,
although we will not be able to measure their impact on the size of mutual fund
investments.
For both types of regressions, we estimate multivariate models dividing mutual
funds according to their mandate: Global and Specialized funds. This multivariate setup
accounts for any residual correlation between the equations for different investor types. We
are thus able to perform hypothesis tests on the estimated coefficients across equations.
3.4.1. Determinants of Mutual Fund Holdings
To analyze the determinants of mutual fund holdings, we run multivariate regressions with
firm-level attributes as explanatory variables. These are pooled regressions including the
whole sample from 1997 to 2004. Country and year dummies are included in these
estimations, and standard errors are clustered at the industry level. We present the first set
of results in Table 3.3A, where constants and fixed effects are not shown.
In the first column of the table, we show the estimated maximum-likelihood logit
model. Remember that our dependent variable is binary. Hence, this regression measures
the probability of a positive outcome, i.e. the probability that a given firm in a certain year
is part of the portfolio of either Global or Specialized funds. The reported coefficients can
14 A poisson model assumes that the mean and the variance of the count data are equal. However, in our
dataset, the variance is considerably larger, making the negative binomial model more appropriate.
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be interpreted as the effect on the log of the odds ratio of a unit change in the independent
variable. The odds ratio shows the strength of the association between a predictor (a firm-
level attribute) and the response (likelihood of being part of mutual fund portfolio).
Moreover, an odds ratio of one means that there is no association between them. 15
The results are very similar to the ones on the bivariate analysis. Firms with higher
market capitalization are more likely to be in the portfolio of mutual funds, a finding
consistent with the institutional investor bias. Mutual funds are also more likely to invest in
assets of firms with lower price-to-book values, i.e. their odds ratio increase as the price-
to-book value falls. Although not reported, the results are strongly robust to the other
proxies of firm size. 16
The results in Table 3.3A also support our main hypothesis of differences in
foreign portfolio holdings across institutional investors with different investment mandates
with respect to firm size. The odds ratio for market capitalization is 3.28 in the regression
explaining holdings of Global funds, a number significantly larger than one. This means
that an increase in US$ 1 million in a firm's market capitalization, improves the odds of
being held by a Global mutual fund in 3.28. For Specialized funds, these odds increase by
only 2.58. A Wald test can reject the hypothesis that these effects are equal. In other words,
firm size is a stronger determinant of whether a Global fund holds assets from a certain
firm than it is for Specialized funds. This is the same as saying that Global funds hold
assets from larger firms than Specialized funds do. Moreover, firm size is the only firm
attribute that is significantly different across mutual fund types. We could not reject the
hypothesis that the other characteristics are equal across the two estimated equations.
In the second column of Table 3.3A, we show the estimated maximum-likelihood
negative binomial model. We can interpret the negative binomial regression coefficient as
follows: for a unit change in the predictor variable, the difference in the logs of expected
15 There is a direct association between the reported coefficients and the odds ratio: the log of the odds ratio
is equal to the estimated coefficients.
16 In order to save space, we only report the results in which market capitalization is a proxy for firm size for
the rest of the chapter. Results considering total assets or total sales are available upon request.
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counts of the response variable is expected to change by the respective regression
coefficient, given the other predictor variables in the model are held constant. In our case,
the dependent variable this time is the number of mutual funds, Global or Specialized, that
hold assets from a certain firm at a given point in time. Hence, the estimated coefficients
mean that a unit change in a firm characteristic increases the number of funds that invest
on that company if the estimated coefficient is positive, where the coefficient value
measures the magnitude of such increase.
The results for the negative binomial model are similar to the ones obtained using a
logit model with respect to the firm size effects across mutual fund types. The number of
Global mutual funds with positive holdings increases significantly more than the number
of Specialized funds with positive holdings as firms get larger. In other words, Global
funds tend to hold firms that are considerably larger than the firms held by Specialized
funds. In this regression, the portfolios of Global and Specialized funds also differ with
respect to return on assets and leverage.
Next, for robustness purposes, we estimate logit models on a yearly basis instead of
the pooled-sample regression. 17 The results are reported on Table 3.3B. Once more, the
outcome of these regressions is comparable to the results shown in the previous section.
The heterogeneous size effect across mutual fund types is consistently significant over
time. All other firm attributes are not consistently different across portfolios of different
mutual fund types. They might be relevant for a short period of time though, as the
dividend yield in the first years of our sample. Therefore, the results reported in Tables
3.3A and 3.3B support our hypothesis that information asymmetries are more pronounce
for Global funds than for Specialized funds.
Furthermore, as highlighted with the simple bivariate analysis, firm size affects
considerably more the portfolio choice of mutual funds in the later part of the sample,
independent of their mandate. We performed Wald tests of whether the effects of firm size
17 The firm size effect on the negative binomial model is also robust to these cross-sectional estimations and
not reported to save space. The other effects are not robust and change considerably with the sample.
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were equal in 1997 and 2004 across mutual fund mandates. The results are shown in the
last column of Table 3.3B. The null hypothesis was strongly rejected at 1% level. This
evidence suggests that information asymmetries might be getting worse over time.
3.4.2. Information Asymmetries in Mutual Fund Portfolios
Following the literature, we have used so far firm size as a proxy for information
asymmetries - the larger the firm, the less exposed to these frictions a firm is. The results
shown in the previous sections thus support our hypothesis that Global fund managers
prefer to invest in firms less prone to information asymmetries than Specialized fund
managers. However, firm size, through its correlations with other variables, might be
capturing other effects that are not purely related to information asymmetries, and
therefore need to be controlled for. Therefore, the goal of this section is to identify and
control for these other effects on mutual fund portfolio choices captured by firm size.
3.4.2.1. Transaction Costs and Liquidity
First, firm size is positively correlated with liquidity. If institutions turnover their portfolio
often and are large relative to foreign stocks, they might prefer firms with high liquidity
and low transaction costs. 18 For example, Perold and Salomon (1991), Lowenstein (1997),
and Chen, Hing, Huang, and Kubik (2003) argue that a large asset base might erode
performance because of trading costs associated with liquidity or price impact. In this case,
firm size would not be capturing any effects related to information asymmetries. Therefore,
it is important to control for both liquidity and transaction costs.
It should be noted that liquidity might also be capturing an aspect of information
asymmetries: the less informed about a particular region/country a manager is, greater the
incentives to hold assets from more liquid firms because of lower transaction costs.
However, we cannot distinguish these two effects without information at the fund level.
IS See for example, Schwartz and Shapiro (1992).
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Given the methodology followed here, this is not possible. We thus have no strong prior
about the impact of liquidity across mutual fund mandates.
We interpret the residual effect of firm size on mutual fund portfolio choices as
evidence in favor of information asymmetries, given that only one particular aspect of it
might be captured by the liquidity controls. For example, liquidity should not be associated
with different costs of processing information. Hence, we test whether these residual
effects are significantly different across mutual fund mandates.
To control for price impact, we use a country-level transaction cost variable
measuring market impact from Elkins/McSherry. This market impact variable is calculated
by comparing trades to the volume-weighted average price (VWAP) on a given trade
day. 19 The reported values are the yearly averages of the principally weighted loss to the
VWAP. We use the log of the turnover ratio at the firm-level to control for liquidity effects.
Turnover ratio is defined as the number of traded shares during the year divided by the
total number of outstanding shares.
The results are shown in Tables 3.4A and 3.4B for the logit and negative binomial
models, respectively. The coefficient on firm size is always significant at the 1% level.
Moreover, the Wald tests show that the effect of firm size on mutual fund portfolio choice
is still significantly larger for Global funds than for Specialized funds. The estimated
coefficients on the transaction costs control, especially on the logit regressions, indicate a
negative effect on the portfolio choice of Global funds, and to a lesser extent, an also
negative effect on Specialized fund holdings. This piece of evidence is consistent with the
fact that Global funds tend to be larger than Specialized funds, and thus might be more
responsive to market impact costs. The effects of turnover as a determinant of mutual fund
holdings are mixed. The logit regressions suggest that greater liquidity increases the
probability of being held by a mutual fund. However, the negative binomial estimations
point toward the opposite effect. The results on the literature on these effects are also
19 VWAP are calculated by calculating the ratio between all shares traded in a particular stock on a particular
day and the total principal traded within that stock.
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mixed. For example, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) document a positive relation
between foreign ownership and liquidity. On the other hand, Kang and Stulz (1997) find
mixed effects at best, with negative estimates on cross-sectional regressions. Edison and
Warnock (2004) also find a negative impact if holdings in Emerging Asia are considered.
In sum, adding control variables for liquidity and transaction costs did not change
our previous results. We still find robust evidence that information asymmetries become
more pronounced as mutual funds mandates become broader.
3.4.2.2. Other Barriers to International Capital Flows
In this sub-section, we address other direct and indirect barriers to international capital
flows. Firm size is significantly correlated with foreign listings for example - larger firms
are more likely to have international activity, i.e. be cross-listed in a U.S stock exchange.
In other words, the shares of large firms might be more easily available abroad through
ADRs. This would imply that asset holders of large firms would face fewer direct barriers
to international investments. Furthermore, firms adopting these discretionary policies also
make themselves more attractive to foreign investors by overcoming institutional
shortcomings of their home country, such as shareholder protection. Hence, foreign
investors could hold assets from these firms because of improved shareholder protection or
because of lower barriers. None of these possibilities are directly related to information
asymmetries. We thus need to control for them.
When firms issue ADRs, they not only reduce direct barriers to international capital
flows but they might also improve the information environment due to stricter disclosure
rules for example. This last effect has implications for our hypothesis. If this were indeed
the case, these firms should become more attractive to Global fund managers. Luckily, we
can distinguish between these two effects. ADRs can be basically classified into two types
for our purposes: private issues with no additional requirement on information disclosures
(Levels I and IV, which are OTC and private placements) and public issues that are
required to comply with U.S. disclosure rules (Levels II and III). Therefore, both types of
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ADRs involve reductions in the direct barriers but only the "public" type is associated with
a better informational environment. Therefore, we expect public ADRs to have a stronger
effect on the portfolio choice of Global funds than on the portfolio of Specialized funds.
But no such heterogeneity is expected from private issues.
Our second set of controls is related to direct measures of restrictions to foreign
investments: investability and closely held. Investability is a firm-level variable from
EMDB capturing the legal availability of a firm's stocks to foreigners. Closely held, a
more indirect measure, compute the percentage of outstanding shares that are held by large
shareholders, and thus are not practically available to foreigners.
The results are shown in Tables 3.5A and 3.5B for the logit and negative binomial
models, respectively. As expected, the estimated coefficients on investability are
significantly positive in all specifications for both investor types. As more shares become
legally available to foreigners, larger the probability of being held by a mutual fund and
possibly larger the number of funds with positive holdings. Our other measure of direct
restrictions on foreign holdings, closely held, is mostly not significant.
Regarding our hypothesis that Global funds are more prone to information
asymmetries than Specialized funds, the evidence in these tables provides strong support.
We capture these effects with two variables this time: firm size and ADRs. Firm size
measured by a firm's market capitalization and ADR dummies are always significant at
1% significance level for the estimated models. For both firm size and Public ADR, the
estimated coefficients are significantly larger for Global funds than for Specialized funds,
suggesting that greater effects of these variables on the portfolio choice of Global funds.
Furthermore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on Private ADRs is equal
for both mutual fund types, with the exception of one specification. These results also
corroborate the hypothesis analyzed in this chapter, since private listings do not affect the
informational environment for these firms and therefore should not necessarily have
different effects across investors' mandates.
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3.4.2.3. Information Asymmetries across Mutual Fund Mandates
In this sub-section, we include all the controls analyzed in the previous sections in our
estimations. Thus, we estimate both logit and negative binomial models with controls for
transaction costs, for liquidity, and for other barriers to international capital flows.
Although not essential to the main argument of the chapter because it is purely related to
information asymmetries, we also try to disentangle whether firm size is capturing
Merton's (1987) familiarity effect. The argument is that investors hold shares in firms with
which they are familiar and that investors are more likely to be familiar with large firms.
Similarly, Falkenstein (1996) shows that mutual funds tend to hold more shares in firms
that have a lot of news stories associated with them. Firm size can thus be a proxy for
visibility through their positive correlation with exports: larger firms would also be more
well-known. 20 Most importantly, any residual effect of firm size on mutual fund portfolio
choices is interpreted as evidence of information asymmetries. For example, there are no
controls in the analysis that allow us to identify, or even capture, differences in costs
related to information acquisition and information processing across investors types. Firm
size still captures these effects. We thus test whether these residual effects are significant
and different across mutual fund mandates. We also perform the same test on the Public
ADR variable, as it does capture a particular feature of information asymmetries, as
explained in the previous sub-section.
The estimated regressions are shown in Tables 3.6A and 3.6B for the logit and
negative binomial models, respectively. All the results previously reported are robust to the
extra controls added here. Firm size and Public ADR are always significant at 1%
confidence level, independent of the type of regression or mutual fund mandate.
Furthermore, in all of them, the coefficients on for Global funds are significantly larger
than the ones for the Specialized funds. For the logit regressions, a larger estimated
coefficient means than a unit increase in a firm's market capitalization is associated with
20 Some might argue that exports might be indirectly capturing the fear of capital controls as firms with
export sales do have a source of income in foreign exchange. Although important in debt markets, we believe
that the argument has limited scope for equity markets.
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an increase in the odds that a firm is held by a certain mutual fund type. In the case of the
ADR dummy, an estimated positive coefficient measures the increase in the odds ratio for
the case in which the dummy equals one relative to the case in which the dummy equals
zero. In other words, as firms issue ADRs publicly, they increase their probability of being
held by a Global fund. In the poisson regressions with over-dispersion, a unit increase in a
firm's market capitalization is associated with an increase in the log of number of funds
holdings assets from this firm. In either case, the implications are similar: firm size and the
issuance of Levels II and III ADRs have a greater impact on the portfolio choice of Global
funds than on the portfolio choice of Specialized funds.
The evidence based on the estimated coefficients on Private ADRs suggests a
slightly mixed picture, not as consistent as found in the previous section. Although not a
robust result, Private ADRs might also have a larger impact for the decisions of Global
funds than for those of Specialized funds. The effect of firm-level turnover is contradictory
as well. In some specifications, turnover is significant and positive, while in others
significantly negative. Once more, this is consistent with previous findings in the literature.
The effects of transaction costs are unchanged and also somewhat mixed. Transaction costs
always affect more negatively Global funds than Specialized funds; however, the
coefficients are not always significant. These results are consistent with the fact that Global
funds are considerably larger than Specialized funds. Therefore, transaction costs related to
market impact might be more relevant for them. Investability also seems to affect the odds
of being held by mutual funds, independent of their mandate.
We have introduced a new control in Tables 3.6A and 3.6B. We have added a
variable to capture familiarity effects - foreign sales to total sales. In order to support our
argument that informational asymmetries have become more pronounced as investor
mandate becomes broader, we expect foreign sales to total sales ratio to have a higher
estimated coefficient for Global funds than for Specialized funds. However, the results are
somewhat mixed. In the logit regressions, we find that its effects on Global funds are not
significant, but depending on the specification we cannot reject the hypothesis that it
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affects both fund types symmetrically. In the negative binomial regressions, the results are
more interesting, with the familiarity variable being even significantly larger for Global
funds than for Specialized funds. Once liquidity effects are considered, we do not obtain
such a positive outcome anymore, although the sample size is reduced considerably. It
should be noted though that exports is not the only variable capable of capturing the
familiarity effects. Participation in standard indexes such as the MSCI and the number of
analysts following a given firm have been used in the literature and might actually be
better measures. Thus, we believe that firm size might still capture part of the familiarity
effects, not completely covered by the control used here.
With respect to the other firm-level attributes, these tables suggest that their impact
on mutual fund portfolios is not robust across different specifications. This finding has
support on the literature. Depending on the sample used and the type of investor analyzed,
the effects of firm attributes, other than the ones described above, on portfolio choices are
not consistent.
Lastly, our results in the previous sections have suggested that information
asymmetries were becoming worse over time. It is interesting to analyze whether the same
pattern emerges in this version of the analysis, where several controls have been added. We
have performed the same tests as before: we compare the coefficient on firm size for each
investor type in 1997 and in 2004. The results are reported in the last line of Tables 3.6A
and 3.6B. With the exception of one negative binomial model specification, our tests
indicate that the effects of firm size on mutual fund portfolio choices have increased
significantly over time. We have also compared the coefficients on the ADR dummies.
However, their impact on portfolio choice has not changed over time.
In sum, the main argument in this chapter relies on managers with different
mandates facing different costs and benefits in gathering and processing information. As
the investment mandate becomes broader, informational costs for a specific region
becomes higher and benefits lower. Therefore, Global fund managers would prefer to
invest in firms less prone to information asymmetries than Specialized fund managers. We
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do find strong evidence that there is indeed such a heterogeneous effect across investor
mandates. Hence, our results suggest that information asymmetries vary across
institutional investor mandates, being significantly more pronounced for funds with
broader mandates. Moreover, we also find some evidence that information asymmetries
might have become considerably worse in recent years, especially in the last two years of
our sample.
3.5. Conclusion
The literature on home bias and portfolio choice has identified both a foreign bias and an
institutional investor bias. The first bias is characterized by foreign investors holding assets
from larger firms than domestic investors, whereas the second one goes one step further
and state that this is actually a feature of the portfolio choice of institutional investors,
independent of their nationality. In this chapter, we further analyze the institutional
investor bias. The hypothesis is that there is actually heterogeneity in this bias across
institutional investors with different investment mandates. Our main argument relies on
managers with different mandates facing different costs and benefits in gathering and
processing information. As the investment mandate becomes broader, informational costs
for a specific region becomes higher and benefits lower. Therefore, Global fund managers
would prefer to invest in firms less prone to information asymmetries than Specialized
fund managers.
We focus on the U.S. mutual fund industry, where managers have their mandates
clearly defined. Mutual funds are classified as Global or Specialized funds according to the
regions they are allowed to invest in. In the first part of the chapter, we study bivariate
relationships between mutual fund holdings and firm-level attributes, such as firm size,
leverage, and return on assets. We show that the average firm in the portfolio of Global
funds is significantly larger than that on the portfolio of Specialized funds. Following the
literature, we interpret firm size as a proxy for information asymmetries - the larger the
firm, the less prone to informational related-frictions a firm is.
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However, firm size, through its correlations with other variables, might be
capturing other effects not purely related to information asymmetries, and therefore need to
be controlled for. In the second part of the chapter, we present a multivariate analysis using
controls for transaction costs, liquidity, and other direct and indirect barriers to
international capital flows. The residual effect of firm size on mutual fund portfolio
choices is interpreted as evidence of information asymmetries. We do find strong evidence
that there is a heterogeneous firm size effect across investor mandates. Hence, our results
suggest that information asymmetries vary across institutional investor mandates, being
significantly more pronounced for funds with broader mandates.
The analysis sheds light on the extent that information asymmetries affect the
portfolio decisions of different institutional investors. However, it does not address the
consequences of these market frictions, especially once the growing importance of Global
funds is taken into consideration. Although, there is some preliminary evidence shown in
Chapter 2 of this thesis that Global funds do perform worse than Specialized funds within
the same family of funds. Moreover, we have shown some evidence that these frictions
became more pronounced in recent years. Understanding the causes of such phenomenon
is also left for future research.
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Table 3.1. Sample Description
Average No. of Average Fund Average No. Average No. of Holdings in
Funds per Year Size of Holdings Developing Countries
Fund Type:
All Funds 727 598 159 43
Global Funds 471 802 179 21
Specialized Funds 256 222 122 72
t-statistic:
Ho: Global = Specialized 8.8 11.4 23.0
This table describes our sample of mutual fund portfolios. We report the average number of funds per year, the
average fundsize, captured by their net asset under management, the average number of holdings in mutual fund
portfolios, and the average number of holdings in assets from developing countries in mutual fund portfolios.
The table also reports the t-statistic of a hypothesis test that a given fund characteristic is equal across mutual
fund types. Mutual funds are classified as either Global or Specialized funds. Global funds include both World
Stock and Foreign Stock funds. Specialized funds include: Emerging Market funds, Regional funds, and Country
funds. Data on net assets under management is in US$ million. The source of the mutual fund holdings data is
Morningstar International Equity Mutual Funds.
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Table 3.2A. Characteristics of Firms in Mutual Fund Portfolios
Universe of Specialized
Firms Global Funds Funds t-statistic
No. of Firms 9,501 1,982 3,710
Firm-Level Characteristics:
Size Variables:
Market Capitalization 417 1,460 1,013 7.66
Total Assets 1,062 3,592 2,611 7.37
Total Sales 385 1,292 983 7.12
Performance Variables:
Price-to-Book Value Ration 2.5 2.0 1.6 1.58
Price-Earnings Ratio 14.8 14.8 13.3 0.42
Prudence Variables:
Dividend Yield 5.9 3.6 4.8 0.87
Financial Health Variables:
Return on Assets 3.0 5.3 5.3 0.01
Leverage 32.5 30.3 27.6 1.46
Current Ratio 3.4 1.9 2.1 1.22
This table reports the average values of characteristics of firms in mutual fund portfolios as well as the
averages for all firms in our sample (called the universe of firms). The table also shows the total number
of firms in our sample, the total number of firms actually held by Global funds, and the total number of
firms in the portfolios of Specialized funds. We perform a hypothesis test that average firm
characteristics are equal across portfolios of different mutual fund types. The t-statistic of this test is
reported. We divide mutual funds into two categories: Global and Specialized funds. Global funds
include both World Stock and Foreign Stock funds. Specialized funds include: Emerging Market funds,
Regional funds, and Country funds. See main text for a detailed description of firm characteristics. Data
on firm size is in US$ million. The data sources are Worldscope for firm characteristics and Morningstar
International Equity Mutual Funds for mutual fund holdings.
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Table 3.2B. Average Size of Firms in Mutual Fund Portfolios
Market Capitalization
Universe of Firms Global Funds Specialized Funds t-statistic
1997 613 1,020 724 3.31
1998 472 774 695 0.39
1999 528 1,486 997 3.22
2000 395 1,316 955 2.12
2001 334 1,345 943 2.60
2002 299 1,320 827 3.88
2003 425 2,289 1,156 5.57
2004 541 2,937 2,724 0.63
Total 436 1,492 1,037 7.16
Total Assets
Universe of Firms Global Funds Specialized Funds t-statistic
1997 1,577 2,607 1,992 2.63
1998 1,392 2,532 2,055 2.00
1999 1,010 2,853 2,105 3.07
2000 959 3,277 2,584 2.31
2001 850 3,334 2,645 2.19
2002 930 4,065 2,650 3.80
2003 1,039 5,259 2,738 5.84
2004 1,206 6,606 6,173 0.42
Total 1,063 3,670 2,670 7.05
Total Sales
Universe of Firms Global Funds Specialized Funds t-statistic
1997 512 851 670 2.86
1998 488 884 718 2.14
1999 358 975 731 2.96
2000 351 1,192 969 1.82
2001 310 1,373 1,104 1.88
2002 319 1,494 1,032 3.18
2003 368 1,992 1,106 5.36
2004 465 2,374 2,467 0.34
Total 381 1,331 1,014 6.73
This table reports the average size of firms in mutual fund portfolios. Averages are shown
across mutual fund types and over time. The table also shows the average firm size for the
universe of firms in our sample on a yearly basis. Three proxies for firm size are analyzed:
market capitalization, total assets, and total sales. Lastly, we perform a hypothesis test that the
average firm in the portfolio of Global funds is larger than the average firm in the portfolio of
Specialized funds. The t-statistic of this one-sided test is reported. We divide mutual funds
into two categories: Global and Specialized funds. Global funds include both World Stock
and Foreign Stock funds. Specialized funds include: Emerging Market funds, Regional funds,
and Country funds. Data on firm size is in US$ million. The data sources are Worldscope for
firm characteristics and Morningstar International Equity Mutual Funds for mutual fund
holdings.
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Table 3.3A. Determinants of Mutual Fund Holdings
Logit Model Negative Binomial Model
Fund Type: Global Specialized Global Specialized
Market Capitalization 1.187 0.950 1.089 0.95
[0.029] [0.020] [0.077] [0.018]
Price-to-Book Value Ratio -0.007 -0.010 -0.009 -0.012
[0.003] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007]
Price-Earnings Ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Dividend Yield 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.00007] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Return on Assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.0001] [0.00004] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Leverage -0.001 0.000 -0.006 0.000
[0.002] [0.00003] [0.003] [0.001]
Current Ratio -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
Pseudo R2 0.41 0.35 0.22 0.24
No. Obs. 34,449 34,445
Chi2-statistic:
Market Capitalization 89.35 4.75
Price-to-Book Value Ratio 0.64 0.26
Price-Earnings Ratio 2.32 0.02
Dividend Yield 0.11 0.56
Return on Assets 1.32 10.41
Leverage 0.85 5.15
Current Ratio 0.37 0.23
This table reports the estimation results of multivariate logit and negative binomial models of the determinants
of mutual fund holdings. Firm characteristics are the explanatory variables. See main text for more details. The
dependent variable is binary: it equals one if a firm belongs to the portfolio of a certain mutual fund type in a
given year, and zero otherwise. We divide mutual funds into two categories: Global and Specialized funds.
Thus, one regression for each fund type is estimated. This multivariate regression accounts for the residual
correlation between the equations for different investor types. The table also reports the Chi2-statistic of a
hypothesis test that the coefficients associated with a firm characteristic are equal across mutual fund types. The
table shows the pooled results over the 1997-2004 sample. The regressions include country and year dummies.
Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in
brackets.
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Table 3.3B. Determinants of Mutual Fund Holdings: Cross-Sectional Logit Estimations
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Fund Type: Global Specialized Global Specialized Global Specialized Global Specialized Global Specialized Global Specialized Global Specialized Global Specialized
Market Capitalization 0.644 01484 0.718 0651 0.943 0.819 0.896 0.997 0.963 0.812 1.043 0.652 1 196 0.642 1.336 1.286
[0 0371 0 0311 [0.0471 [0.037] [10 0531 [0.0371 1[0037] [00411 10.0361 [0.0291 [100391 [0.0271 [0.046] [0 034] [0.0481 100481
Pnce-to-Book Value Ratio -0004 -0.035 -0.046 -0 034 -0 012 -0.040 -0.015 -0009 -0)005 -0002 -0.006 -0.011 -0.008 -0.030 0.002 0.002
(0.008 [0 013] [0.019 (100171 [ 00261 [0.014] [0.0061 [0.0091 10.0061 001)1oll 0.0041 [0.0121 [0.00491 [0.0401 [0.0051 1[0.021
Pnce-Eamings Ratio 0000 0000 0000 0000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0003 -0 001 -0001 -0.003 -0.004 0000 0000 -0001 -0.001
10 001] 100011 10.00021 [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001 [0.o001 [0.001l [0.00021 [(0.01ol 110021 [00021 [000011] [0.00031 [0.0011 [0.00081
Dividend Yield 0000 0000 0000 000 0000 0.000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0.000 0.000 0,000 0000 0000 0.000
10o.ooo 01 o0001ooll [0000031 [0.0001oo] [0o.oo000o] [0o.o0001oo [0.0011 [0o0011 [01 00(31 1(000021 [o.0001 [0. 00021 [00001) 0003 [0001 [00001]
Return on Assets 0001 0004 0002 -0001 0.000 0.000 0000 001 -0001 0001 0000 0000 0 000 -0.001 0 000 0000
[(10031 10004] [0o0031 [00301 10. 0001] [00001] [0 001] [o.001 I(0.0021 [0.0011 [0.0001] [0.00021 [0.000021 10.00031 [0.oo000] Oo000
Leverage 0010 0.008 0002 0000 -0.007 0.002 -0.002 0003 -0006 0 000 -0008 0.001 -0.013 -0 004 -0016 -0015
[0(1003] [00031 [0002] [(10002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0o001 10.0031 [0000021 [0.004] [o.001l [0.003] 10.0021 100031 [100041
Current Ratio -0004 -0.003 0013 -0023 -0.017 -0.003 0.004 -0.002 0(003 0001 -0.007 -0.012 -0.007 0.008 0.000 -0.003
[0.0181 [00141 [0.0181 [0.0271 [0.0091 [0.0041 [0.0021 [100061 (10 021 0021 [0.0091 10.0081 [0.012] [0.003] 10.0021 [0.0071
Pseudo R2 017 0 11 020 0 17 032 0.26 0.30 0.33 032 0(126 029 0 16 0.36 0.16 0.42 0.42
No Obs 2.069 2.318 2.707 3.692 4.397 6.062 6.421 6.786
Chi2-statistic:
Market Capitalization 18 45 2 79 5.89 478 15.67 10787 14597 0.97
1997 vs. 2004 134 07 201.52
Pnce to Book Value 428 040 1.30 038 029 020 036 004
Pnce Earnings Ratio 027 003 6.11 1.01 021 0.41 1 69 0.59
Dividend Yield 13 40 400 2.07 509 1 94 0.22 000 0 69
Return on Assets 0.53 059 13.85 1.86 067 1.53 2.47 3 11
Leverage 0 62 2660 10.57 234 3.26 6.23 9 19 0.05
Current Ratio 000 220 1.99 1.67 141 025 1 55 0.20
This table reports the estimation results of cross-sectional multi arnate logit models of the determinants of mutual fund holdings. Firm charactenstics are the explanator) vanables. See main text for more details. The dependent varianable is binary: it
equals one if a firm belongs to the portfolio of a certain mutual fund t pe in a given year, and zero otherwise We divide mutual funds into twio categones: Global and Specialized funds Thus, one regression for each fund type is estimated This
multivanate regression accounts for the residual correlation between the equations for different investor types. The table also reports the Chi2-statistic of a hypothesis test that the coefficients associated with a firm characteristic are equal across
mutual fund types Standard errors are clustered at the industry level Heteroskedasticitt -consistent standard errors are reported in brackets
Table 3.4A. Logit Model: Controlling for Liquidity and Transaction Costs
(Fund Type:G l
Fund Type: Global
Market Capitalization
Transaction Costs: Mkt. Impact
Turnover
Price-to-Book Value Ratio
Price-Earnings Ratio
Dividend Yield
Return on Assets
Leverage
Current Ratio
Pseudo R2
No. Obs.
Chi2-statistic:
Market Capitalization
1.188
[0.032]
-0.003
[0.002]
-0.006
[0.006]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.00004]
0.000
[0.0002]
-0.001
[0.004]
0.43
Specialized
1.002
[0.023]
0.001
[0.001]
-0.010
[0.006]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0002]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.00002]
-0.003
[0.003]
0.37
(2)
Global Specialized
1.062 0.736
[0.049] [0.039]
0.226
[0.0341
-0.004
[0.006]
-0.001
[0.0002]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.002
[0.002]
-0.004
[0.003]
0.007
[0.005]
0.31
28,413
46.23
0.183
[0.031]
-0.015
[0.030]
-0.001
[0.001]
-0.002
[0.003]
0.002
[0.0021
-0.003
[0.002]
0 000
[0.002]
0.26
7,753
57.01
(3)
Global Specialized
1.040 0.801
[0.055] [0.047]
-0.004 -0.002
[0.002] [0.002]
0.225 0.194
[0.038] [0.035]
0.000 -0.010
[0.000] [0.012]
0.000 0.000
[0.0001] [0.0002]
0.000 -0.003
[0.0001] [0.004]
0.001 0.002
[0.003] [0.003]
-0.003 -0.001
[0.003] [0.001]
0.006 -0.001
[0.005] [0.002]
0.25
6,019
28.00
This table reports the estimation results of multivariate logit models of the determinants of mutual fund holdings. Firm characteristics
are the explanatory variables. See main text for more details. The dependent variable is binary: it equals one if a firm belongs to the
portfolio of a certain mutual fund type in a given year, and zero otherwise. We divide mutual funds into two categories: Global and
Specialized funds. Thus, one regression for each fund type is estimated. This multivariate regression accounts for the residual
correlation between the equations for different investor types. The table also reports the Chi2-statistic of a hypothesis test that the
coefficients associated with a firm characteristic are equal across mutual fund types. The table shows the pooled results over the 1997-
2004 sample. The regressions include country and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. Heteroskedasticity.
consistent standard errors are reported in brackets.
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Table 3.4B. Negative Binomial Model: Controlling for Liquidity and Transaction Costs
Market Capitalizatio'
Fund Typ
n
Transaction Costs: Mkt. Impact
Turnover
Price-to-Book Value Ratio
Price-Earnings Ratio
Dividend Yield
Return on Assets
Leverage
Current Ratio
(1)
e: Global Specialized
1.040 0.900
[0.069] [0.015]
-0.006 -0.002
[0.002] [0.001]
-0.003
[0.005]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
-0.004
[0.003]
-0.003
[0.002]
-0.006
[0.003]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.00002]
-0,002
[0.001]
(2)
Global Specialized
0.875 0.694
[0.116] [0.027]
-0.051
[0.020]
-0.017
[0.025]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
-0.002
[0.003]
-0.001
[0.002]
0.001
[0.001]
-0.015
[0.006]
-0.022
[0.012]
0.000
[0.0001]
-0.001
[0.001]
0.003
[0.001]
0.000
[0.001]
-0.001
[0.001]
(3)
Global Specialized
0.848 0.691
[0.113] [0.028]
-0.004 -0.002
[0.002] [0.001]
-0.059 -0.020
[0.020] [0.007]
-0.007 -0.011
[0.018] [0.004]
0.000 0.000
[0.0001] [0.0001]
0.000 -0.001
[0.0002] [0.001]
-0.007 0.001
[0.003] [0.001]
-0.002 0.000
[0.003] [0.001]
0.000 -0.002
[0.001] [0.001]
Pseudo R2
No. Obs.
Chi2-statistic:
Market Capitalization
0.24 0.12
28,407
This table reports the estimation results of poisson models of the determinants of mutual fund holdings. Firm characteristics are the
explanatory variables. See main text for more details. The dependent variable (count data) is: the number of funds within a given
mutual fund type with positive holdings in a given firm in a given year . We divide mutual funds into two categories: Global and
Specialized funds. Thus, one regression for each fund type is estimated. This multivariate regression accounts for the residual
correlation between the equations for different investor types. The table also reports the Chi2-statistic of a hypothesis test that the
coefficients associated with a firm characteristic are equal across mutual fund types. The table shows the pooled results over the 1997-
2004 sample. The regressions include year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors are reported in brackets.
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0.12
7,759
3.45
0.14
6,022
2.83
Table 3.5A. Logit Model: Controlling for Other Barriers to International Capital Flows
(1)
Fund Type: Global Specialized
Market Capitalization 1.102 0 885
[0.030] [0.021]
ADR Dummy: Public 2.879 1.911
[0.267] [0.179]
ADR Dummy: Private 1.131 1.108
[0.099] [0.094]
Investability
Closely Held Shares
Price-to-Book Value Ratio
Price-Earnings Ratio
Dividend Yield
Return on Assets
Leverage
Current Ratio
Pseudo R2
No. Obs.
Chi2-statistic:
Market Capitalization
ADR Dummy: Public
ADR Dummy: Private
-0.005
[0 003]
0.000
[0.0001]
0 000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
-0.004
[0.002]
-0.001
[0.003]
-0.008
[0.004]
0.000
[0 0004]
0.000
[0.0002]
0.000
[0.00004]
0.000
[0 00002]
-0 002
[0.002]
(2)
Global Specialized
1.036 0.669
[0.050] [0.035]
2.057
[0.156]
-0.003
[0.008]
0.000
[0.0002]
0.000
[o.oool0001]
0.000
[0.003]
-0.001
[0.003]
0.010
[0.007]
1.888
[0.133]
-0.009
[0 008]
-0001
[0.0002]
-0.003
[0.004]
0.002
[0.002]
-0.001
[0001]
0.001
[0.002]
(3)
Global Specialized
1161 0.918
[0.023] [0.031]
-0.004
[0.005]
-0.013
[0.011]
0 000
[0.0002]
0.000
[0.0001]
0 000
[0.0002]
-0.002
[0 002]
-0.001
[0.003]
-0.014
[0.005]
-0.020
[0.014]
-0.001
[0.0002]
0.000
[0 0003]
-0.001
[0.0005]
0.001
[0.0003]
-0.001
[0.002]
(4)
Global Specialized
0.979 0.625
[0.050] [0.040]
2.382 1.589
[0.321] [0.240]
0.515 0.585
[0.144] [0.138]
1.788 1.653
[0.179] [0.141]
0.038 0.044
[0.030] [0.033]
-0.001 -0.007
[0.007] [0 005]
-0.001 -0.001
[0.0002] [0.0002]
0.002 -0.001
[0.003] [0.001]
0.002 0.003
[0.003] [0.003]
-0.004 -0.005
[0.003] [0 002]
0.006 0.001
[0.004] [0 002]
0.44 0.37 0.34 0.30 0.37 0.30 0.36 0.31
34,452
69.77
14.08
0.06
7,856
72.80
22,196
65.54
5,960
47.51
7.25
0.23
This table reports the estimation results of multivariate logit models of the determinants of mutual fund holdings. Firm characteristics are the explanatory
variables. See main text for more details. The dependent vanable is binary: it equals one if a firm belongs to the portfolio of a certain mutual fund type in a
given year, and zero otherwise We divide mutual funds into two categories: Global and Specialized funds. Thus, one regression for each fund type is
estimated. This multivariate regression accounts for the residual correlation between the equations for different investor types. The table also reports the
Chi2-statistic of a hypothesis test that the coefficients associated with a firm characteristic are equal across mutual fund types. The table shows the pooled
results over the 1997-2004 sample. The regressions include country and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in brackets.
Table 3.5B. Negative Binomial Model: Controlling for Other Barriers to International Capital Flows
(1)
Fund Type: Global Specialized
Market Capitalization 0.930 0.799
[0.056] [0.018]
ADR Dummy: Public 2.145 1.010
[0.590] [0.170]
ADR Dummy: Private 1.004 0.742
[0.120] [0.065]
Investability
Closely Held Shares
Price-to-Book Value Ratio
Price-Earnings Ratio
Dividend Yield
Return on Assets
Leverage
Current Ratio
Pseudo R2
No. Obs.
Chi2-statistic:
Market Capitalization
ADR Dummy: Public
ADR Dummy: Private
-0.004
[0.004]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0003]
-0.007
[0.003]
-0.002
[0.001]
-0.008
[0.004]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0002]
0.000
[0.001]
0.21 0.23
34,445
(2)
Global Specialized
0.831 0.662
[0.114] [0.027]
1.522
[0.185]
-0.005
[0.007]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
-0.001
[0.003]
0.000
[0.002]
0.002
[0.001]
0.13
7,857
8.04
6.55
8.17
1.035
[0.084]
-0.012
[0.006]
0.000
[0.0001]
-0.001
[0.001]
0.003
[0.001]
0.000
[0.001]
0.000
[0.001]
0.14
(3)
Global Specialized
1.060 0.852
[0.063] [0.014]
-0.007
[0.005]
-0.012
[0.011]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0002]
-0.001
[0.0003]
-0.005
[0.003]
-0.002
[0.001]
0.20
22,235
112.84114.31
-0.012
[0.003]
-0.010
[0.006]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0002]
0.000
[0.0003]
0.000
[0.001]
0.000
[0.001]
(4)
Global Specialized
0.891 0.625
[0.036] [0.023]
0.938 0.578
[0.122] [0.089]
0.381 0.438
[0.095] [0.069]
1.213 0.875
[0.123] [0.084]
0.004 0.001
[0.004] [0.003]
-0.003 -0.007
[0.005] [0.004882]
0.000 0.000
[0.0001] [0.0001]
0.000 -0.001
[0.0001] [0.0001]
0.005 0.004
[0.003] [0.001]
0.003 0.001
[0.001] [0.001]
0.002 0.000
[0.001] [0.001]
0.21 0.18 0.16
5,980
69.21
24.28
0.73
This table reports the estimation results of poisson models of the determinants of mutual fund holdings. Firm characteristics are the explanatory variables.
See main text for more details. The dependent variable (count data) is: the number of funds within a given mutual fund type with positive holdings in a
given firm in a given year . We divide mutual funds into two categories: Global and Specialized funds. Thus, one regression for each fund type is
estimated. This multivariate regression accounts for the residual correlation between the equations for different investor types. The table also reports the
Chi2-statistic of a hypothesis test that the coefficients associated with a firm characteristic are equal across mutual fund types. The table shows the pooled
results over the 1997-2004 sample. The regressions include year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors are reported in brackets.
Table 3.6A. Logit Model: The Heterogeneous Size Effect Across Mutual Fund Types
(1)
Fund Type: Global Specialized
Market Capitalization 1 116 0.952
[0.033] [0.025]
ADR Dummy: Public 2.744 1.493
[0.320] [0.214]
ADR Dummy: Private 0 934 0.862
[0.113] [0.102]
Transaction Costs: Mkt. Impact -0 004 0.001
[0.002] [0.001]
Turnover
Investabilitv
Foreign Sales to Total Sales
Price-to-Book Value Ratio
Pnce-Eamings Ratio
Dividend Yield
Return on Assets
Leverage
Current Ratio
-0.004
[0 004]
0 000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
-0.001
[0.0021
-0.001
[0.003]
-0.009
[0.005]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0002]
0.000
[0.00004]
0.000
[0.00003]
-0.003
[0.003]
(2)
Global Specialized
0.951 0.702
[0.053] [0.043]
2.523 1.059
[0 342] [0 280]
0.570 0.424
[0.140] [0.133]
-0 003 0 000
[0.002] [0.002]
0.084 0.079
[0.037] [0.035]
1.531 1.405
[0.190] [0 155]
0 000
[0 000]
0.000
[0.0002]
0.000
[00001]
0.003
[0 003]
-0.004
[0 003]
0 007
[0 004]
-0.009
[0.009]
0.000
[0.0002]
-0 003
[0.003]
0.003
[0.003]
-0 002
[0 002]
0 000
[0.002]
(3)
Global Specialized
1.052 0.898
[0 046] [0.034]
2.513 1.370
[0.402] [0.309]
0.962 0.767
[0.132] [0.120]
-0.002 0.003
[0.003] [0.003]
0.002
[0 001]
-0.022
[0.0091
0 000
[0.0003]
0 000
[0.0002]
0.000
[0.00002]
-0.003
[0.003]
-0.014
[0.012]
0.005
[0.001]
-0 030
[0.015]
0.000
[0.0002]
0 000
[0.0002]
0.000
[0.0003]
0.002
[0 001]
0.000
[0.002]
(4)
Global Specialized
0.970 0.691
[0.070] [0.058]
2.308 1 070
[0 394] [0.350]
0.597 0.469
[0 180] [0 182]
-0.001 0.001
[0.004] [0.0041
0.030 0 105
[0.054] [0 049]
1.787 1.397
[0.296] [0.211]
0.004 0008
[0.003] [0.003]
-0.006 -0001
[0.007] [0 006]
-0.001 0.000
[0.0002] [0.0003]
0.000 -0.003
[0 .004] [0 004]
0.003 0.005
[0.004] [0 004]
-0.001 0001
[0.004] [0.001]
-0.007 0.023
[0.023] [0.020]
Pseudo R2
No. Obs.
Chi2-statistic:
Market Capitalization
ADR Dummy: Public
ADR Dunmy: Private
Foreign Sales to Total Sales
Market Capitalization: 1997 vs. 2004
0.45 0.38 0.35 0.28 0.40 0.32 0.35 0.27
28,413
34.57
20.83
0.41
51.52
6,019
29.93
24.14
0.84
76.04 8.38 10.48
11,831
14.65
17.13
1.94
3.63
30.06
2,906
19 19
11.20
0.36
1 85
36.85 12.20
This table reports the estimation results of multivariate logit models of the determinants of mutual fund holdings. Firm characteristics are the explanatory variables. See
main text for more details. The dependent variable is binary. it equals one if a firm belongs to the portfolio of a certain mutual fund type in a given year, and zero
otherwise. We divide mutual funds into two categories: Global and Specialized funds. Thus, one regression for each fund type is estimated. This multivariate regression
accounts for the residual correlation between the equations for different investor types. The table also reports the Chi2-statistic of a hypothesis test that the coefficients
associated with a firm characteristic are equal across mutual fund types. The table shows the pooled results over the 1997-2004 sample. The regressions include country
and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in brackets.
Table 3.6B. Negative Binomial Model: The Heterogeneous Size Effect Across Mutual Fund Types
(1)
Fund Type: Global Specialized
Market Capitalization 0.924 0.839
[0.058] [0.019]
ADR Dummy: Public 2.065 0.759
[0.602] [0 190]
ADR Dummy: Private 0.907 0.508
[0.138] [0.071]
Transaction Costs: Mkt Impact -0.008 -0.002
[0.002] [0.001]
Turnover
Investability
Foreign Sales to Total Sales
Price-to-Book Value Ratio
Price-Earnings Ratio
Dividend Yield
Return on Assets
Leverage
Current Ratio
-0 002
[0.001]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
-0.004
[0.003]
-0.003
[0.002]
-0.004
[0.003]
0 000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.00002]
-0.002
[0.001]
(2)
Global Specialized
0.712 0.612
[0.071] [0.033]
1.723 0.572
[0.412] [0.159]
0.534 0.318
[0.162] [0.079]
-0.005 -0 003
[0.002] [0.001]
-0.039 -0.020
[0.013] [0.006]
0.911 0.588
[0.183] [0.087]
0.001
[0.007]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.0001]
0.000
[0.002]
0.001
[0.002]
0.001
[0.001]
-0.007
[0.003]
0.000
[0.0001]
-0.002
[0.001]
0.002
[0.0011
0.001
[0.001]
-0.001
[0.001]
(3)
Global Specialized
0.968 0.780
[0.032] [0.020]
1.326 0.662
[0.300] [0.220]
0.722 0.506
[0.108] [0.077]
-0.009 -0 002
[0.003] [0.001]
0.009
[0.002]
-0 008
[0.011]
0.000
[0 0001]
0.000
[0.0002]
-0.001
[0.0003]
-0.001
[0.002]
-0.003
[0.005]
0.004
[0.001]
-0.004
[0.005]
0 0000
[0 0001]
0.000
[0 0001]
0 000
[0. 0005]
0.002
[0.001]
0.001
[0 001]
(4)
Global Specialized
0.869 0.618
[0.042] [0 029]
1.133 0.452
[0.207] [0.171]
0.395 0.363
[0.130] [0.093]
-0.008 -0.004
[0.002] [0.002]
-0.054 -0.031
[0.018] [0.012]
1.099 0.595
[0.206] [0.122]
0.001 0.002
[0 002] [0.002]
-0.017 -0.008
[0.010] [0.002]
0.000 0.000
[0.0001] [0.00005]
-0.001 -0.001
[0 002] [0.002]
0.000 0.003
[0.003] [0.002]
0.005 0.002
[0.002] [0.001]
0 010 0.004
[0.023] [0.013]
Pseudo R2
No. Obs.
Chi2-statistic
Market Capitalization
ADR Dummy: Public
ADR Dummy: Private
Foreign Sales to Total Sales
Market Capitalization 1997 vs. 2004
0.23 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.16
28,407
3.23
8.45
13.41
21.35 24.94
6,022
4.76
16.40
3.33
11,829
61.38
35.41
5.27
19.31
0.29 0.32 45.80 6738 21 48
2,911
67.90
62.09
0 13
0.29
17.69
This table reports the estimation results of poisson models of the determinants of mutual fund holdings. Firm characteristics are the explanatory variables. See main text
for more details. The dependent variable (count data) is: the number of funds within a given mutual fund type with positive holdings in a given firm in a given year. We
divide mutual funds into two categories: Global and Specialized funds. Thus, one regression for each fund type is estimated. This multivanate regression accounts for
the residual correlation between the equations for different investor types. The table also reports the Chi2-statistic of a hypothesis test that the coefficients associated
with a firm characteristic are equal across mutual fund types. The table shows the pooled results over the 1997-2004 sample. The regressions include year dummies.
Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in brackets.
